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This master’s thesis examines how violence against civilians has become a matter of 
international peace and security for the United Nations (UN), how the UN protects 
civilians and what social and political implications does this protection enterprise entail.  
 
The matter is of interest because civilian protection has risen from relative obscurity into 
prominence in the UN’s international peace and security agenda. Civilian protection is a 
matter of controversy, however, because it raises the thorny issues of sovereign integrity, 
use of force and impartiality, not to mention that some of the most painful peacekeeping 
experiences in the history of United Nations are related to violence against civilians. It is 
deeply political. 
 
The thesis asserts that violence against civilians has been made a matter of security. With 
this premise as its point of departure, the thesis employs a modified theory of 
securitization to examine how this status quo came to be. With the theory, the thesis 
produces an analytical narrative on how Protection of civilians, as defined and 
implemented by the UN, has recast violence against civilians as a matter of security. 
Under scrutiny are the discourses, practices and rationales of protection. 
 
The analyses show how the experiences in the field led to the securitization of violence 
against civilians. The peacekeeping practices developed as a result of the decades of 
experience have been incorporated into the ensemble of discourses and practices of 
United Nations Protection of Civilians. They expand the international peace and security 
agenda into the domestic sphere. Similarly, analysis of the UN discourse on protection of 
civilians shows who the complexity of violence against civilians serve as a premise for 
the comprehensive protection programme formulated under the Protection of Civilians 
moniker. The discourse serves to rationalize the previously developed practices.  
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How has violence against civilians become a matter of international peace and security 
for the United Nations and with what political effects? 
 
Civilian protection by peacekeepers is and has been almost from the beginning among 
the most difficult issues on the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping agenda. It raises the 
thorny issues of sovereign integrity, use of force and impartiality, not to mention that some 
of the most painful peacekeeping experiences in the history of United Nations are related 
to violence against civilians. And yet, Protection of Civilians (POC)1 has become a core 
issue of peacekeeping in matter of decades. Today, an overwhelming majority of peace 
operations are mandated to protect civilians by any means necessary. Moreover, the 
concept has been integrated into the broader peacekeeping policy framework. It structures 
the actions of the Security Council, frames operational planning and guides the quotidian 
activities of peacekeepers. Success in protecting civilians has also become a yardstick for 
measuring peace operations’ performance. Civilian protection has moved from the 
periphery to the core of peacekeeping. 
 
The UN’s long history of protecting civilians goes back to the early peacekeeping 
operations; as a consequence, civilian protection has become embedded in various 
peacekeeping techniques and technologies. One might even say that it is an ensemble of 
discourses and practices designed for a purpose, to tackle a concrete, real-world problem. 
As we know and will see in the coming pages, however, policies that are developed in 
response to a problem also frame the issue at hand in specific ways that foster specific 
ways of response. Human interventions have a way of making the world “hang together” 
(Ruggie, 1998). Yet, these interventions come with a degree of choice that concerns the 
specific frames and methods we use in tackling the problems of the world around us. Our 
interventions have effects in the world. They are thus political (Dillon, 1996). What then 
might be the choices, methods and effects involved in the formulation of Protection of 
Civilians at the UN?  
 
 
1 This thesis uses three similar yet distinct concepts: civilian protection, protection of civilians and 
Protection of Civilians. The first two refer to protection in general, whereas the third refers to the specific 
policy and discourse developed by the UN, as in UN POC discourse or POC policy. The abbreviation POC 
alone might refer to the general concept that is used outside the UN as well, most famously in the fourth 
Geneva Convention of 1949 and its additional Protocols of 1977. As will be demonstrated below, their 




This thesis takes as its point of departure the premise that violence against civilians has 
indeed become a matter of international peace and security. Or more precisely, it has been 
made security. It has been securitized. Protection of Civilians, as articulated and devised 
in the policy programme of the United Nations, is a response to this insecurity. These 
claims will be substantiated in the ensuing chapters. So, by posing a number of questions: 
 
How and when did violence against civilians become problem for the UN? How has the 
UN responded to the problem? What are the practices of protection the UN uses to tackle 
the problem of violence against civilians? What constitutes violence against civilians? 
That is, who or what is taken to threaten civilians or to put them at risk? From where do 
the insecurities emanate? What kind of (re-)organization of social and political relations 
do the perceived insecurities and their respective countermeasures entail? 
 
With the opening question and these latter questions in mind, this thesis embarks on a 
study of securitization of violence against civilians that takes into account the discourses 
and practices that contributed to transferred civilian protection from the periphery to the 
core. The result is an analytical narrative that attempts to make sense of the problematic 
laid out above with the use of UN documents and international relations literature. This 
introductory chapter situates the thesis in the field of International Relations scholarship 
and especially those parts that touch upon the subject of Protection of Civilians. This is 
followed by an outline of the thesis that summarizes the chapters to come. 
 
1.1 Situating the thesis 
This section situates the thesis within the field of International Relations scholarship on 
Protection of Civilians. It first takes mainstream bodies of literature that assess the 
efficacy and conceptual–doctrinal consistency of Protection of Civilians and then 
proceeds to critical literature on interventions and peace operations. These reviews are 
cursory rather than comprehensive and point out general tendencies in the field, which 
then allows proceeding to more specific reading of certain texts. The review excludes 
general analyses of the UN, peace operations and civilian protection in the field as well 
as analyses from other fields, such as international law. Literature on these subjects is 
burgeoning and therefore cannot be considered in their entirety here.  
 
In the mainstream studies on Protection of Civilians, a common goal is to assess the POC 




(e.g. Fjelde, Hultman, & Nilsson, 2019; Hultman, 2013; Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon, 
2013) and those who focus on the high politics of the Security Council (e.g. Shesterinina 
& Job, 2016). Another common approach is to focus on the concept of POC. The purpose 
is either to systematize it internally (e.g. Breakey, 2012a; Holt & Berkman, 2006; Lilly, 
2012; P. D. Williams, 2013) or to put it in relation with other related concepts, most often 
with R2P (e.g. Breakey, 2012b; Hunt, 2019; Tardy, 2012; P. D. Williams, 2016).  
 
The tone and attitude toward POC vary from positive (Hultman) to cautious-yet-
encouraging (Williams) to cautious (Tardy) and finally to negative (Shesterinina & Job). 
The analyses may be critical in the sense that they reveal how the POC concept fails to 
deliver (Shesterinina & Job), how it is misoriented (Williams), or how its liaison with 
other doctrines may turn dangerous (Tardy). While this review is far from complete and 
while it is sometimes acknowledged (P. D. Williams, 2016, p. 537), analyses of the 
political dimension inhering in POC seem to be largely absent in mainstream scholarship. 
The rationale of protection is taken as a given. 
 
Admittedly, analyses of the political seem to be more prominent among critically minded 
scholars. They have questioned the rationale of international regimes ever since the 1990s 
(Keeley, 1990) and showed that peace is a contested concept (Richmond, 2005). Others 
have analysed individual peace operations and showed how they might foster disorder 
(e.g. Bode & Karlsrud, 2019; Maisonneuve & Saeteroey, 2014), but are not the blunt 
instrument of a global Leviathan (Zanotti, 2011). A critical analysis of R2P showed that 
its emergence marked a turn from “deeds to words” in the sense that the concept 
rationalized UN’s international executive authority, which it had assumed and developed 
since the beginning of peacekeeping (Orford, 2011). Some see the development of 
international executive authority as a sign of police power becoming the most important 
modality (Ryan, 2011). Critical scholars have analysed numerous aspects of global 
security governance and yet, critical analyses of Protection of Civilians specifically seem 
to be rather rare.  
 
This is equally true among securitization scholars. Analyses of the securitization of 
humanitarianism (Watson, 2011) and the erosion of indistinctiveness (Vaughn, 2009) are 
the rare examples that are even remotely related to the topic of the present thesis (one 
reason for this rarity might be found in section 2.1 below). Critical constructivist studies 




& Karlsrud, 2019; Maisonneuve & Saeteroey, 2014), while the discourses, practices and 
rationales in the field seem to receive less attention. In sum, numerous analyses of the 
POC concept and practice exist in mainstream literature, but they ignore the political 
aspects of protection. Critical scholars, in turn, have analysed several aspects of the 
politics of global governance, including peace operations, but Protection of Civilians 
seems to have remained oblivious to them. 
 
There is one notable, and recent, exception to this general silence: Marc Doucet’s (2017) 
Reforming 21st Century Peacekeeping Operations: Governmentalities of Security, 
Protection, and Police. Doucet’s analysis is a book-length treatise on the rationales 
underlying the key peacekeeping concepts of security sector reform, Protection of 
Civilians and policing. The study is located within the critical security studies tradition 
and, as the title suggests, he employs a Foucaultian approach, which is also central for the 
rendition of securitization theory used in this thesis. Moreover, his analysis of policing in 
peace operation follows similar ideas as the ones presented in chapter four below. 
Doucet’s arguments regarding POC deserve further explication if only to distinguish it 
from the present work. 
 
Doucet’s central argument is that dead or alive, civilians are part of the governmental 
rationale that guides UN’s efforts to protect civilians under the Protection of Civilians 
moniker (p. 100). He notes that the concept of civilian has become universal in the sense 
that the status of civilian guarantees one the rights and protections afforded by 
humanitarian and human rights laws (p. 105). This has not always been so, as “non-
civilized” peoples were previously deemed unworthy of these rights and protections (see 
Mégret, 2006). Combined with the obligation to protect civilians irrespective of the source 
of the threat (meaning that peacekeepers might have to fight against the host state’s 
authorities), the promise of protection seems universal.  
 
It however appears to be impossible to deliver on this promise, which has led the UN to 
rationalize its failures to protect with the use of several caveats (see section 3.1 below), 
and to manage recipients’ expectations (p. 117). Those who fall through the cracks of 
protection are incorporated to the protection programme with the use of casualty counts 
that are used to improve protection (p. 119). Protection itself, in Doucet’s reading, is 
guided by the logic of policing that emphasizes maintenance of order through the 




argues that the policing logic has led to the blending in of military and police functions 
as the former are now frequently assigned with public order tasks (pp. 114–115).  
 
The chapters below raise many same or similar points and I am inclined to agree with 
Doucet’s analysis of the United Nations Protection of Civilians. When our readings 
concur, I will acknowledge this and when they do not, I will comment on Doucet’s 
reading. The present thesis thus supplements Doucet’s study at these points. The 
differences are mostly matters of nuance, but I think it is important to acknowledge any 
possible similarities so as to avoid unnecessary confusion between two works that are 
rather similar in approach and entered the public domain within a relatively short time. 
There is, however, a gap where the present thesis can make a more significant 
contribution, which is the domain of insecurity. Doucet does not consider what the UN 
POC defines as insecurity. But as the coming chapters argue, this is a central part of the 
rationale of United Nations Protection of Civilians dispositif. Here, the explicit use of 
securitization theory proves its utility.   
 
1.2 Outline of the thesis 
Now that the research questions and other preliminaries have been presented, this thesis 
begins by laying out the theoretical framework, which is built on the theory of 
securitization. More specifically, this thesis uses Jef Huysmans’ modification of the 
original theory that expands the notion of securitization and makes the theory more 
nuanced. The chapter also proposes to start the analysis of securitization from 
problematizations; that is, the moments when violence against civilians and the responses 
to it have been called into question. The overall purpose of the framework is to provide 
tools for the construction of an “analytical narrative” that explains how the securitization 
of violence against civilians has come about and gives an account of the politics of 
protecting civilians. 
 
Before moving to the problematizations, Chapter 3 presents the policy of Protection of 
Civilians, as conceived by the United Nations Secretariat together with the Departments 
of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support. The first section presents the purview of 
the policy, its stipulations on the use of force, and the rationale of protection, which is 
based on the three-tiered structure of protection activities and the risk-assessment 
approach to protection. Then the chapter advances an alternative reading of the concept 




ensemble of security discourses and practices that has emerged from the UN’s decades of 
peacekeeping experiences. 
  
Chapter 4 and 5 offer two takes on the problematization of violence against civilians – 
one historical, the other discursive. They examine how the governing of international 
peace and security and protection of civilians in particular have been called into question. 
The historically oriented Chapter 4 explores the historical trajectories of civilian 
protection, militarization and policing and how they have shaped UN peacekeeping. With 
the use of peacekeeping literature and UN documents, the chapter shows how these three 
trajectories and their root-problematizations of violence against civilians, adequate force, 
and disorder have shaped UN peace operations and civilian protection. Moreover, the 
chapter shows how the problematizations have blended into one another. The blending-in 
of the problematizations has led the UN peace operations to adopt a logic of policing that 
expands the practices of protection beyond the traditional remit of international peace 
and security.  
 
In contrast to the preceding chapter, Chapter 5 turns to the United Nations’ discourse on 
violence against civilians. The chapter analyses Secretary-General’s report series on the 
protection of civilians in armed conflict to identify how the UN perceives armed conflict 
and what are the insecurities that threaten civilians. The chapter concludes that the UN 
perceives armed conflict and insecurities as complex and interdependent, which 
necessitates the comprehensive protection programme presented in the POC policy. As 
such, the discourse rationalizes the expansion of peace operations purview from the 
international sphere to the domestic. It internationalizes domestic issues at the level of 
discourse, like the peace operations had done at the level of practice. In sum, chapter 4 
establishes how the existing practices of protection came about, whereas chapter 5 
demonstrates how the UN discourse of protecting civilians provides a rationale for the 
practices.  
 
The concluding chapter reviews the findings of the preceding chapters in terms of three 
key concepts of the thesis: problematization, securitization and protection. The United 
Nations Protection of Civilians discourse and policy programme, on their part, expand 
the concept of international peace and security into the domestic realm. International and 
domestic security become indistinguishable. Consequently, the jurisdiction of the UN is 




the problematizations, practices of protection, the security rationale and the principle of 
reasonable force enable the UN to penetrate deep into the vital institutions of statehood 
and pursue the Organization’s vision of good order.  
 
Before proceeding to the theory chapter, three caveats are in order. First, the thesis is 
premised on the idea that security is artificial by nature and political by function. This is 
not a comment on the reality of threats, however. Securitization theory is not a yardstick 
with which to point out “objective” threats, let alone lies. It is a framework for 
understanding where and how insecurity emanates, and how this might be politically 
significant. Thus, when speaking of for example framing of insecurities, this is not to be 
construed as a denial of the violence of armed conflict that has destroyed the life of many.  
 
Second, the thesis constantly speaks of the UN doing things without references to 
successes, failures or resistance. This is not to imply that the UN is a global Leviathan 
that reorders the world at will (see e.g. Zanotti, 2011, on this point). Neither are constant 
references to politics of protection meant to be construed as insinuations of malice or 
cynical ploys. Any question regarding ethics, benefits of the usefulness of Protection of 
Civilians and peace operations more generally deserves a nuanced evaluation. Finally, the 
thesis focuses on UN POC in general and excludes related discourses on women, peace 
and security, protection of children and prevention of sexual abuse in armed conflict. 







2 Securitization as a multidimensional process 
The primary theoretical framework to be used for analysis in the following chapters is 
based on the theory of securitization. The origins of the theory reach back to the debates 
stirred up by the linguistic turn in International Relations and the broadening–deepening 
debate in security studies during the 1980s and early 1990s.2 The former turned the social 
scientific gaze to discourses and concepts and the politics they entailed. The latter divided 
students of international security into traditionalists who wished to keep the meaning of 
security limited to national security, and reformists who argued for the broadening of the 
concept beyond non-military issues as well as deepening it above and below the state 
level (Krause & Williams, 1996). At stake in these debates were nothing less than the 
criteria for legitimate security knowledge and the acknowledgement that making reality 
intelligible in terms of security has political implications (Huysmans, 2006, pp. 16–26). 
 
Securitization theory engaged in each of these debates. First, it applied a linguistic 
approach to the concept of security and re-conceptualized it as a social construction, or 
an artificial status constituted by the speech act of securitization (Buzan, Wæver, & de 
Wilde, 1998, pp. 23–24; Wæver, 1995, p. 55).3 Second, in a nod to the traditionalists, 
securitization theory posited that security was a matter of survival. Security status implied 
existential gravity, which distinguished security from other statuses. Often, the survival 
of political order was seen as the primary referent object. The state in particular was 
thought to give the concept of security intelligibility that other referent objects could not 
(Wæver, 1995, pp. 48–49), although the possibility of other referent objects is explicitly 
acknowledged too (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 8). Finally, securitization theory also nodded to 
the direction of reformists by acknowledging that matters of non-military nature may 
become matters of security, provided that they were perceived as threats to survival 
(Wæver, 1995, pp. 51–53). Together, these premises form the basis for charting relations 
between perceived threats and their respective referent objects across different security 
sectors.4 
 
2 The history of the theory has been accounted many times and it is not necessary to repeat it here. For an 
examination of securitization theory as part of the broader field of security studies, see Buzan and Hansen 
(2009). The debates revolving around securitization theory and critical security studies have been analyzed 
in detail by for example the C.A.S.E. collective (2006), Vuori (2011) and Wæver (2004).   
3 To be precise, it was ‘security’ that was originally considered a speech act (Wæver, 1995, p. 55), but for 
example Vuori (2011, pp. 134–135) has argued it is more logical to think of security as a status and 
securitization as the act of constituting the status. 
4 The concept “security sectors” is part of the broader framework of “Copenhagen School of security 
studies” that builds it research program on three core ideas: securitization, sectors and regional security 





From these premises the securitization theory derived the “grammar of security”: An 
existential threat is asserted, which is followed by a demand for the immediate 
deployment of emergency measures without regard for the normal rules because 
otherwise the threat would wreak its havoc (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 33). When the 
securitization move is successful – that is, when it resonates sufficiently enough with its 
audience – it brings forth a new, shared social reality in which something or someone is 
considered an existential threat to something or someone valued. Together the perceived 
gravity of the threat and the value of the referent object justify measures that would 
otherwise be considered illegitimate. A successful securitization thus opens the possibility 
of altering “inter-unit relations” in the given political field. In case the insecurity is 
institutionalized, the emergency measures will have lasting effects. (ibid., pp. 24–28.) The 
normalization of the unthinkable distinguishes securitization from mere politicization 
because it implies intensity that normal politics lack. And in this sensitivity to the special 
nature of securitization lies the value of the theory; it encourages critical evaluation of 
security speech. 
 
Since the tumultuous debates in the 1980s and 1990s, securitization theory has become 
widely popular in IR and beyond. Its utility in analysing the politics of security on the one 
hand and its ambiguities on the other have spawned numerous approaches within the 
general framework (see Balzacq, Léonard, & Ruzicka, 2016). Among these is the one 
developed by Jef Huysmans (2006, 2014). His approach shares the basic premise of the 
original theory that sees security as a socially constructed status with inescapable political 
implications. However, whilst acknowledging the discursive side of securitization, his 
approach is more interested in bureaucratic practices of rendering insecurity. Moreover, 
his version of securitization theory posits that insecurities come in different forms, some 
of which are of less-than-existential gravity.  
 
 
environmental, military and societal security on the basis of their assumedly distinct patterns of threat 
relations. This is argued to reduce unnecessary complexity. (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 8.) Despite its centrality 
for the original securitization theory, the present thesis makes no use of sectors for two reasons: First, as 
critics such as Jef Huysmans (2006, pp. 80–83) have noted, sectoral thinking risks the “reification” of threat 
relations, which could obscure the complex situations from which insecurities emerge. The second problem 
with sectoral thinking arises from illogical construction of sectors. This point will be elaborated below in 





The present thesis uses Huysmans’ version of the securitization theory, as presented in his 
books The Politics of Insecurity (2006) and Security Unbound (2014). Section 2.2 below 
presents Huysmans’ ruminations and contextualizes them with the use of relevant 
literature. The following and final section is dedicated to methodological matters. It 
establishes the basic premise and ties the concept of securitization with that of 
problematization to create a tool for the identification of individual instances of 
securitization. It then discusses briefly the method and research materials used in the 
empirical chapters. But before moving on to Huysmans’ theory, the connection between 
security and protection must be established. 
 
2.1 Security and protection 
Securitization theory is not primarily concerned with peace operations. In fact, in their 
“framework book” of securitization theory, Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde 
even denied that such operations could be considered as security measures. They posited 
that humanitarian interventions and peace operations are “routine world order activities” 
and therefore they “cannot be viewed as concerning existential threats to their states or 
even as emergency action in the sense of suspending normal rules” (Buzan et al., 1998, 
pp. 22, 49). States contributing troops to peace operations are not acting against existential 
threat that threatens the troop contributing state and therefore peace operations are not 
matters of military security. The statement is not a key component of the securitization 
theory, and I may have the luxury of hindsight, as peacekeeping is not what it was in the 
1990s. But as Buzan (2008, p. 553) repeated the statement a decade later, the position begs 
a reply. I argue this position is untenable even within securitization theory’s own 
parameters and then posit that protection is integral to securitization.  
 
As noted, Buzan et al. (1998) deny peace operations being matters of military security. 
Later in the framework book, however, they state that the UN Security Council 
resolutions invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter constitute “very clear instances” of 
securitizing moves in the political sector (ibid., p. 149). The problem is that the authors 
did not consider the eventuality of a resolution that invokes Chapter VII and deploys a 
peace operation to maintain or restore international peace and security by any means 
necessary. Such a resolution would in the authors’ reasoning fulfil the threshold of 
securitization both in the political and military sectors, but there are no criteria with which 
to adjudicate between the sectors, especially if both the threat and the response were of 





Moreover, the statement lacks in nuance. The first under-nuanced detail is the remark that 
peace operations are not emergency measures because the troops are not acting against 
threats of their respective home countries. This is true, peacekeepers are not acting on 
their home country’s behalf. But when recruited to a peace operation, peacekeepers 
become hired guns who are working for the UN. In other words, they become the UN’s 
military for the duration of their deployment, acting against insecurities the UN has 
designated as threats to international peace and security. It is unclear why the authors 
think the UN cannot be a securitizing actor in the military sector, while in the political 
sector it can.  
 
Further still, peace operations are thus emergency measures deployed to contain threats 
to peace and security. An overwhelming majority of operations is authorized under 
Chapter VII, which triggers an international state of exception where rules protecting 
sovereign integrity are relaxed. Here I undoubtedly enjoy the benefit of hindsight, as the 
book was written more than two decades ago when operations of this kind were rarer. Yet, 
even then, let alone by 2008, the argument was simplistic, if not entirely without 
foundation. As will be discussed in Chapter 4 below, the UN had commissioned and 
deployed peace operations of its own under Chapter VII by the latter half of the 1990s. 
The second peace operation ever deployed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo was 
even closer to the kind of securitization envisioned in the original theory.  
 
The final point of contention is that when Buzan, Wæver an de Wilde dub peace 
operations as routine world activities, they do not take into consideration their concept of 
“institutionalized securitization”, that is, security issues around which looms a stable 
sense of menace and in response to which permanent bureaucracies have been created 
(Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 27–28). Arguably, the UN has identified such insecurities and 
established bureaucracies to manage them. Violence against civilians is one of these 
insecurities, and the UN POC as well as peacekeepers’ POC policy are the clearest 
markers of this, as will be elaborated further in chapter three.  
 
Yet, it is not just UN POC and its policies that participate in securitization. There is a 
deeper, conceptual connection between security and protection, which connects the two 
in the abstract: Securitization refers to the assertion of an existential threat, which then 




political field. In other words, securitization implies protection, because the emergency 
measures are taken to secure the valued referent object. Furthermore, as with security, 
different conceptions of protection shape the politics of protection; is the protector to 
shield herself, or maybe she is to contain the protégé. Different conceptions of protection 
introduce different techniques and technologies of security into play (Bigo, 2006b). Thus, 
contra the original securitization theory, protection, and for example UN POC as its 
manifestation, is a matter of security and therefore suitable object of study. Now, after 
this note, it is time to move on to Huysmans’ rendition of the theory. 
 
2.2 Securitization – from speech acts to multidimensional processes 
Originally, securitization theory focused on the social construction of existential dangers 
via speech acts. When successful, such constructions permit the use of emergency 
measures without due regard for normal rules and might ultimately cause more permanent 
changes in the fabric of society. While the basic premise of the theory holding that security 
is a socially constructed status is now widely shared, some of the theoretical commitments 
and ambiguities of the securitization theory have resulted in lively debates about the 
precise nature of security, how it is brought about, and what in fact does the social 
construction of (in)security entail politically.  
 
An amicable critique from Jef Huysmans (2006, 2014) has challenged and refined the 
securitization theory on four grounds: 1) the locale of securitization, 2) the conduit for 
securitization, 3) the politics of (in)security, and 4) the nature of (in)security. The sub-
sections below examine each at a time. 
 
2.2.1 The locale of securitization 
The first point of contention concerns the locale where securitizations take place. The 
original securitization theory was built on the idea of securitization speech acts. The word 
act, or its plural acts, draws one’s attention to a singular instance of something, or a series 
of singular instances, in this case securitization speech acts. This turns the securitization 
analysts’ gaze toward discourses that are in plain sight, often public spectacles and grand 
declarations of existential danger by authority figures. (Although one must bear in mind 
that for the original theory securitizations did not result from such declarations alone, but 
from an assertion of a threat, its acceptance by a relevant audience, and the alteration of 





Huysmans’ contention here is not that public framing of threats is unimportant. To the 
contrary, these framings may generate a sense of unease and thereby contribute to 
securitizations (Huysmans, 2006, p. 54). Rather, the problem is that such understanding 
of securitization lacks nuance. For Huysmans (2006, p. 153), securitization is “a 
multidimensional process” that is more subtle than explicit speech acts; it embeds an issue 
into a context in which skills, expert knowledge, institutional routines as well as 
discourses of danger frame an issue as an insecurity. This is what he calls a domain of 
insecurity where the security status is constituted by “the political and institutional 
framing of policy issues … in terms of security rationality” (ibid., p. 4). The locale of 
securitizations is thus not simply the public fora. Securitization takes place just as much 
in the workings of security experts and their methods of evaluating risks and insecurities. 
 
An example of insecurity domain at work can be found in Chapter 4 below, which 
analyzes the discursive construction of insecurities in the Secretary-General’s POC 
reports. The report from 2001 frames the issue of displacement as an insecurity not 
because it places civilians in harm’s way, but because the possibility of armed elements 
hiding among civilians risks the spread of armed conflicts thus jeopardizing regional 
stability and because displacement en masse might disturb “delicate ethnic balances”.5 
Displacement in this imaginary is thus not dangerous in and of itself, but because it feeds 
other insecurities. In other words, displacement becomes intelligible as a matter of 
international security because it has been embedded into a context that implies insecurity. 
 
2.2.2 The conduit for securitization 
Huysmans’ second point of contention concerns the primacy of language in the analysis 
of securitization processes. As the discussion on insecurity domains suggests, discourses 
alone cannot account for securitizations. Often the discourse-based approaches make the 
argument that discourses constitute our social reality and therefore have power effects in 
the real. Yet, the power of discourse often remains at the level of assumption, thus leaving 
the discourse-based approaches inadequate. (Huysmans, 2006, p. 91.) Anna 
Holzscheiter’s (2014) sobering summary of the problem at the heart of discourse analysis 
and accounts of power is worth quoting at length:  
Discourse approaches are very strong in … exploring how structures of signification 
and discursive formations shape social life and to account for how patterns of meaning 
 




and discursive practices change through communicative interaction. However, in 
seeking to do more than that, IR discourse analysts, again, seem to sit uncomfortably 
between positivist epistemology and constructivist ontology. (p. 157, emphasis added) 
As a result, she continues, discourse approaches fail to establish “a direct link between 
particular types of communication and communicative behaviour and the impact of these 
practices on their social environment” (ibid.).  
 
The same arguably applies to securitization theory, which is why Huysmans has focused 
on techniques of government – policy programmes, techniques, technologies and other 
devices of security experts, which shape and empower discourses. In so doing, he has 
turned to Michel Foucault, and his significant studies on the rise of the administrative 
state and the modern art of governing peoples in the early modern period. For the French 
historian of systems of thought, government refers to the “conduct of conduct” and 
“action upon actions”, which “structure the possible field of action of others” (Foucault, 
2002, p. 341). It has “population as its main target and apparatuses of security as its 
essential mechanism” (Foucault, 2007, p. 108).6  
 
An apparatus, or a dispositif, of security refers to an ensemble of discursive (knowledge) 
and non-discursive (techniques) elements that are conjoined in a specific moment in time 
for a specific purpose (Foucault, 1980, pp. 194–195). The essential function the dispositif 
is to deal with harm so that it “cancels out the reality to which it responds— nullifies it, 
or limits, checks, or regulates it” and thereby ensures the continuing of beneficial 
circulations and blocking of harmful circulations (Foucault, 2007, pp. 19, 47). The security 
dispositifs in some early modern European states, for example, harnessed the newly 
developed knowledge of the state, statistics, in combination with the technology of police 
to manage populations in a manner that fosters benevolent internal order while still 
optimizing the development of state’s resources (ibid., pp. 313–326). Governing 
populations through the use of an ensemble of knowledge and bureaucratic techniques is 
an activity for the optimization of resources and performance. 
 
 
6 To be precise, there is a disconnect between Foucault’s ideas of security and governmentality. In the first 
three lectures of the Security, Territory, Population (2007) lecture series, Foucault theorizes security in 
relation to other forms of power he had analyzed previously. He suspends the idea ultimately, however, and 
the subject of the lecture series shifts to governmentality in the fourth lecture. For a more detailed analysis 




Little explication is required to incorporate the notion of dispositif into Huysmans’ theory 
of securitization and ultimately with UN civilian protection. The primary components of 
this explication are the governmental rationale and the security rationale that operates 
within it. They guide the working of the dispositif. Security rationale defines “the logic 
of security practice, of how security practice modulates objects of government, integrates 
fragmented events and developments, and introduces specific technologies” to counter 
insecurities (Huysmans, 2006, p. 147). Discerning security rationales of the object under 
analysis shows us how security discourses and practices are woven together to make 
insecurities visible and governable.  
 
Governmental rationale, as the upper category, refers to  
a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can 
govern; what governing is; what or who is governed), capable of making some form of 
that activity thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom 
it was practised. (Gordon, 1991, p. 3; also Huysmans, 2006, p. 93)  
To compare, both rationales refer to rationales of organizing power and both involve 
discourses and practices. But whereas the former is concerned with tackling insecurity 
specifically, the latter approximates to what below is referred as the “vision of the 
political” – that is, the vision of social and political organization embedded in security 
discourses and practices. Both security and governmental rationales shall be examined 
(though rarely invoked explicitly) in Chapters 4 and 5, roughly with the division of labour 
that empirical sections deal with the security rationales while discussion parts discern the 
overall governmental rationale inhering in UN civilian protection. The outcome is that 
the analysis of security rationales reveals what the UN civilian protection conceives as 
insecurities, while the analysis of governmental rationales explicates their political 
consequences. The empirical parts analyse the tackling of insecurities while the 
discussion parts explicate the political meaning of the empirical parts.  
 
2.2.3 The politics of (in)security 
Huysmans emphasizes the inevitably political nature of security. The original 
securitization theory also acknowledged the political nature of security in its reference to 
changes in “inter-unit relations”, but Huysmans offers a more nuanced reading of the 
politics of securitization. In the 1990s, some of the notable political theorists of security 
had noted how the politics of security is not limited to mere naming of threats. Instead, 




questions, such as those concerning who we are and who we are not (Dillon, 1996, pp. 
34–35; also Connolly, 2002), and who or what are the legitimate subjects (or in 
securitization theory’s vernacular, referent objects) of security (Walker, 1997). When such 
questions are approached in terms of security, the answers to these questions tend to be 
consolidated in the sense that it is no longer acceptable to question them. Security 
becomes the securing of our fundamental view of the world and what is precious in it. It 
offers a “constitutive account of the political” (ibid., p. 69). 
 
Taking his cue from these thinkers, Huysmans (2006) argues that security is not just one 
sector among others, but that the politics of (in)security entail a vision of the political. In 
his later work, for example, he explores the familiar concerns of how security policies 
enact democratic limits (Huysmans, 2014). His concern lies not so much in explicit 
violations of democratic rule than in the way in which existential and diffuse modes of 
securitization organize social and political life around enmity, danger, risk and suspicion. 
Operating at many levels of society, securitization tends to relativize democratic 
principles and thereby undermine them. The analytical point here is to show how 
securitizations are not only struggles over the “true” meaning of security, but that they 
“articulate and invest in social relations certain imaginations of the political” and thereby 
envision “the political organization of social relations” (Huysmans, 2006, pp. 11, 13). 
 
2.2.4 The nature of (in)security  
Huysmans engages in the debate concerning the nature of security and especially whether 
security signifies an existential danger. As noted above, the original securitization theory 
conceptualized security in this manner. The authors of the original theory derive the 
threshold to existential danger from international security studies and use the threshold 
as a device with which to identify authentic securitization moves (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 
21; Wæver, 1995, pp. 52–53). Conversely, a reference to danger is not a securitization move 
if it is not alleged to threaten the very survival of the referent object in question. This 
position has drawn much criticism from those who share the idea of security as an 
artificial status but hold that it operates through other modalities besides the existential 
one. In spite of this, Ole Wæver (2011, p. 468) has warned against straying from the “tight 
conceptual core” of securitization theory – i.e. speech acts alleging existential danger – 
because it is precisely the fixed form that makes it possible to identify securitization 
moves in any given sector. He responds to a critique from Huysmans by asking: “If the 




see these new forms of security and know that they are security?” (ibid., p. 473). The 
question deserves an answer if securitization theory is to be used in later chapters.   
 
The critique of the existentialist framing of security arises from both empirical and 
theoretical sources. For example, in her analysis of the securitization of the African 
continent by the Blair government in the United Kingdom, Rita Abrahamsen (2005, p. 71) 
posits that the gravity varies in a scale ranging from risk to fear, without ever reaching 
existential gravity. She sees securitization more as a mundane risk management based on 
policing, rather than soldiering (ibid.). Similarly, Scott Watson (2011) argues that an a 
priori commitment to security as an existential danger would ignore the routinized state 
practices taken in emergency situations. In his view, securityness arises from a “threat-
urgency modality” rather than existential gravity (ibid., pp. 7–8). Claudia Aradau (2008) 
advances a more theoretical critique, but ends up adopting a conception of securitization 
that is resembles the previous two. For her, securitization can refer to “undesirable 
events”, which trigger security measures that may not always amount to extraordinary 
measures envisioned by the original theory (ibid., p. 91). Following James Der Derian, 
then, she rejects the a apriori commitment to security as an existential danger as 
unfounded (ibid.) 
 
Despite the differences, the crux of these critiques seems to boil down to the same 
problem: a theory of securitization that is built on an a apriori commitment to security-
as-existential danger is only nominally nominalist because on the one hand it maintains 
that the theory is agnostic of what ought to be securitized, while on the other it predefines 
security as implying existential insecurity by default (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 34). Here, the 
problem is, as Felix Ciută (2009) has noted, that such ambivalence might result in a 
situation where the analyst’s conception of security supersedes that of the securitizing 
actor. The critique points out that irrespective of the inherent agnosticism, the analyst has 
a say in what constitutes security after all. This is precisely what happened, as noted in 
the previous section, when the authors of the original theory stated that humanitarian 
intervention and peace operations do not fall within the purview of securitization theory.   
 
 
2.2.5 Existential and diffuse securitization 
Jef Huysmans has engaged in this debate by developing the idea of two modalities of 




former, Huysmans (1998b) was among the first, along with Michael Williams (2003), to 
point out the family resemblance between securitization theory’s existential threat and the 
political theory of Nazi Germany’s crown jurist Carl Schmitt.7 Huysmans used Schmitt’s 
(1985) “political theology” to elaborate the concept of the political in securitization theory. 
Schmitt’s theology holds that the true marker of sovereignty is the capacity to decide on 
the state of exception, which is triggered by the identification of a mortal enemy. For 
Schmitt (2007, p. 35), the declaration of a mortal enemy distinguished politics from other 
spheres of life – it was constitutive of the political.  
 
Huysmans (2006, pp. 135–136) combined this theology with securitization theory by 
arguing that a successful assertion of an existential danger can open up a “passage to the 
limit” where the rules of the standing order lose their meaning and the polity is reimagined 
in terms of enmity. Later, he examined two mechanisms through which existential 
securitization works to bring forth the state of exception. He argued that the intensification 
of insecurity and enemy construction à la Schmitt materializes by pushing the boundaries 
of the law and by paving way for the militarization of society through an increase in state’s 
repressive capacities (Huysmans, 2014, pp. 41–59). The mechanisms underline how 
misleading a strictly Schmittian conception of security is; it asserts that securitization is 
the rendering of the standing order null and void when securitization in the existential 
mode might in fact bring about a state of exception without ever nullifying the standing 
order.   
 
In a nod to the critiques aimed at the a priori commitment to security-as-existential danger, 
Huysmans has also developed ideas on diffuse domains of insecurity, where securitization 
functions through other mechanisms than intensification and designation of mortal 
enemies. Risk is a key concept here. Following Ulrich Beck’s (1992) ideas on “risk 
society”, security scholars have also started to think international security in terms of risk, 
even to the extent that this has resulted in speculations about a nascent field within 
security studies (Petersen, 2012).  
 
 
7 It ought to be noted that whereas securitization theory and critical security scholars more broadly hold 
that security is detrimental and that normal mode of politics is preferable to securitization (Buzan et al., 
1998, p. 29), absolute sovereignty and the politics-as-enmity was the ideal for Schmitt. Schmitt’s concept 
of the political is an inspiration for critical study of security precisely because it so neatly captures the 
detrimental aspects of security. Ole Wæver (2011) has specified that the concept of the political in 




Mikkel Rasmussen (2001) was among the early IR scholars to employ Becks’ ideas on 
risk to reflect upon what Rasmussen called “reflexive security”. In Rasmussen’s view, 
what is characteristic of this risk-based security are the emphasis on management and pre-
emption, rather than elimination, of problems as the mode of government. Emphasis on 
prevention privileges future-oriented scenario-thinking. Reflexive security combines 
these features with the fear of policy solutions backfiring, which ends up harming those 
attempting to manage problems. This fear motivates the management-oriented approach 
to government. The logic is that even if policies were able to solve the original problem, 
they still result in collateral problems. Thus, in the age of risk, politics is never finished, 
and problems can only be managed. 
 
Huysmans’ concept of diffuse insecurities builds on similar ideas. He takes notice of how 
the language of uncertainty has spread across international affairs thus making risk 
management the primary mode of governing. The risk management mode expands 
security agendas almost uncontrollably because the uncertain, that which cannot 
completely be known, becomes the insecurity to be pre-empted (Huysmans, 2014, p. 79).  
Pre-emption mode does not abolish the boundary between security and non-security but 
contests it and makes it more porous. Securitization in its diffuse mode is no longer a 
process of intensification of danger, but of accumulation of uncertainty (ibid., p. 88). More 
specifically, securitization in this mode functions by accumulating uncertainty, which 
weaves suspicion into “a network of signification” that ultimately amounts to diffuse 
securitization (ibid., p. 109).  
 
Huysmans develops the notion of diffuse insecurities in the context of surveillance 
technologies, but the key point for the present thesis is that securitization can work 
through different modalities. The difference between existential and diffuse modes of 
securitization is thus that the former institutes a state of exception by asserting an 
impending existential danger, which then justifies the stretching of boundaries of law and 
the militarization of society; whereas the latter constitutes insecurity by accumulating 
suspicion, which tends to undermine checks and balances of public authority. They both 
introduce violence, fear and anxiety into political and social life. 
 
This reading of the the two modes of securitization is fairly dichotomous. As Huysmans 
notes, however, this is not to be understood as the replacement of unimodal securitization 




blend into one another even in one context (Huysmans, 2014, p. 181). It is therefore 
perhaps best to combine Huysmans’ existential and diffuse modes of securitization with 
Abrahamsen’s (2005) and Watson’s (2011) critique, and conclude that securitizations are 
recognizable by their assertion of insecurity, but the gravity of threats and risks grow on 
a scale ranging from uncertainty and suspicion to existential insecurity. This thesis does 
not develop a yardstick for measuring the gravity of various assertions of insecurity that 
are articulated in the Protection of Civilians reports of the United Nations. Rather, the 
point was to present a more nuanced understanding of securitization than that which limits 
securitization to survival. This way, the myriad of insecurities that the Secretary-General’s 
reports on the protection of civilians in armed conflict portray can be understood as part 
of the securitization of the UN POC. 
 
To summarize this reading of Huysmans’ securitization theory, 1) it begins by relocating 
securitization from public spectacles and discourses to the more anonymous workings of 
security experts and governmental techniques of security that are used to counter 
insecurities. 2) The outcome is a redefinition that expands the conduit for securitization 
from discourses to practices. 3) The modified securitization theory emphasizes the role of 
politics of (in)security in the analysis by highlighting how security is implicated in the 
organization of social and political relations. 4) Finally, the theory reconceptualizes the 
nature of (in)security so that it includes insecurities of less-than-existential gravity. 
Securityness is defined by identifying the assertions of threat–urgency modality, not the 
assertions of existential dangers. This inclusion of the concept of risk into the vocabulary 
of securitization theory further underlines how indirect possibilities of harm might 
become the object of security techniques.  
 
This section closes by paraphrasing Huysmans (2006, p. 153): securitization in the present 
thesis refers to a multidimensional process by which discourses – such as expert 
knowledge, policy definitions and guidelines, discourses of danger – and institutional 
practices – such as reporting, monitoring, and police and military techniques – frame an 
issue in terms of a threat–urgency modality, which entails changes in the broader 
constellation of social and political relations. The next section discusses methodological 





2.3 Methodological underpinnings and research materials 
The basic methodological premise of this thesis arises from the problem with which 
discourse theorists and analysts have struggled for a long time. Namely, how to explain 
the power of discourses – how might mere language have effects in the real (for an 
explication of this problem, see Holzscheiter, 2014). Academics ranging from discourse 
analysts to IR scholars have turned to the analysis of social practices to remedy the 
problem (e.g. Bueger & Gadinger, 2015; Fairclough, 2003). The basic idea is, as suggested 
in the previous section, that practices empower discourses. For example, the discourse of 
law gets its force when state’s enforcement machinery implements it. Similarly, the 
discourse of Protection of Civilians gets effects in the real when the UN embeds the 
discourse into a policy programme and instructs peacekeepers to obey it. To understand 
the securitization of violence against civilians, both must be examined. 
 
How to do this and where to begin? I propose to start with problematizations. 
Problematization refers to the relatively rare moments when the “conduct of conduct” is 
called into question in terms of a specific ensemble of discourses and practices, that is in 
terms of a dispositif (Dean, 2010, p. 38). These are the moments when something (re-
)emerges as a problem of government, something that must be controlled and therefore 
also known. For example, as will be discussed in Chapter 4 below, the second-ever peace 
operation in the Congo realized that it must rethink the principles regarding self-defence 
and use of force because of the escalating violence in the area of deployment. The 
outcome was an innovative redefinition of self-defence to include defence of mission 
mandate and to use force to maintain order. As such, problematizations are not mere 
representations calling for government for they also enable government. They do so by 
making the problem at hand intelligible in a specific manner, which then enables 
governmental intervention. (Aradau, 2008, pp. 3, 15, 18.)  
 
In the chapters below, I use this concept of problematization together with the 
securitization framework. Securitizations, as defined above, consist of discourses and 
practices that frame an issue in terms of threat–urgency modality. Particularly the last part 
of the definition of securitization is important for the identification of securitizations. 
Thus, I look for the relatively rare moments in time and place where something is called 
into question in terms of threat–urgency modality, which then serves as the starting point 
for further analysis. Once the moments have been identified, it is possible to move on to 




problematizations. In the quasi-empirical chapter four, I do so through a historically 
oriented analysis of the emergence of civilian protection and other trajectories that have 
shaped peacekeeping. Chapter five, in turn, is in effect one massive problematization, as 
it comprises of the insecurities identified in the UN Secretary-General’s reports on the 
protection of civilians in armed conflict.  
 
I apply this procedure on key UN documents concerning Protection of Civilians and peace 
operations more generally. The primary research materials consist of 15 POC reports 
published between 1999 and 2019, seven POC aide-mémoires published between 2002 
and 2018, the peacekeeping POC policies from 2015 and 2019 as well as the supplementary 
guidelines for military and police components published in 2015 and 2017 respectively. I 
supplement these with other relevant documents, such as Security Council resolutions 
and statements, Secretary-General’s reports, peace operations’ operational directives, 
peacekeeping data provided by the UN Peacekeeping database, and policies and 
guidelines authored by the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support. 
The documents were retrieved from the United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library, the 
Official Document System of United Nations, and, in case a document was not available 
in these databases, it was retrieved by through online searches.8 
 
The POC reports are the UN’s primary source of knowledge on violence against civilians 
in armed conflict. The aide-mémoires, along with Security Council resolutions, are 
normative documents, though they are not equally binding. The aide-mémoires tell the 
Council where to focus when considering matters of civilian protection, but they also 
store the consolidated language and references to important resolutions on the subject. 
This ensemble of research materials has some blind spots. For example, Secretary-
General publishes reports on conflict related sexual violence, women, peace and security, 
and children in armed conflict – all are pertinent to civilian protection. This thesis 
considers protection of civilians only at a general level, however. These sub-discourses 
are beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
The POC policies and their supplementary guidelines, finally, comprise the materials that 
the UN uses to incorporate a civilian protection perspective to the quotidian travails of 
peace operations. They tell peacekeepers how to collect intelligence in the field and how 
 




to act on it, how to intervene in different kinds of situations, how to deal with local 
authorities, how to create a protective environment and so forth. The policies and 
guidelines offer advice for the practical realization of protection. They are thus vital for 
understanding the practices of protection and their underlying rationales.  
 
The practical method I use to analyze these materials is theoretically informed, qualitative 
content analysis. It is theoretically informed because the points of interest in the research 
materials are primarily identified with the use of the notion of problematization and 
securitization theory more broadly. The notable exception to this general rule is chapter 
5, in which the reasoning is more inductive. The section focuses on insecurities, which is 
a theoretically informed choice, but the insecurities themselves arise from the research 
materials. This is the only section that (subtly) nods at the direction of quantitative 
analysis with its use of frequencies (see Hermann, 2008) to identify the distribution of 
insecurity sub-discourse across time. Here, I analyzed the research materials by the using 
qualitative data analysis software NVivo. After perusing the documents, I coded the 
insecurities in NVivo and marked their appearance and disappearance in the reports. The 
results are visualized in Table 5.1 below. I validated the distribution of sub-discourses by 
using NVivo’s text search query. The software enables the researcher to view the query 
results in context, which in turn allows one to ensure that the findings are pertinent. 
 
To conclude, the value of the conclusions drawn from the analysis does not derive from 
the generalizability of the results and they do not build into a grand theory of international 
intervention, peacekeeping or civilian protection. The value of this thesis lies in the 
“analytical narrative” which the conclusions comprise (Jackson, 2011, pp. 115, 142). In 
other words, the variant of securitization theory and the problematization procedure 
presented above are used to organize observable facts concerning UN peace operations 
and civilian protection so that they form a consistent explanation of a specific 
phenomenon. In short, they produce an analytical narrative which, I hope, renders the 






3 Protection of civilians as a contested concept 
The phrase Protection of Civilians has been in use in international affairs at least since 
1923 (Mamiya, 2016, p. 65n6). In 1999, it entered the UN parlance and since then it has 
become a highly institutionalized doctrine guiding the initiation, management and day-
to-day activities of peace operations. In spite of the institutionalization, however, the 
concept seems elusive – different actors speak differently of it and apply it in different 
ways, and a single actor may use it ambiguously. Yet, as we shall see, it is precisely this 
elusiveness that guarantees the concept’s value for UN peace operations. But the 
elusiveness also begs the question about the nature of UN POC. This chapter starts by 
presenting the concept and its basic components. It then examines why the meaning of 
POC is difficult to grasp and proposes an alternative to the more traditional approaches 
in order to facilitate the examination of security politics of United Nations’ Protection of 
Civilians. 
 
3.1 Protection of civilians as a peacekeeping doctrine 
After years of development, the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field 
Support (DPKO and DFS respectively) published the policy in 20159 that defined the POC 
concept as the use of  
all necessary means, up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at 
preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within 
capabilities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of 
the host government.10 
 
9 In 2019, DPKO’s successor, the Department of Peace Operations published an updated version of the 
policy that supersedes the version examined here (DPO, 2019). The differences between the policies are 
merely cosmetic, and the key components remain the same or highly similar, which is why the examination 
here is based on the 2015 policy. The updated version will be referenced when pertinent. The key similarities 
include: three tiers and four phases of protection; the definitions of POC and the concept “civilian” are 
almost identical; DPO maintains UN POC is “grounded in international law” and that the policy is 
consonant with peacekeeping principles; POC is a mission priority; the caveats to POC mandate are the 
same; it emphasizes the need for a comprehensive approach that includes cooperation with e.g. 
humanitarians; and finally, the policy retains the idea of exhaustion of peaceful means to protect and permits 
the use of force against host state’s authorities when needed. 
10 DPKO & DFS (2015b, para. 13). The 2019 definition reads: “without prejudice to the primary 
responsibility of the host state, integrated and coordinated activities by all civilian and uniformed mission 
components to prevent, deter or respond to threats of physical violence against civilians within the mission’s 
capabilities and areas of deployment through the use of all necessary means, up to and including deadly 
force” (DPO, 2019, para. 18). The differences are italicized. The elements that are new to the definition were 
present in the 2015 policy but were not just included in the definition. The changes are thus superficial as 




As a “whole-of-mission activity”, POC tasks belong to civilian, police and military 
components, who are to collaborate with humanitarian actors, to engage with 
communities and to take special concerns regarding women and children into 
consideration when planning and implementing the tasks.11 
 
The expression “all necessary means” suggests a variety of techniques ranging from 
peaceful to less-than-peaceful. The expression “threats of physical violence”, on the other 
hand, includes all threatening things arising from whatever source that may result in 
“death or serious bodily injury”.12 Moreover, peacekeepers are expected to protect 
civilians “no matter the scale of the violence and irrespective of the source of the threat”.13 
The concept “civilian”, in turn, refers to anyone who does not belong to armed forces or 
groups and does not directly engage in combat or has stopped doing so.14 Together, the 
components of the definition suggest a broad agenda of protection. It entails the use of 
force even against even the host state’s authorities or participation in an armed conflict if 
necessary.  
 
As Doucet (2017, pp. 115 – 118), too, notes, the policy acknowledges that UN cannot 
protect all civilians at all times. Therefore, several caveats have been included in the 
policy: First, echoing language familiar from the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept, 
the policy states that peace operations’ mandate does not prejudice the host state’s primary 
responsibility to protect, which the peacekeepers are not to assume out of their own 
accord.15 Second and third, peacekeepers are to protect civilians only within the limits of 
their capacities and area of deployment. This is to say peacekeepers are not obliged to 
respond to situations beyond their physical reach or equipment (e.g. civilian UN 
personnel are not expected to tame armed perpetrators).16 Fourth, sometimes the Security 
Council limits protection to imminent threats, although the meaning of “imminent” is 
unclear.17 Finally, what Doucet seems to miss, is the decision to protect must be based on 
 
11 Ibid., paras. 24–29. 
12 Ibid., para. 15. 
13 Ibid., para. 20.  
14 Ibid., para. 14.  
15 UN General Assembly (2005, paras. 138–139). 
16 DPKO & DFS (2015b, paras. 18, 20). “Area of deployment’ is defined only vaguely in the DPKO policies 
and guidelines. The 2015 policy and the military guidelines merely state that peacekeepers cannot protect 
civilians at all times, whereas the 2019 policy acknowledges that a missions geographical reach may be 
limited (DPO, 2019, para. 25). 
17 Imminence of the threat refers not to how close at hand the threat is in its incidence, as the word is usually 
defined, but to its identification: “A threat of violence against civilians is imminent from the time it is 




a cost-benefit calculus that takes into consideration the “nature of the threat and risk to 
civilians”, “the missions ability to address the threat”, “comparative advantages and 
expected impact”, as well as “possible negative consequences of its actions or 
inactions”.18 Thus, in spite of the definition presented above, the protection promised by 
the policy is not universal after all.  
 
The UN has realized, moreover, that civilians’ expectations sometimes exceed the UN’s 
ability to protect, which then can undermine the operation’s credibility and ultimately its 
success. In order to bring the reality of protection and expectations closer to one another, 
the authors of the policy have incorporated “expectations management” into the policy.19 
Expectations management is aimed at the civilian populations, local authorities and host 
governments. Its purpose is to clarify the limits of protection in light of international 
humanitarian law (IHL), human rights law and the caveats listed above. The policy 
proposes that public perception of and confidence in the mission ought to be monitored 
through surveys. 
 
Finally, the protection programme itself is divided into three non-hierarchical and non-
sequential tiers,20 which roughly equal to diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. 
The first tier consists of dialogue and engagement with local authorities, parties to the 
conflict and other relevant actors. The goal is to mitigate harm to civilians by mediating 
conflicts between these actors, by persuading them to avoid harming civilians, and by 
convincing them to take steps to protect civilians. The second tier, provision of physical 
protection, comprises forceful measures with which threats of physical violence are to be 
prevented, deterred, pre-empted. The last tier is concerned with the establishment of a 
protective environment through societal and institutional reform within the host state. 
 
The tiers are then located within a framework of four distinct operational phases defined 
in terms of the immediacy of the threat: prevention, pre-emption, response and 
 
2015b, para. 47). The language of imminence is not included in the policy’s definition of threat (para. 13), 
but it is sometimes used by the Security Council (e.g. resolution 1270, see UN Security Council, 1999c, 
para. 14). 
18 DPKO & DFS (2015b, para. 49). Doucet (114) does notice the reliance on risk assessments but he does 
not connect it with the caveats.  
19 DPKO & DFS (2015b, Annex A, p. 12). In the 2019 policy, expectations managements is explicitly listed 
under tier one as part of public information activities and strategic communications (DPO, 2019, para. 53). 




consolidation.21 The preventive phase is one in which threat to civilians is still emergent 
and its materialization can be prevented by means of dialogue and engagement. When a 
threat has been identified, protection enters pre-emptive and responsive modes. The 
former concerns situations where harm can still be avoided through pro-active means, 
such as posturing for deterrence, whereas the latter refers to situations where an ongoing 
infliction of harm is to be halted by force, if necessary. In post-conflict situations, civilian 
harm is to be mitigated by initiating and supporting reconciliatory processes, by providing 
development assistance and by aiding in reforming state institutions that guarantee the 
security of civilians.  
 
According to the policy, peace operations are to prioritize the phases of prevention and 
pre-emption as well as the host state’s responsibility.22 Prevention and pre-emption 
necessitate a future-oriented approach to protection that can react to protection needs 
before the occurrence of actual violence. In other words, the policy calls for a risk-based 
approach. The orientation toward future is manifest in the policy’s call for early warning 
assessments, alignment of all political and security assessments with POC goals, 
monitoring of human rights and IHL violations, identification of vulnerable groups and 
communities, and the creation of a POC threat matrix for the identification of priority 
threats.23  The information produced through these procedures can then be used to steer 
the actual prevention activities, such as patrolling, in the field. This will be done in 
accordance with the fifth caveat to the protection policy, namely, the cost-benefit calculus, 
which sets the risk to civilians in proportion to the risk to peacekeepers.  
 
3.2 Protection of Civilians as a contested concept 
 
3.2.1 The law and policy of POC  
What, in fact, is United Nations Protection of Civilians? Many analysts have taken notice 
of the overlapping and even contradictory articulations of the POC concept. Hugh 
Breakey (2012a), for instance, deduces four kinds of civilian protection – combatant POC, 
peacekeeping POC, Security Council POC, and humanitarian POC – from the praxis of 
different actors. Victoria Holt and Tobias Berkman (2006, pp. 37–42) deduce for their part 
three broad categories and six subcategories of protection from military and civilian uses 
 
21 Ibid., paras. 31–32. 
22 Ibid., para. 30. 




of POC concept. Damian Lilly (2012), finally, treads on a similar path and distinguishes 
between peacekeeping and peace enforcement POC. Yet, each of the analyses start from 
the premise that POC rests on a solid conceptual foundation. Writes Breakey (2012a, p. 
57): “Across all these perspectives, the core concerns of POC remain the same – the 
protection of the basic rights of non-combatants, as specified in IHL, from threats caused 
by large-scale violence.” In spite of the differing conceptions of POC, the analysts hold 
that there is a solid core to the concept, an essence, that separates it from other concepts. 
 
In a report from 2012, Secretary-General defines POC with a similar confidence as “a 
legal concept based on international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law”.24 The 
POC policy characterizes the policy as “grounded in international law”, which “should 
be implemented in both the letter and spirit of these legal frameworks”.25 There are further 
intertextual elements between UN POC and IHL: The former borrows its name from the 
legal instruments of IHL, that is the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and the two 
additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1977.26 The UN also uses other well-
established terminology of IHL, such as the concepts of the civilian’27, “neutrality” and 
“impartiality”28. In addition to the intertextual elements, the UN acknowledges its own 
influence on the concept, too: “The majority of the tasks mentioned in this policy are 
well-established activities in UN peacekeeping and many of them have been mandated 
and implemented for well over a decade.”29 In sum, it would appear that in the UN’s view, 
UN POC is at least built on the legal foundation of IHL. A program for the implementation 
of the law. 
 
The inter-textual elements between international law and the POC policy and its 
supplementary guidelines for military and police components seem shallow at times, 
 
24 UN Secretary-General (2012, para. 21 – emphasis added). 
25 DPKO & DFS (2015b, para. 17). 
26 Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949; 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
II), 8 June 1977. Available at: https://www.icrc.org. 
27 Like IHL, UN POC defines ‘civilian’ in the negative by delineating what it is not (DPKO & DFS, 2015b, 
para. 14; see also Geneva Convention IV, art 3.1; Protocol I, art. 50; Protocol II, art. 4.1). “Civilian” is an 
established concept in customary IHL as well (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2005). 
28 Neutrality and impartiality are used for example in connection with the “Protective Powers” and civil 
defence organizations that are appointed to implement the conventions and their protocols in times of 
international armed conflict. Principles of impartiality and neutrality set Protective power and civil defence 
organizations apart from the parties to the conflict. See Protocol I, arts. 2, 5, 61–62, 64, 67; see also the 
commentary on said articles in International Committee of the Red Cross (1987). 




however. While concepts such as “civilian” are direct loans from IHL, references to the 
fourth Geneva Convention and the additional protocols and to international refugee and 
human rights law are rare and superficial at best: the rare references to international 
treaties under the heading “Normative or superior references” are included in the POC 
guidelines for police components from 2017, but specific articles are not cited in the main 
text and references are usually assurances of commitment to uphold the law.  The POC 
policy and guidelines for military components refer exclusively to UN documents.30  
 
The scarcity of specific references to IHL may result from the fact that the conventions 
and their protocols give very few indications as to what civilian protection by third parties 
to the conflict might look like. In fact, no article in the Convention and Protocols provides 
for the kind of protection programme that the UN POC envisions. One of the rare articles 
in the fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocols that do envision active 
protection measures, is article 61 of Protocol 1 (see also International Committee of the 
Red Cross, 1987, paras. 718–744), which stipulates that civil defence organizations must 
be established to take proactive measures to protect civilians. However, they may not 
interfere in the conflict itself. But this is not how civilian protection looks like under the 
UN POC as peacekeepers may be expected to interfere in conflict and even go against the 
authorities of recipient states. 
 
What the fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocols actually do is that they 
open up the possibility of action. Article 89 of Protocol I on “co-operation in matters 
pertaining to populations in the power of a party to the conflict” provides that “[i]n 
situations of serious violations of the Conventions or of this Protocol, the High 
Contracting Parties undertake to act, jointly or individually, in co-operation with the 
United Nations and in conformity with the United Nations Charter.” A commentary based 
on the preparatory work of the diplomatic conferences and published by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross argues that the “actions to which Article 89 refers may 
consist of an appeal to respect humanitarian law… setting up enquiries on compliance 
with the Conventions and the Protocol and even, where appropriate, of coercive actions 
which may include the use of armed force (International Committee of the Red Cross, 
 
30 DPKO & DFS (2017b, p. 24). The superior references include UN Nations Charter, Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law (Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols 
of 1977), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is also noteworthy that none these 




1987, para. 3597, emphasis added). It would thus seem that the provisions in article 89 
confirm the broad discretionary powers that the UN Security Council enjoys in matters 
of international peace and security as per the UN charter. Still, Protocol 1 applies 
exclusively during international armed conflicts and the unclear relation between UN 
POC and IHL remains. 
 
The confusion seems to emanate from two discrepancies between the UN POC and POC 
under IHL: different visions of protection and different praxes and scope of protection.  
As the reference to article 61 of Protocol I above suggests, there is no vision as to how 
third parties might protect civilians without becoming parties to the conflict themselves. 
Neither is it clear that they even should engage in the protection of civilians. The UN has 
filled this void by resorting to its own conflict management techniques that have emerged 
during peace operations and legitimized them primarily through Security Council 
resolutions (these developments are discussed in chapter 4).  
 
Differences of praxis and scope arise, firstly, from the fact that Geneva Conventions and 
their additional Protocols apply only in times of international and non-international armed 
conflict,31 whereas other times are governed by other legal bodies. The protection 
programme envisioned by the UN POC is more ambitious than that of IHL, however, as 
it includes pre- and post-conflict situations (phases one and four), in which IHL does not 
apply. Furthermore, nothing in the POC policy nor Security Council practice suggest that 
the application of UN POC is limited to armed conflicts, because the POC policy is 
triggered by a Security Council mandate that is a response to a threat to or a breach of 
international peace and security, whose existence the Council alone can determine, as 
per article 39 of the UN Charter. This is supported by the existence of peace operations 
that have been mandated under Chapter VII of the Charter in response to a threat to 
 
31 According to an International Committee of the Red Cross opinion paper, an international armed conflict 
occurs when “one or more States have recourse to armed force against another State, regardless of the 
reasons or the intensity of this confrontation” (2008, p. 1). Non-international armed conflict is defined 
differently by common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and article 1 of the Protocol II. Within the 
meaning of the common article 3, non-international armed conflict may involve governmental armed forces 
and non-governmental armed groups or non-governmental groups only. The threshold of existence for non-
international armed conflict is a certain level of intensity and the level of organization of non-governmental 
forces. (ibid., p. 3.) The definition in Protocol II is more restrictive: non-international armed conflict can, 
firstly, exist only between governmental and non-State armed groups, and second, non-governmental forces 
must be able to exercise sufficient degree of territorial control in order to count as a party to conflict. (ibid., 
p. 4.) The restrictive definition is relevant only for the application of Protocol II and opinio juris on IHL is 




international peace and security but ostensibly not in response to armed conflict.32 In sum, 
the goals and temporal scope of protection in IHL and UN POC policy differ from each 
other and the connection between IHL and the policy seems ambiguous. Consequently, 
IHL cannot thus be the primary source of legality for UN POC (but by grace of Security 
Council’s supremacy it can still be legal). 
 
Considering these discrepancies, the overlap between the UN’s and international 
humanitarian law’s POC language is likely to result from some other source than an 
essential connection. More specifically, it would appear that the legal language of IHL 
legitimizes UN POC by embedding it into the pre-existing civilian protection discourse 
that wields the authority of international law. The legal language thus serves as a “cloak 
of legality” (Neocleous, 2008, p. 70), which obscures the uncomfortable fact that bending 
the sacrosanct rule of sovereign integrity in the name of civilian protection is not so much 
about the impartial administration of justice, as it is about the exercise of power.  
 
The point here is not to deny the legality of POC as articulated in the Geneva Conventions 
and their additional protocols. Neither is it to assess the legality of UN POC. Instead, the 
purpose of this sub-section was to point out the essential difference between the 
Protection of Civilians that is codified in the Geneva Conventions and their additional 
Protocols on the one hand, and the Protection of Civilians formulated in the United 
Nations policy documents and reports on the other. The difference is that between law and 
policy, an abstract principle and a plan with which the principle is applied in the real. 
Thus, as the sub-section has demonstrated, while the UN POC is quite far apart from the 
POC of IHL in letter, it does not exclude similarities in spirit. The masquerading of the 
UN POC as a legal concept, however, is problem because it obscures what the different 
conceptions of protection do politically – who or what it empowers, which actions it 
privileges as reasonable and which actions it rejects. This is also the problem with the 
 
32 Consider for example the last UN operation in Haiti, which includes only police forces and civilian 
personnel whom the Security Council mandated to “protect civilians under imminent threat of physical 
violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, as needed” under Resolution 2350 (2017, para. 13). 
The operation is also mandated to for example “assist the Government of Haiti to strengthen rule of law 
institutions in Haiti; further support and develop the [Haiti National Police]; and engage in human rights 
monitoring, reporting, and analysis” (ibid., para. 6). While it is possible that the armed FPUs find 
themselves in situations that amount to armed conflict within the meaning of IHL, it would be far-fetched 
to argue the operation is by default involved in an armed conflict when the operation is engaged in state-




analyses presented at the beginning of this sub-section; they, too, take the rationale of 
protection as a given. 
 
3.2.2 POC and discretionary power 
What use, then, does the UN POC have? As noted previously the fourth Geneva 
Convention is vague about the exact measures the UN is allowed to take. The UN Charter 
stipulates, on the other hand, that the Council has the primary responsibility of 
maintaining international peace and security (art. 24.1), the prerogative to determine “the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” (art. 39), 
and the authority to use all peaceful and coercive means necessary to restore peace (arts. 
41, 42). The Security Council’s primacy in matters of international peace and security is 
constrained only by Article 2.7 that prohibits the UN from intervening in matters that fall 
“essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”. However, Article 2.7 shall not 
prejudice the application of Chapter VII measures (arts. 39–51). This is to say that the 
Council may resort to force if it determines that international peace and security is in 
jeopardy. There is no meaningful legal recourse with which to challenge the Council’s 
decisions (Johnstone, 2016). Theoretically speaking, the Security Council thus has broad 
discretionary power to decide when, where and how international peace and security 
should be restored. 
 
What then constitutes a threat to international peace and security? Even though there is a 
degree of inconsistency in the Council’s declarations of threats to peace and security 
(Hehir, 2013), determining the existence of a threat does not happen (completely) at 
random. Certain patterns are discernible across eras. During the Cold War, for example, 
Chapter VII articles were rarely invoked and in case they were, this was done only 
tentatively. References to “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression”, 
as article 39 of the Charter puts it, were primarily reserved for intra-state armed conflicts 
(Welsh, 2004, p. 178). After 31 January 1992, however, the Security Council relaxed its 
conventions as the Council President declared that 
[t]he absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure 
international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, 
social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to international peace 
and security.33 
 




Henceforth, international insecurity would include a variety of sources of instability on 
grounds of which the Council could exert its authority.  
 
Secretary-General followed suit and endorsed a similar attitude on 17 June 1992 in his 
seminal peacekeeping document An Agenda for Peace:  
The sources of conflict and war are pervasive and deep. To reach them will require our 
utmost effort to enhance respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to 
promote sustainable economic and social development for wider prosperity, to alleviate 
distress end to curtail the existence and use of massively destructive weapons.34 
To achieve this, the Agenda goes on to argue that successful management of international 
peace and security will require adequate post-conflict peacebuilding. This would include 
measures for improving disarming former combatants, for example, but also the 
improvement of governmental institutions and facilitation of political participation.35 The 
expansion of the meaning of international peace and security will be analysed in greater 
detail in the concluding section of Chapter 5. 
 
The political significance of opening the concept of international peace and security in 
1992 is that it rendered the concept indeterminate, because various issues from non-
military sources can be interpreted to threaten international peace and security. The 
reinterpretation together with Council’s discretionary powers discussed above are 
mutually reinforcing developments as they allow the Council to expand its jurisdiction 
and to take more matters into its hands. This is underlined by the absence of meaningful 
legal recourse with which to challenge Council’s rulings. Moreover, article 12 of the 
Charter is also relevant here as it prohibits General Assembly from making any 
recommendations on a matter of which the Council is seized, unless Council so explicitly 
requests. In short, the practical consequence of the reinterpretation, coupled with these 
institutional characteristics, centralize power over matters conceived as matters of peace 
and security into the Council’s hands.  
 
Secretary-General’s subsequent endorsement of Council President’s statement is of equal 
political significance. An Agenda for Peace argued for the expansion of collective security 
instruments so that they allow intervention at every stage of conflict – before, during and 
after. The idea contained in the Agenda is that with proper engineering, peace can be 
 
34 UN Secretary-General (1992a, para. 5). 




fostered. The UN, and Security Council in particular, had thus become “the technician of 
peace”, as one early analyst noted (Koskenniemi, 1995, p. 344). Few years later the UN 
discourse Protection of Civilians emerged to offer the technician a manual for fostering 
peace by elaborating what is violence against civilians, how it threatens peace and 
security, and how to foster the latter.  
 
As will be elaborated in Chapter 5 below, the POC policy is largely in line with the 
Council President’s reinterpretation of international peace and security and Secretary-
General’s Agenda for Peace. The utility of the UN POC and the POC policy is thus that 
it reinforces the Security Council’s discretionary power over matters of peace and 
security. If the permissibility of an intervention depends on the existence of a threat to 
international peace and security, then the widened conception of peace and security, 
which is echoed in the POC policy, facilitates the reinforcement. Thus, even if the formal 
rules of the contemporary world order remain unchanged – that is, the UN Charter is not 
renegotiated – the limits of sovereignty do in fact change because UN POC centralizes 
more authority to the Security Council.  
 
3.2.3 The UN POC as a dispositif  
The centralization of authority is a major component of the politics of UN POC that the 
remainder of the thesis analyses. To facilitate this line of inquiry, two conceptual moves 
are proposed here and substantiated in later chapters. The first one is to conceive of UN 
POC as institutionalized securitization. The thesis starts from the premise that violence 
against civilians in general has indeed been securitized. The relevant markers (Buzan et 
al., 1998, pp. 24–26) are visible: a securitizing actor (Security Council) has designated 
violence against civilians as a threat to international peace and security in numerous case-
specific and thematic resolutions,36 which have justified the use of extraordinary 
measures with the consequence that inter-unit relation have been altered.37 The 
securitization of violence against civilians in the context of peacekeeping is examined in 
greater detail in Chapter 4.   
 
36 The first thematic resolution to elevate violence against civilians onto the Council agenda was resolution 
1265 (UN Security Council, 1999b). Case-specific resolutions are examined in the next chapter.  
37 While the securitization of individual instances of violence against civilians is subject to a case-specific 
Security Council resolution where violence is declared to threaten peace and security, which itself is the 
outcome of “a unique constellation of necessarily temporal factors” (Hehir, 2013, p. 156), the fact that 
violence against civilians in general has been adopted to the Council agenda means that the protection of 
sovereign integrity protection by article 2 of the UN Charter has in general been relaxed. It does not mean 





Violence against civilians is also institutionalized in the way that securitization theory 
uses the word (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 27–28): it has been incorporated into the Security 
Council agenda and the Council has even established a distinct vernacular for dealing 
with the issue, as is indicated by the Secretary-General’s POC reports and the POC aide-
mémoires that the Council consults in matters of civilian protection. The latter has even 
appended selected language from previous resolutions to ensure consistent use of 
language in future resolutions.38 These matters are further examined in chapter five. 
Furthermore, as a result of its incorporation into the UN’s peace and security agenda, 
peacekeeping has been recalibrated to better protect civilians. Thus, the UN has its 
standing bureaucracy that deals with violence against civilians, a matter that the 
securitization theory identifies as one marker of institutionalization. 
 
The second move is to conceptualize UN POC as a dispositif in the vein of Michel 
Foucault (1980, pp. 194–195), that is as an amalgamation of discourses and practices that 
are conjoined for a specific purpose in a specific point in time. Understanding this requires 
a step back and consideration of the general concept of protection of civilians. The present 
thesis starts from the premise that protection, much like “peace” (Richmond, 2005)  and 
“security” (Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver, 1995), is an essentially contested concept (see Bigo, 
2006b). There is constant rivalry over their definition. Especially in institutional contexts, 
the right to define is paramount because it grants its holder the ability to distribute 
authority and resources, for example. It is also significant because the definition of a given 
problem frames the solutions and means with which it is tackled. This, consequently, 
shapes the fate of those who become the target of these solutions and means, which, in 
the context of security politics, may sometimes be of fateful gravity. The significance of 
the definition of protection lies, thus, in the fact that it shapes the discourses and practices 
of protection.  
 
Stemming from this basic premise, POC can be conceptualized as a discursive formation. 
It is a mesh of several differing discourses emanating from different sources and contexts 
that may comprise numerous and even contradictory articulations of the object in question 
(Foucault, 1972, pp. 21–39). Just like this non-foundational understanding of concepts 
allowed Foucault to understand how come medical experts and legal officers were not 
 




“dealing with the same madmen” between and amongst themselves throughout centuries 
(ibid., p. 32), it allows us to grasp why diplomats, humanitarians, lawyers, and 
peacekeepers alike have not been talking about or doing the same thing between and 
amongst themselves since the early 1920s. Indeed, different actors may nominally speak 
of the same thing all the while referring to a different thing, as illustrated by Breakey’s 
and others’ analyses. 
 
The point is not, of course, that POC is entirely devoid of meaning, however. Rather, POC 
is understood here as a signifier with a degree of “thickness” in the sense that protection 
as a social activity implies a fixed set of social relations between a protector, a protégé 
and an insecurity (see Huysmans, 1998a, p. 228, also note 3).39 Who or what is the 
protector, protégé, and the insecurity are variables subject to change, but the setting 
remains. In other words, the social setting implied by the word protection remains fixed, 
but the question “who protects whom from what and by what means?” may be answered 
differently again and again. And if an authoritative actor (e.g. Security Council) were to 
endorse one answer in particular (e.g. the answer that has become UN POC), it is this 
particular answer that would have real-world effects when it is implemented whereas 
other articulations of the same concept lose their influence.  
 
This is the case with UN POC. As shown above, it has been adopted by Security Council, 
UN Secretariat and the DPKO. The mere civilian protection discourse that emerged 
during the 1990s has been developed into a prominent policy discourse that is articulated 
in the policy programmes and manuals which guide entire peace operations. UN POC is 
therefore understood here as a dispositif: an apparatus of international executive rule that 
comprises both discursive (rationales, knowledge) and non-discursive (social practices) 
elements that are brought together at a given moment in history to serve a strategic 
function in response to an urgent need (adapted from Foucault, 1980, pp. 194–195).  
 
To conclude, UN POC is a securitization in that it has recast an issue – violence against 
civilians – as a matter of international peace and security. It is an institutionalized 
securitization in that its existence has been consolidated in numerous resolutions, reports, 
policy programmes and manuals. They establish a distinct language of protection and a 
 
39 In the referenced article Huysmans speaks of security as a “thick signifier,” that is, a register of language 




set of practices that guide the work of UN and its peace operations. A distinct language 
and practices make UN POC a security dispositif. Securitization theory, as conceptualized 










4 UN and the problematization of violence against civilians I: 
civilian protection, militarization, policing 
The purpose of this historically oriented and the next, discursive chapter is to examine 
the securitization of violence against civilians from the vantage point of problematization. 
They seek to identify the moments when the governing of international peace and security 
and protection of civilians in particular have been called into question. The present 
chapter focuses on historical developments as a result of which civilian protection has 
emerged on the international peace and security agenda in the form it is known today. The 
time frame covers the entire timeline of peacekeeping from 1956 to the present day, but 
for reasons of space, the analysis is cursory at times. As a general rule, when the 
trajectories reach the turn of the millennium, the discussion turns to doctrinal 
development because it is the past up to and including the 1999 that explains the present 
practices of protection.  
 
As proposed in the previous chapter, UN civilian protection is a dispositif, an ensemble 
of discourses and practices of protection that has emerged over time to serve a specific 
purpose. This chapter traces the bureaucratic, doctrinal and institutional changes that give 
shape and form to the dispositif. It does not reveal a hidden history of peacekeeping as it 
relies heavily on existing peacekeeping literature. Rather, the novelty of this chapter lies 
in what it brings together; it presents a reading of three trajectories that have shaped UN 
peace operations and civilian protection. The first section charts the development of 
civilian protection from the 1960s until its institutionalization after the atrocities of 1990s. 
The next sections turn to two other processes that have shaped peacekeeping – 
militarization (increasing reliance on force and the deployment of “bigger guns”) and 
policing (the increasing role of the actor police and the activity of policing) – and 
concludes by showing how they are interlinked with the development of civilian 
protection. The next chapter continues from this by turning to the current-day discourse 
on the Protection of Civilians and examines how it rationalizes the practices of protection 
described in this chapter. 
 
4.1 UN civilian protection from the early days to the present 
4.1.1 The origins of civilian protection 
At the UN, peacekeeping as a distinct activity of sending an international ensemble of 




suffering from armed conflicts began in 1956 when the UN General Assembly established 
UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force) to intervene in the Suez crisis that had erupted 
between Egypt, France, Israel, and the United Kingdom.40 While UNEF did not have a 
mandate to protect civilians nor did it undertake any such efforts, the mission was 
consequential for the development of UN peacekeeping on the whole because it serves as 
the “blueprint” of UN peacekeeping in the UN peacekeeping imaginary.  
 
This blueprint was first articulated by the then Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld 
(1905–1961) in his summary study of UNEF. He argued that peacekeeping operations 
ought to be deployed only with the consent of the recipient state; that use of force should 
be limited to the minimum and only for self-defence; and that peacekeeping forces should 
retain their independence and impartiality.41 In Hammarskjöld’s view, peacekeeping was 
clearly distinct from enforcement and it was a non-coercive measure for the restoration 
and maintenance of international peace and security, rather than coercive. In other words, 
its constitutive basis lay in Chapter VI rather than VII of the UN Charter. As a non-
coercive tool for peace, use of force in peace operations was unacceptable in 
Hammarskjöld’s eyes because it would blur the line between peacekeeping and 
enforcement. By resorting to force, peace operations would overstep their statutory 
powers. Finally, to retain a credible posture of a neutral party keeping the peace, 
peacekeeping operations were to draw their troops from disinterested parties and to keep 
their distance to local authorities and local conflicts so that the force, nor the UN by 
extension, would not become politicized.  
 
These principles became important for the UN’s self-identification in later years and key 
peacekeeping documents published in the 2000s portray them as the “basic principles” of 
peacekeeping.42 The principles, and their re-definition, have been important for the 
militarization of peacekeeping, as will be shown in the next section, but for the present 
purposes, suffice it to note that the principles lost all their practical value already in the 
second peace operation in the Republic of the Congo. The operation, best known by its 
French acronym ONUC (Opération des Nations Unies au Congo, 1960–1964), entered 
 
40 Having boots on the ground sets peacekeeping apart from simple observation missions. The opinion 
among peacekeeping scholars and practitioners is divided whether the later should be included in the 
analysis of peace operations. The scope is limited to the narrow conception of sending soldiers, police and 
civilians to make, support, and enforce peace. 
41 UN Secretary-General (1958, paras. 155–79). 
42 See e.g. the so called Capstone doctrine (DPKO & DFS, 2008b, pp. 31–35) and the Brahimi report (UN 




Congo at a time when there was hardly a peace to keep; interfering neighbouring states 
as well as its former colonizer Belgium, whose citizens took part in the conflict as 
mercenaries, had pushed Congo to the brink of civil war (Orford, 2011, pp. 69–73). The 
chaotic situation with its dramatic incidents, such as the detention and later summary 
execution of the Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba by the Katangese 
secessionists in December and January 1960, pushed ONUC, too, to extremes.  
 
This is first of all indicated by the development of ONUC’s mandate, which had initially 
consisted of military assistance to Congolese state authorities with public order tasks,43 
but by November 1961 had evolved into de facto enforcement of ceasefires and detention 
of local and foreign (para-)military personnel (more on this in the section on 
militarization).44 Secretary-General’s thoughts on force followed the track declared in 
Security Council mandates: at first, he perceived ONUC as a force for peace, but, as 
violence escalated, he took more forceful measures into consideration as a result of which 
the nature of the operation changed (Findlay, 2002, pp. 55–57).45  
 
Similarly, the Operations Directives, in which the force commander defines the specifics 
of how to perform peacekeeping tasks, evolved gradually toward force: At first, ONUC 
was described as a force for peace, both by goals and means. An early Directive ordered 
that the peacekeepers ought to tame disputes through diplomatic means. As the situation 
escalated, however, peacekeepers’ right to self-defence was expanded so that their ability 
to use force was considerably broadened (although minimum force and due exhaustion 
of peaceful measures was still expected). They were also ordered to take more actively 
part in the resolution of local disputes. (ibid., pp. 58–61.) 
 
The civil war in the Congo raised concerns over the safety of civilians, too, as they were 
often targeted or at least collaterally damaged by armed conflicts. As a result, Secretary-
General Hammarskjöld started to take steps to protect civilians. In December 1960, by 
which time the Security Council had fallen into deadlock, he acted independently and 
authorized ONUC to take measures to protect civilians, although he did even consult 
 
43 UN Security Council Resolution 143 (1960).  
44 UN Security Council Resolution 161 (1961a).  
45 See UN Secretary-General (1961b, Annex VII). In addition, the switch of Secretary-General from 
Hammarskjöld to U Thant after the former’s untimely demise in an air crash on 18 September 1961 may 
have contributed to the hardening attitude toward the use of force. Thant’s approach to use of force is 




troop contributing countries. Toward this end, peacekeepers patrolled as part of their 
public order tasks and sought to deter violence. This marks the birth of “inter-positional 
tactics” – intervening in a situation and thereby forcing the assailant to either stop or to 
continue with the attack, which triggers the peacekeepers’ right to self-defence and to use 
force. Interposing oneself belongs to pre-emptive tactics in the current POC 
terminology.46 In mid-February 1961, ONUC established and guarded safe zones for 
civilians persecuted by state and non-state actors alike. The safe zone in Léopoldville, 
now Kinshasa, for example, attracted 280 persons in the course of two weeks.47 
Furthermore, peacekeepers evacuated alive, wounded and dead civilians out of the 
disorderly areas. (Findlay, 2002, p. 66; Wills, 2009, pp. 9–11.)  
 
The will to protect was present in the force commander’s directives, too. For instance, the 
second paragraph of Directive number six of 28 October 1960 ordered ONUC to “take all 
possible measures for the protection of life” (reproduced in Findlay, 2002, p. 412). 
Paragraph four of the same Directive also argues that while ONUC is not to intervene in 
local disputes, this does not “preclude the UN from humanitarian measures to prevent 
bloodshed”. Instead, peacekeepers should buffer against attacks by using inter-positional 
tactics (ibid.). Paragraphs nine and ten order peacekeepers to stop “lawlessness, 
bloodshed, pillaging or looting” with appropriate force after due exhaustion of other 
means. Paragraph twelve, finally, defines rogue soldiers, gendarmerie and police engaged 
in “unlawful killing of unarmed civilians or the pillaging and burning of towns and 
villages or in any flagrant violation of elementary human rights” as threats to public order 
who should be neutralized and confined to their barracks, should peaceful means fail. 
(Reproduced in Findlay, 2002, pp. 413–414.)  
 
Directive number 8 of February 1961 begins by positing that peacekeepers ought to 
prevent armed conflict by any means necessary except armed force. The Directive 
continues, however, that peacekeepers should “afford every protection”, including use of 
force, to unarmed groups, refugees of any nationality, political leaders and hostages. 
(Reproduced in Findlay, 2002, p. 414.) The language of bloodshed, which demands that 
peacekeepers do not “stand aside as passive onlookers when arbitrary acts in violation of 
 
46 See DPKO & DFS (2015a, p. 19, 2015b, para. 31(ii)). 
47 UN Secretary-General (1961a, para. 7). According to the same report (para. 8), prospective protégés were 
vetted to verify they were indeed in danger; their political activity was prohibited; and the zones would not 




human dignity, freedom and security are committed in their presence” (from Operations 
Directive no. 7, quoted in Findlay, 2002, p. 66), draws explicitly on the moral argument 
that the UN cannot just stand idly by when violence against civilians is committed. Moral 
outrage, as we have seen, was thus the primary mode of problematization of violence 
against civilians in the early peacekeeping experiences. The problematization was 
primarily concerned with the protection of civilians in immediate danger and hence the 
protection envisioned by the Secretary-General did not go beyond inter-positional tactics 
and safe zones.  
 
Violence against civilians had thus become a problem for the UN in the Congo. Impetus 
for the problematization emanated firstly from Secretary-General’s moral indignation. 
Indeed, Hammarskjöld argued to the Security Council that violence in the Congo was no 
longer a mere internal dispute the UN could ignore and that the “senseless slaughter of 
civilians” could not be an excuse for non-intervention (Findlay, 2002, p. 69). This line of 
argument is not that dissimilar from later rationalizations of civilian protection.48 Civilian 
protection was also rationalized as part of ONUC’s “general responsibility” that flowed 
from the mission mandate to maintain law and order. In so doing, he was able to draw on 
the fact that the Security Council too had sanctioned these activities.49 In sum, for the UN, 
protecting civilians had a moral value, but it was also seen as part of keeping good order. 
At this point, however, the problematization resulted only in the inter-positional tactic 
and safe zones that provided protection against immediate threats. Structural violence had 
to wait. 
 
All in all, the Congo experience was a harrowing one for the UN; the vicious conflict 
cycle and mission creep had exhausted ONUC. The mission ended abruptly after a series 
of violent clashes between the peacekeepers and Congolese armed forces as well as non-
state armed groups between 1961 and 1963, which led the UN to take the first opportunity 
to exit the country in March 1963. The UN was out of Congo fifteen months later. 
Immediately after disbanding ONUC, the feeling at the UN was that the misadventure 
ought to be forgotten. There was a long-term effect, too, as the setbacks in Congo 
obliterated any desire to develop the peacekeeping doctrine (Findlay, 2002, pp. 75–81, 87–
89; Wills, 2009, pp. 11–12.) Moreover, after ONUC, UN peacekeepers would not set a foot 
 
48 The moral indignation is present for example in Kofi Annan’s “Two sovereignties” speech as well as the 
first POC report (Annan, 1999; UN Secretary-General, 1999e, para. 67). 




in Africa for twenty-five years. The UN also became generally more cautious about new 
peace operations, as only four out of eleven operations between 1964 and 1989 – UN 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP in Cyprus (1964–), Emergency Force (UNEF 
II) in Egypt (1973–1979), Interim Force (UNIFIL) in Lebanon (1978–), and Transition 
Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia (1989–1990) – had military boots on the 
ground.50  
 
4.1.2 From stagnation to (momentary) solidarity 
Two of the four exceptions – UNFICYP and UNIFIL – did to some extent continue to 
protect civilians, though no doctrine was developed in the context of these operations. 
UNFICYP was deployed to Cyprus at a time when the conflict between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots exhibited characteristics of ethnic cleansing. Under the circumstances, 
especially after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, UNFICYP combined, for 
instance, patrolling with the right to use force in self-defence in order to deter inter-
communal violence and thereby protect civilians. Peacekeepers also continued to use the 
inter-positional tactics and set up safe zones.  (Findlay, 2002, pp. 95, 97; Wills, 2009, p. 
13, also footnote 57.)  
 
UNIFIL, on the other hand, collided with two Israeli invasions to Lebanon (1978 and 
1982), which at the time had no effective government in place. In addition, the operation 
enjoyed only the consent of the ineffective Lebanese government, while the other parties 
to the conflict were hostile to the force and support from the Security Council and member 
states was wavering at best. (Findlay, 2002, pp. 103–108; Wills, 2009, pp. 14–15.) The 
mission engaged in humanitarian tasks and for example rescued civilians from the ruins 
caused by the Israeli invasion, while also interposing themselves between Israeli forces 
and Lebanese fighters to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, (Findlay, 2002, p. 
115; Wills, 2009, pp. 15–16). Thus, while ONUC was often denounced a mistake, some of 
its lessons were put into use during the next 20 years. The problematization of violence 
against civilians did not change during this time, however, as protective measures 
remained minimal and related only to immediate threats.  
 
 
50 During this period, the UN deployed several observation, assistance or political missions. List of past 





Meanwhile, civilian protection had started to ascend toward the upper echelons of power 
within the UN when the Security Council started explicitly to pay attention to the perils 
civilians face in armed conflict. This first came in the form of recognition of humanitarian 
issues during the Six Days War in 1967, but references to humanitarian issues in council 
resolutions did not become frequent until after 1980. By this time the Council had started 
to identify violations of international humanitarian law and condemn them, make 
decisions about the liability of violations, request corrective actions, demand observance 
of the law, establish fact-finding missions, determine the applicability of IHL, and 
facilitate humanitarian action by the International Committee of the Red Cross. 
(Bourloyannis, 1992.) All practices are currently present in the Council’s repertoire. 
Violations of humanitarian law mark a considerably broader conception of civilian 
protection and thus the problematization of violence against civilians had taken a turn 
toward a more structural and comprehensive direction.  
 
The Council did not take direct action in defence of civilians until after the end of the 
Cold War, however. During what has been dubbed as the “solidarist moment” in 
international affairs (Wheeler, 2000), a belief in a new era of Security Council action in 
which paralyzing Cold War deadlocks were but a remnant of the past gave rise to 
optimism at the UN and the international affairs more broadly (Malone, 2006, p. 11). At 
first, there seemed to be reason for cautious optimism, as the Council was relatively 
determined during the humanitarian crisis that had resulted from the Iraqi attempts to 
suppress the Kurdish rebellion in 1991: for the first time in its existence, it had named, 
because of its consequences, the oppression of a civilian population as a threat to 
international peace and security and demanded Iraq to grant humanitarian organizations 
access into Iraq (Wills, 2009, p. 22).51  
 
The Council did not, however, invoke Chapter VII in its resolutions and did not explicitly 
call for third party intervention; instead, the United States, United Kingdom and France 
took it upon themselves to intervene and imposed no-fly zones upon Iraq. Perhaps 
ironically, the first attempt to protect civilians in the post-Cold War era was then initiated 
without Security Council’s explicit blessing, as it was the critical omission of a call for 
action that led the three states to establish no-fly zones in northern and southern parts of 
 




Iraq – and support them with air raids – for the specific purpose of protecting civilians. 
(ibid., also Malone, 2006, p. 88.)  
 
The solidarist moment withered rapidly away during the first half of the 1990s, however, 
as the difficulties of protecting civilians arose. In 1992, the Security Council deployed the 
biggest peace operation since ONUC to Cambodia to monitor ceasefires, hold elections 
and disarm armed groups, but also take over the administration of Cambodia, to protect 
human rights and to facilitate the return of refugees. The Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC, 1992–1994), was not deployed under Chapter VII despite its 
executive role, but its rules of engagement allowed the peacekeepers to prevent crimes 
against humanity by any means necessary. While the operation provided local authorities 
with human rights education and training, it avoided confrontation with local armed 
factions in order not to risk the elections, which left the civilian population unprotected. 
The peacekeepers reportedly abused the local people too, which further undermined the 
cause peacekeepers were supposed to uphold. (Wills, 2009, pp. 24–27.) Here, human 
rights education represented a new angle to civilian protection – one that reflected the 
idea according to which people will make better decisions when properly informed. This 
idea would become integral to peace operations, as we shall see in the section on policing. 
The prevention of crimes against humanity represented a continuation of the moral 
indignation that had emerged already in the Congo. 
 
4.1.3 The internationalization of violence against civilians 
Meanwhile, a civil war had erupted in Somalia after the fall of Siad Barre’s regime in 
1991. The situation in the country was fragile as the Somalis had both capacity and 
incentive for violence. Indeed, Somalia had been armed by both poles of the Cold War 
and the relations between local clans were becoming increasingly hostile because of their 
struggle for power. The result was a civil war that claimed 14 000 lives, wounded twice 
as many, and ruined agricultural and livestock production which in turn caused 
widespread famine. (Wheeler, 2000, p. 174.) The international response to the situation in 
Somalia came in the form of three peace operations: UNOSOM I (UN Operation in 
Somalia, April 1992 – March 1993), UNITAF (Unified Task Force, December 1992 – May 
1993), and UNOSOM II (March 1993 – March 1995). The first mission in Somalia was a 




protect the delivery of humanitarian aid, but it was eventually overwhelmed by the hostile 
environment and lack of effective government.52  
 
In response, the Security Council decided to deploy a more robust force, UNITAF – a 
UN-sanctioned but US-led mission – to enforce its will. The deployment was historic, 
because the Council declared in its resolution 794 not only that the “the magnitude of the 
human tragedy” inside Somalia was a threat to international peace and security but also 
mandated for the first time in its existence an enforcement operation under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter to “use all necessary measures to establish as soon as possible a secure 
environment for humanitarian relief operations”.53 The resolution was adopted 
unanimously and, in light of the deliberations leading to the resolution (see Wheeler, 
2000, pp. 184–185), there is little doubt about the humanitarian motive. Another factor that 
made UNITAF exceptional is that it was launched in the absence of state consent (but not 
against Somali consent, for Somalia had no effective government).54 The resolution can 
be read as an application of the Council President’s and the Secretary-General’s 
redefinition of international peace and security presented earlier in 1992.55 
 
During its five-month stint, UNITAF assumed by and large the responsibilities of 
UNOSOM I, although its posture was much more aggressive in terms of its rules of 
engagement (Findlay, 2002, pp. 170–171): the mission focused on the provision of security 
that would facilitate the distribution of humanitarian aid by convoys, setting up 
humanitarian programmes and zones in Somalia (ibid., pp. 172–175). Yet the United States 
had no real interest in committing to Somalia (Wheeler, 2000, p. 190), despite arguments 
 
52 The mandate was set in UN Security Council Resolutions 751 (1992b), 767 (1992c) and 775 (1992d). On 
the inadequacy of the UN force and the insecurities it faced in 1992 that led to the deployment of the two 
other missions, see UN Secretary-General (1992e, paras. 11–21, 1992b, 1992c). 
53 UN Security Council Resolution 794 (1992f, p. 1, and paras. 3, 8, 10). Findlay (2002, p. 167n2) notes that 
UNITAF was the fifth time the Security Council authorized enforcement operation: first was in relation to 
Korea in 1950, then against Rhodesia in 1966, and finally twice in the context of Iraq-Kuwait conflict in 
1990 and 1991. 
54 On a side note, Nicholas Wheeler (2000, p. 200) argues that resolution 794 and the deployment of 
UNITAF are not to be construed as a transition into an age where a consensus on humanitarian intervention 
prevails, because for example China and India, while not objecting the resolution, argued the Somali case 
is unique and exceptional and did not therefore constitute a departure from article 2.7 of the UN Charter 
(i.e. the non-intervention rule). Wheeler is probably right, seeing as how the Council has not always been 
able to find consensus in these matters after Somalia. However, I would argue they are nonetheless ground-
breaking in the sense that they opened up the possibility of exception in cases where the constellation of 
wills, motives and interests among the (permanent) members of the Security Council converge sufficiently. 
This would not be possible without the rationale according to which crises inside states and human rights 
abuses constitute a threat to or a breach of international peace and security.  
55 See An Agenda for Peace by UN Secretary-General (1992a); and the note by the Council President (UN 




raised by Secretary-General for a long-term substitutive UN force.56 Eventually in May 
1993, UNITAF handed over its responsibilities to the second UNOSOM mission.  
 
Like UNITAF, UNOSOM II was equally unprecedented because it was the first UN-led 
mission to have a broad mandate to, inter alia, monitor and enforce the cessation of 
hostilities, secure “all ports, airports and lines of communications required for the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance”, and to ensure the safe return of refugees and 
displaced persons.57 Moreover, though not mandated under Chapter VII, UNOSOM was 
to engage in state- and nation-building tasks by assisting the Somalis to re-establish 
institutions for civilian administration and police that would be able to enforce and 
maintain law and order in the entire country.58 In the field, the lofty mandates were 
dampened by persistent violence and insecurity, the subsequent clashes that claimed 
several lives of peacekeepers, and the implication of Belgian and Canadian troops in the 
murder of one and abuse of several Somalis (Findlay, 2002, pp. 181–183; Wheeler, 2000, 
pp. 194–200; Wills, 2009, p. 29). The case of the Somalian civil war marks a sea change 
in the UN’s problematization of violence against civilians because it had de facto defined 
a state’s internal conflicts as threats to international peace and security. Domestic and 
international security began to merge. 
 
After Somalia, another tragedy befell Africa in April 1994 when the long-lasting disputes 
between Rwanda’s Tutsi and Hutu populations escalated into genocide. The conflict had 
begun already in 1990 when the Armed Forces of the majority Hutu government and the 
Rwandese Patriotic Front representing the Tutsi population started fighting each other. 
The UN first got involved in the conflict in June 1993, when it sent a group of military 
observers to monitor the Rwanda–Uganda border. Later in October, however, it deployed 
the Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to Rwanda as it became clear that mere 
monitoring would not suffice. UNAMIR was to, inter alia, monitor the previously made 
ceasefire agreement and especially its demilitarization procedures, monitor the security 
situation preceding the forthcoming elections, monitor and verify the return of refugees 
and displaced persons, contribute to the security of “weapons-secure” area in the city of 
Kigali, investigate and report on the activities of the local gendarmerie and police forces, 
 
56 UN Secretary-General (1993, paras. 19–20, 55).  
57 Security Council endorsed the Secretary-General’s proposition for UNOSOM’s mandate, see UN 
Secretary-General (ibid., para. 57(a–b, e, h)). 




assist in demining through training programmes, and to assist in the coordination of 
humanitarian assistance.59 While some of the tasks could be construed as requiring 
enforcement capacities, the mandate was not issued under Chapter VII. The resolution 
was equally silent about protection of civilians, although UNAMIR’s rules of engagement 
allowed the prevention of violence against civilians even with force (Wills, 2009, p. 31).  
 
As the accounts of fleeing UN personnel who left both local civilians as well as locally 
recruited workers at the mercy of Hutu génocidaires suggest,60 however, UNAMIR not 
only failed to protect civilians, it ultimately failed its mandate more generally. Although 
the mission was suffered from poorly trained troops and poor equipment, the failure can 
largely be attributed to three reasons. Firstly, the “shadow of Somalia”61 – the fear of 
“mission creep” (uncontrollably expanding mission agenda), casualties and damages – 
was still hanging above the UN, which made the DPKO more cautious about venturing 
beyond the “traditional” peacekeeping tasks, such as monitoring ceasefires (Findlay, 
2002, p. 277).  
 
Secondly, DPKO’s interpretation of warning signs of impending violence and the mission 
mandate was overly cautious. The UN officials saw the interpretation of UNAMIR’s 
mandate as a balancing act between the risk of violence and the risk of undermining UN 
peacekeeping enterprise. There was the risk that excessive measures might result in a 
conflict with the Rwandan government, which in turn could undermine the peacekeeping 
enterprise that was still in recovery of its “Somalia syndrome”. (see Barnett, 2002, pp. 
77–86.). Finally, the international community was largely indifferent about the Rwandan 
situation and by the time it managed to summon the will for a more robust force – that is, 
the Opération Turquoise –violence was already waning (Findlay, 2002, pp. 280–282).62 In 
retrospect, the prudence that resulted from these factors led the UNAMIR to practically 
stand by, or flee, as the genocide unfolded in the course of spring 1994. 
 
Besides Africa, Europe, too, witnessed its share of massacres in its South-Eastern parts 
when the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia started to fall apart at its seams in the 
early 1990s. And along with the disruption, a total of eight UN peace operations were 
 
59 UN Security Council Resolution 872 (1993e, para. 3). 
60 See UN Secretary-General (1999a, pp. 45–46). 
61 Ibid., p. 41. 




deployed to the region to keep violence at bay, manage the disintegration and ease the 
way of newly created states into stable coexistence.63 For the present context, the most 
pertinent of these operations is the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which was first 
deployed to Croatia, then Bosnia and Herzegovina and finally to Macedonia. Though 
matters of civilian protection were of utmost importance elsewhere too, particularly in 
Croatia, the focus here is limited to Bosnia for reasons of space.  
 
UNPROFOR first entered Bosnia in the spring of 1992 to promote peace negotiations and 
to monitor the overall situation, but the situation deteriorated at such a pace that a more 
robust force was deemed appropriate. In September the same year, Security Council 
passed Resolution 776, which expanded both the mission’s strength and mandate. The 
resolution, while not explicitly authorizing protection of civilians, mandated the mission 
to protect the UN’s and ICRC’s humanitarian convoys and refugee assistance.64 The 
mandate did not explicitly reference Chapter VII, but the Secretary-General’s proposal 
upon which the mandate was based authorized peacekeepers to use force in self-defence 
and in defence of the mission mandate.  
 
The mission’s rules of engagement dictated that the mission was authorized to use force 
in self-defence, which included the defence against attempts to prevent peacekeepers 
from discharging their duties. This extended the authorization of use of force to the 
protection of the safe areas (the rules of engagement are reproduced in Findlay, 2002, 
Annex II, pp. 417–422). According to Trevor Findlay (ibid., pp. 221–231), UNPROFOR 
engaged not only in the above-mentioned mandated activities, but also took steps to 
interpose themselves to protect civilians, though the peacekeepers’ willingness to do so 
varied from one contingent to another. Later, in a series of resolutions in 1993, the Security 
Council requested for demilitarized safe zones to be established, authorized the use of 
“all necessary measures” to protect the zones and to prevent the interception of 
humanitarian aid convoys in the safe zones’ vicinity.65 The mission was supposed to 
 
63 List of past peace operations is available at UN peacekeeping website (United Nations, n.d.-b). Other 
international organizations, such as the Organization for Cooperation and Security (OSCE), North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU would later join and eventually assume the UN’s tasks. 
Particularly NATO participated from early on to peace operations by providing air support and by enforcing 
no-fly zones (see Findlay, 2002, pp. 236–252). 
64 UN Security Council Resolution 776 (1992e). The mandate was based on the suggestions of the Secretary-
General (1992d, paras. 3–11). 
65 UN Security Council Resolutions 819 (1993b), 824 (1993c), 836 (1993d). The last resolution authorized 
also UNPROFOR to take part in these activities under Chapter VII (paras. 9–10). However, as Wills (2009, 




provide protection for Bosnians, as the name Protection Force suggests, but 
interpretations of the mandate varied from promises to protection to attempts to deter 
rather than prevent violence (Findlay, 2002, p. 229; Wills, 2009, p. 34, also accompanying 
note 193). 
 
As is well-known by now, the UNPROFOR safe zones succumbed eventually under the 
pressure of Serbian forces, despite initial moderate success. The outcome was the worst 
atrocity on European soil since World War II. The reasons leading to the failure of 
UNPROFOR were similar with the cases of Somalia and Rwanda: The lightly armed force 
was undersized and underequipped to resist the machinations and attacks of Bosnian 
Serbs and the air power provided by NATO was underused. Secondly, UNPROFOR’s 
mandate was vague at best – it was never issued under Chapter VII, but it involved tasks 
that involved enforcement – and it was interpreted rather cautiously due to fears of the 
UN ending up in war against Serbia and Bosnian Serbs. Finally, the UN never fully 
grasped how serious Bosnian and Serbian Serbs were about the idea of “Greater Serbia” 
or about the lengths to which they would go to turn the idea into reality. As for the failure 
to protect civilians, the problem lay with the safe zones, whose concept was unclear and 
they were never properly demilitarized as planned (Findlay, 2002, pp. 265–266; Wheeler, 
2000, pp. 251–254.) Together with the overall reluctance to use force, the result was that 
the safe zones were never actually safe.66   
 
The examples of civilian protection indicate that violence against civilians had become 
profoundly problematized at the UN toward by mid-1990s. Indeed, a sense of moral 
obligation had developed within the UN that gave rise to expectations about civilian 
protection. Sometimes these expectations materialized as actual protection measures in 
the field or as authorization of interventionist protection measures by the Security 
Council. The problematization and concomitant protection measures were often 
overwhelmed, however, by complex political situations, shadows of past experiences, 
lack of determination, and hostile operating environment. The failures to protect in 
Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia left the UN more cautious about waging peace by force. 
Attempts to develop and make civilian protection more prominent part of peacekeeping 
 
“defend”. Rather, the mission was to use all necessary measures only in self-defence, not in defence of the 
safe zones. 
66 See also the inquiry on UN actions in Bosnia and Srebrenica appended in UN Secretary-General (1999d, 




were shelved for the next few years to come.67 Nonetheless, the examples of peace 
operations from the 1990s exhibited signs that civilian protection was about to become 
more comprehensive than mere inter-positional tactics; protection in this period included 
also increasing willingness to use force and it was combined with educational initiatives 
that served the purposes of civilian protection.  
 
4.1.4 Emergence and consolidation of the POC doctrine 
This development would continue at the doctrinal level toward the end of the millennium, 
when the international community re-embraced civilian protection. Indeed, after a period 
of soul-searching,68 the UN took its first steps toward institutionalization of civilian 
protection. Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s term of office was particularly important for 
this process, as it was under his watch that the secretariat prepared two reports in 1998 in 
which the Organization advocated for further protection for humanitarian assistance, 
examined the causes of conflict in Africa and laid the fundaments for the promotion of 
durable peace and sustainable development.69 Next year, Secretary-General’s report series 
Protection of Civilians in armed conflict was launched to provide the Security Council 
with timely analyses of the perils civilians face and propose measures the Council could 
take to mitigate the perils (see next chapter for detailed analysis). In 2000, a key 
peacekeeping document dubbed as the Brahimi report endorsed the UN’s intentions to 
develop its civilian protection efforts (although with reservations concerning the 
mismatch of expectations and capacity).70 
 
The year 1999 was important in another regard as well, as it was in the spring of 1999 
when NATO commenced its “illegal yet legitimate” bombings of Belgrade to persuade 
Serbia to halt its oppression of Kosovars. The Security Council was unable to open its 
deadlock in this case, but the bombing of Belgrade on behalf of Kosovar civilians 
indicated a modicum of openness to civilian protection in some quarters of the 
international community. Shortly after Kosovo war, on 27 October 1999, Security Council 
 
67 The sense of disappointment is tangible for example in the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, where 
the then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali argued that, using Bosnia and Somalia as examples, 
protection of humanitarian convoys and protection of civilians during an armed conflict, and the premature 
attempts to impose reconciliatory processes had resulted in the “less successful operations” (UN Secretary-
General, 1995a, paras. 33–35).  
68 This period is best documented in the Secretary-General’s report The Fall of Srebrenica (UN Secretary-
General, 1999b) and the report of an independent inquiry into the Rwandan genocide (UN Secretary-
General, 1999a), which assessed the UN’s performance in these cases. 
69 UN secretary-General (1998a, 1998b). 




deployed the first UN peace operation with a POC mandate to Sierra Leone.71 In total, 
ten operations would have a POC mandate between 1999 and 2008.72 Moreover, the notion 
of protection of civilians would appear in several peacekeeping and peace and security 
documents during the same time period,73 while meaningful conceptual development did 
not take place. In other words, the UN had established a language of protection to be used 
in Security Council resolutions and aide-mémoires as well as in Secretary-General’s 
reports, but this had not led to the operationalization or implementation of protection in 
the field (Holt, Taylor, & Kelly, 2009, pp. 74, 144).   
 
The development of UN POC into a practical guideline for peacekeepers would have to 
wait for almost ten years. Then, DPKO and the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs commissioned an independent study, Protecting civilians in the 
context of UN peacekeeping operations. Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges, 
on how to improve the implementation of POC mandates (see Holt et al., 2009). 
Following the study, DPKO and DFS published their first draft concept of UN POC in 
2010, which would serve as basis for the coming POC policy of 2015. The policy was 
followed by POC guidelines for military components the same year, and guidelines for 
police components in 2017. The policy was replaced by an update in 2019, however, but 
it did not make fundamental changes to the policy. 
 
Meanwhile, as the “core obligation” of the UN,74 civilian protection has become a well-
established practice at the Security Council. This is indicated by the numerous resolutions 
with references to POC (see Maisonneuve & Saeteroey, 2014). As for peace operations, 
the UN itself advertises how at the time of writing of the present thesis, “more than 95 
%” of peacekeepers are mandated to protect civilians.75 Moreover, 15 out of 22 operations 
established between 1999 and 2017 have at least at one point had an explicit mandate to 
 
71 UN Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999c, para. 14). 
72 The operations are: MONUC in Congo; UNMIL in Liberia; ONUB in Burundi; MINUSTAH in Haiti; 
UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire; UNMIS in Sudan; UNIFIL in Lebanon; UNAMID in Darfur, Sudan; and 
MINURCAT in Central African Republic. See (Holt et al., 2009, p. 3, fn 3). 
73 These documents include for example the report of the high-level panel on threats to peace and security, 
A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (United Nations, 2004, paras. 231–238); the Brahimi report 
(UN Secretary-General, 2000, para. 62); the Capstone Doctrine (DPKO & DFS, 2008b, p. 24); the 
Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO, 2003, p. 92); and the 
United Nations Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines (DPKO, 2000).  
74 As dubbed by the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations report appended in UN Secretary-
General (2015a). 




protect civilians under Chapter VII with all means necessary.76 Thus, even though the 
UN’s performance in this regard has been criticised, even by the Organization’s own 
watchdog,77 we can conclude that the problematization of violence against civilians has 
been consolidated. From the days of ONUC, the problematization has led the Security 
Council to take an increasingly active stance on civilian protection, move peacekeepers 
from inter-positional tactics and safe zones to using force proactively to protect civilians 
and to integrate protection into educational programmes. This expansion of the modalities 
of protection suggests changes in other trends concerning peacekeeping, such as 
militarization and policing.    
 
4.2 Militarization of peacekeeping 
Militarism is a belief that sees use of force and threat of force as effective means of solving 
problems. Militarization, then, refers to the advancement of this conviction in a given 
domain of life, society or polity. It involves the “arming, organizing, planning, training 
for, threatening, and sometimes implementing violent conflict” as the basic model for an 
organization or for solving a problem (Kraska, 2007, p. 503). In the context of 
peacekeeping, militarization has manifested itself in three forms: a) the redefinition of 
self-defence; b) the increasingly frequent invocation of Chapter VII in mission mandates 
to authorize the use of force beyond self-defence; and c) the arming of peacekeepers and 
the introduction of new types of missions and military contingents into the international 
peace and security toolkit (ibid., p. 503; Sloan, 2011, p. 3).    
 
4.2.1 Back to the Congo 
As suggested previously, use of force has been a controversial issue in the peacekeeping 
circles ever since the first peacekeeping operation was deployed to tame the Suez Canal 
crisis of 1956. At first, peacekeeping was not even conceivably a Chapter VII activity, but 
a pacific solution to disputes. After UNEF, the then Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld 
 
76 The number of operations with and without a POC mandate is based on the mission mandates presented 
at the UN peacekeeping website or mission websites (see United Nations, n.d.-b). The operations that did 
not have an explicit POC mandate were: UNMIK in Kosovo, UNTAET and UNMISET in East Timor, 
UNMEE in Eritrea and Ethiopia, MINUCI in Côte d’Ivoire, UNMIT in Timor-Leste, and UNSMIS in Syria. 
The missions may have, however, performed similar tasks. Moreover, a non-UN mission may have worked 
alongside UN to protect civilians, especially if the non-UN mission served as the enforcement arm of the 
international presence, which was the case with NATO’s Kosovo force. 
77 UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (2013, 2014, 2017). The reports’ findings indicate shortcomings 
in reporting of civilian casualties, consistent patterns of inaction when faced with violence against civilians, 
and troop contributing countries interference in matters relating to use of force. Bode and Karlsrud (2019) 
have shown that views as to what peacekeepers are obliged to do when mandated to protect civilians diverge 




contemplated the nature of peacekeeping, which resulted in a set of principles that would 
later be considered the cornerstone of successful peacekeeping. The principles were: 
consent, neutral composition of peace operations, and immunity.78 In short, peacekeeping 
can be commenced only with the consent of the host state; it should not include units from 
the Security Council member states or from states with potential bias; UN personnel 
should enjoy immunity; and the operations should enjoy freedom of movement as 
necessary for the completion of its mandate.     
 
More importantly, however, Hammarskjöld further formulated the “basic rules” to be 
considered when deploying new missions. First, peacekeepers would have to keep their 
distance to local authorities and not get mixed in internal affairs of the host state – 
otherwise the mission would risk politicization. According to the second rule, a peace 
operation must be deployed in response to cross-border or otherwise international dispute; 
it cannot be involved in conflicts of internal nature and it cannot enforce any specific 
solution to the problem at hand – peacekeepers are deployed only to ensure the solution 
holds. Third, peacekeepers’ loyalty should lie exclusively with the UN. Finally, while 
such right did exist in Hammarskjöld’s view, peacekeepers were obliged to limit the use 
of force strictly to self-defence. Key to the appropriate use of force was that peacekeepers 
were not to engage first, but once attacked, or attempted to remove from their positions, 
they would be allowed to use force.79  
 
Many of Hammarskjöld’s ideas have been present in UN’s rhetoric even in the 2000s. For 
example, in the so-called Capstone Doctrine from 2008, DPKO and DFS followed 
Hammarskjöld by positing that the basic principles of UN peacekeeping are consent of 
the parties involved, impartiality, and the restriction of force to self-defence. The doctrine 
defines consent effectively the same way as Hammarskjöld did, whilst impartiality and 
self-defence have assumed new definitions. Impartiality for the Capstone Doctrine means 
that peacekeepers are to do their job “without favour or prejudice to any party”, but this 
is not to be construed as a justification for inaction when faced with activities that hinder 
peace processes. Use of force and self-defence, finally, are not limited to defence of 
oneself and mission positions but includes also the defence of the mission mandate.80  
 
78 UN Secretary-General (1958, paras. 155, 160, 163, 164). 
79 Ibid., paras. 165–166, 168, 179. 
80 DPKO & DFS (2008b, pp. 31–35); a high-level panel report known as the Brahimi report dubs the three 





In between Hammarskjöld’s contemplations and the 2008 Doctrine the “bedrock 
principles”, especially those concerning use of force, have been revised. In other words, 
they have been problematized. This began already with the second-ever peacekeeping 
operation deployed to Congo in 1960, where the situation escalated into civil war and the 
UN suffered numerous casualties.81 Because of the violence, UN could not ostensibly 
operate in accordance with Hammarskjöld’s principles and rules, and therefore ONUC 
had to rethink its approach to the use of force and impartiality. Consequently, the mission 
mandate developed from assistance of state authorities into fully-fledged military and 
police operation in a series of three resolutions: Resolution 143 of 14 July 1960 authorized 
Secretary-General to provide the Congolese government with military and technical 
assistance to better complete its tasks; Resolution 161 of 21 February 1961 authorized the 
force to take all necessary measures to prevent civil war; and Resolution 169 of 24 
November 1961, finally, authorized the force to detain, deport and prevent the return, if 
necessary, of all foreign military and paramilitary personnel.82 
 
Operation Directives followed a similar trajectory and became more permissive of force. 
Indeed, the second Operations Directive of 17 August 1960 pledged that the UN force is 
not in Congo to challenge the local authorities and that it would use its good offices 
whenever encountered with injustice. Subsequent directives had a different tone, 
however, and for example Directive number 6 of 28 October 1960 provided – only four 
months before the resolution 161 which was the first resolution to authorize all means 
necessary to prevent civil war – that ONUC may employ any means necessary to carry 
out the tasks ordered by the force commander.83 The Directive discusses in particular the 
violence of Congolese authorities and their unwillingness to prevent violence, attacks on 
UN installations, and the prevention of banditry as examples of situations in which the 
resort to force might become necessary. The Directive did not allow first use of force and 
discouraged lethal force. (ONUC’s Operations Directives are reproduced in Findlay, 
2002, pp. 411–415.)  
 
 
81 ONUC suffered 250 casualties in total, 245 military personnel and 5 civilians to be precise, which is twice 
as many as UNEF. The numbers are from the ONUC website (United Nations, 2001).  
82 See UN Security Council resolutions 143 (1960), 161 (1961a) and 169 (1961b). 
83 Paragraph 7 of the Directive number 6 provided that peacekeepers may, after due exhaustion, resort to 
force, if: attempts to move from their position are made; attempts to disarm them are made; attempts to 
prevent the force to execute its mandate are made; attempts at arrest or abduction of UN personnel are 




In a message dated 24 February 1961 and addressed to African troop-contributing 
countries, who were concerned that ONUC might get entangled in the Congolese 
conflicts, Hammarskjöld rationalized the more robust approach by arguing that 
peacekeepers would not in fact be interfering in Congolese internal affairs if they resorted 
to force after being attacked. While initiation of combat would be problematic, Secretary-
General reasoned this would be an act of self-defence rather than an interference.84 The 
problematization of force had thus led the UN and ONUC to prioritize order-making 
ability over Hammarskjöld’s impartiality and constraint on the use of force. Moreover, as 
Anne Orford’s (2011, pp. 83–87) analysis illustrates, decisions to use force are in fact 
decisions for something and against something else; the UN always makes a decision on 
whose behalf it resorts to force. Therefore, the decision is always partial. The analysis 
further shows how such decisions entail recognition of authority on the UN’s part, which 
in turn is accompanied by for example financial aid, military support or political 
legitimacy, or a combination of these. The problematization of adequate force and the 
recourse to more forceful measures led the UN to modify its approach to neutrality, 
impartiality and self-defence in peacekeeping. 
 
In its time, ONUC was largely considered a misadventure not to be repeated (Findlay, 
2002, p. 87). Problematization of use of force during the course of ONUC nonetheless set 
the UN on an almost paradoxical path that is at the heart of militarization of peacekeeping: 
the delimiting of use of force strictly to self-defence and expanding it to the defence of 
mission mandate. The consequence of this process is that the line between peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement has blurred. As one analyst noted: if peacekeepers are allowed to 
take action in defence of the mission mandate, it is “no different from allowing them to 
enforce it” (quoted in Wills, 2009, p. 14). It is not necessary to examine the development 
of the doctrine on use of force in every mandate given since ONUC – this has already 
been done by for example Trevor Findlay (2002) and James Sloan (2011, 2014) – but 
general features of this process deserve highlighting to further understand the process of 
militarization. 
 
4.2.2 Redefining self-defence 
The self-defence norm guiding peacekeepers’ use of force, which in itself was not 
abandoned, was revised in the course of ONUC’s lifespan. The broader revision became 
 




a standard for the next few operations to come (Sloan, 2011, pp. 28–29). After ONUC, 
Hammarskjöld’s successor, U Thant, defined the use of force concept for ONUC’s 
successor, UNFICYP, in a similar vein to that of ONUC; self-defence for the mission 
included the defence of UN personnel, posts, premises and vehicles. Attempts to remove 
peacekeepers from their position, disarm them or attempts to prevent them from executing 
their orders would trigger the right to self-defence. The instructions still underlined that 
the mission is not an offensive one, meaning it cannot engage first and non-forceful 
measures would have to be duly exhausted before engaging in combat.85 While UNFICYP 
was not authorized under Chapter VII, Thant’s definition of self-defence continued along 
the same lines with ONUC. 
 
A more profound change in doctrine did not come until a little less than a decade later, 
however, as Thant’s successor, the Austrian Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim proposed 
in 1973 that the second UNEF operation deployed to Egypt should have the expanded 
right to self-defence like ONUC and UNFICYP had: “Self-defence would include 
resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under 
the mandate of the Security Council.”86 Given the Security Council’s concern over the 
situation in the Middle East at the time, the redefinition was passed unchallenged. Only 
this time, peacekeepers were authorized to defend the mandate given by Security Council, 
whereas previously it was the “positions” and “responsibilities” dictated by force 
commanders. Thereby, Security Council endorsed the redefinition of self-defence as 
defence-of-mandate. The redefinition became effectively the blueprint for all subsequent 
peace operations. (Findlay, 2002, p. 100; Sloan, 2011, p. 29.) A sufficiently ambiguous 
mandate, as Sloan (2011, p. 29) notes, would however allow “virtually any use of force”. 
The authorization given to UNEF II thus marks a crucial point of lowering peacekeepers’ 
threshold for resorting to force. 
 
The final, elementary step in the redefinition of self-defence in peace operations was 
taken when peacekeeping mandates were passed under Chapter VII of the Charter. The 
transition to “militarized peacekeeping”, in Sloan’s (2011, pp. 37–39) assessment, 
revolved around the subject of civilian protection: Firstly, the atrocities of the 1990s, 
notably in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, and the UN’s failure to act upon them, provided 
 
85 UN Secretary-General (1964, para. 7c). 




the momentum for increased use of force. Second, perhaps due to his involvement in the 
previous failures, the then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, whose stated priority was 
“[a]dherence to international humanitarian and human rights norms”,87 was highly active 
in matters of civilian protection. For example, during his second year in office, Annan 
wrote two reports on conflict management, humanitarian matters and civilian protection, 
both of which advocated more decisive action on said matters. One of them even called 
for “enforcement action in order to achieve humanitarian objectives”.88  
 
Moreover, at the request of Security Council, Annan initiated a report series on the 
protection of civilians in armed conflict, which is published even today. Notably, the first 
report in the series advocated humanitarian intervention: 
where the parties to the conflict commit systematic and widespread breaches of 
international humanitarian and human rights law, causing threats of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, the Security Council should be prepared to intervene 
under Chapter VII of the Charter.89 
Despite the moderation of the rhetoric since 1999, the crucial point here is that the report 
coincided with other developments related to protection of civilians. The final 
development is the emergence of the R2P concept, in which Annan was also heavily 
involved.90 The concept had undergone some evolution before it was adopted at the UN 
General Assembly in 2005, but the basic principle remained the same: states have a 
responsibility to protect civilians inside their territory and should they fail to take on this 
responsibility, they are subject to intervention.91 
 
Considering the aforementioned factors, the period seems to have been ripe for more 
forceful peace operations. This conclusion is supported also by the peacekeeping 
mandates issued from 1999 onwards, a majority of which explicitly invokes Chapter VII. 
Indeed, between 1999 and 2017 nineteen operations were deployed, while only three did 
not have Chapter VII authorization.92 Key peacekeeping documents – such as the 
 
87 UN Secretary-General (1998b, para. 50). 
88 The quote comes from Report of the Secretary-General on Protection for Humanitarian Assistance to 
Refugees and Others in Conflict situations (UN Secretary-General, 1998a, para. 35); the other report is titled 
The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa. Report 
of the Secretary-General (UN Secretary-General, 1998b). 
89 UN Secretary-General (1999e, para. 67). 
90 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001, p. 83). 
91 UN General Assembly (2005, paras. 138–140). 
92 Sloan (2014) counts 18 operations, but MINJUSTH was deployed to Haiti in April 2017 with a Chapter 
VII mandate. The three operations without Chapter VII authorization were UNMEE (2000–2008, Ethiopia 




previously noted Brahimi report, Capstone doctrine and two High-Level Panel reports 
from 2004 and 2015 – also employ language that confirms the redefinition of self-defence 
and invites forceful measures.93 This leads to the conclusion that militarization, 
understood as permissive attitude to use of force, has become consolidated within the UN. 
This is not to be construed as though the issue is entirely without controversy for example 
among member states. To the contrary, use of force for the purpose of protection of 
civilians, for example, is still controversial among member states (Bode & Karlsrud, 
2019).94 Militarization has been consolidated in UN agencies that represent the 
Organization, such as the secretariat and DPKO. 
 
To recap, the problematization of adequate force, which stemmed originally from the need 
to respond to violence, resulted in a more permissive redefinition, one that would allow 
peacekeepers to engage more proactively with a hostile environment. Especially after 
self-defence was defined as a defence of mission mandate, the need for a formal constraint 
on use of force has eroded. This development is reinforced by the Security Council 
practice of establishing missions under Chapter VII of the Charter and authorizing the 
mission to use any means necessary in the execution of its mandate. Consequently, 
peacekeeping has started to approximate enforcement and distinguishing between the two 
has become “of ever diminishing value” (Sloan, 2011, p. 62). (Peace operations do not 
operate with a Chapter VII mandate by default, however, and therefore peacekeeping does 
not equal enforcement.)  
 
4.2.3 Militarized innovations 
Militarization of peacekeeping is not limited to mission mandates, however. It also 
involves innovations that increasingly rely offensive capacities, such as armed police and 
specialized units. For instance, the UN has come to deploy what it calls “stabilisation 
missions” – the precise meaning of which is unclear, but, as the term suggests, their goal 
in the broad is to bring state stability where there is none. At the time of writing, four such 
missions have been established, all with Chapter VII mandates: Stabilization Mission in 
Haiti (MINUSTAH, 2004–2017) in Haiti, Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization 
 
Republic and Chad). MINURCAT’s mandate was updated to include Chapter VII authorization in 2009, 
after which a new mission with Chapter VII authorization replaced MINURCAT. Also, the UN mission in 
Lebanon, UNIFIL, was authorized to use force in 2006, though not under Chapter VII. (ibid., p. 692n80.) 
93 DPKO & DFS ; UN Secretary-General (2000, para. 49, 2015a, para. 128); United Nations (2004, para. 
213). 





Mission in Central African Republic (MINUSCA, 2014–), Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA, 2013–) in Mali, and Organization Stabilization 
Mission (MONUSCO, 2010–) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The meaning of 
“stabilization” has remained unclear in the mission mandates, but the common 
denominator is that they all undertake tasks related to consolidation and extension of state 
authority. Other tasks have ranged from civilian protection to monitoring human rights 
and from supporting political and electoral processes to supporting state security agencies 
(Gorur, 2016, pp. 9–11).95 In many ways, these are the same tasks that contemporary peace 
operations have been assigned with after the turn of the millennium. However, references 
to consolidation and extension of state authority indicate, once again, a yearning for order.  
 
The yearning also makes stabilization missions politically significant, despite the absence 
of clarity about the precise meaning of the term. Stabilization missions are significant 
because they are partial by definition. That is, the missions take side with the recognized 
government of the host state. Stabilization missions are not sent to keep peace, but to 
create stability (Bellamy & Hunt, 2015, pp. 1282–1283). An extreme example is the Force 
Intervention Brigade, which was deployed in 2013 to support MONUSCO in 
consolidating Congolese state authority and to protect civilians, among other tasks. The 
Intervention Brigade, with its three infantry battalions, one artillery and one special force 
and reconnaissance company is, “without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the 
agreed principles of peacekeeping”, to “carry out targeted offensive operations” in order 
to “neutralize”, “disarm” and “prevent the expansion” of armed groups.96 The brigade 
gives MONUSCO’s order-making efforts a rather coercive bent. It remains to be seen 
whether this marks the merging of robust peacekeeping forces with UN’s state- and 
peacebuilding efforts.  
 
Another example of militarization of peace operations is the increasing deployment of 
armed police. Armed police have been part of peace operations since 1998 when NATO 
deployed a 600 persons strong Multinational Specialized Unit to support its Stabilisation 
Force (Hansen, 2001, p. 71).97 Four years later, the UN sent its own armed police, or 
 
95 UN Security Council Resolution 2098 (2013, paras. 9, 12). 
96 UN Security Council Resolution 2098 (2013, paras. 9, 12). It ought to be borne in mind, however, that the 
establishment of the Brigade was not a case of Security Council imposing its will upon the Congolese, but 
a bottom-up process (see Piiparinen, 2016). 
97 The Specialized Unit drew its officers primarily from Australia, Italian Carabinieri, Argentinian 
Gendarmeria Nacional, Romanian Politia Militari and Slovenian Military Police (Hansen, 2001, p. 71, also 




Formed Police Units (FPUs) as it calls them today, to Kosovo and East Timor to provide 
security and maintain law and order.98 Both cases were historic also because they marked 
the first instance where the UN assumed full executive authority over a sovereign state, 
or a state-to-be in the case of Kosovo. Later, the number of FPUs has grown steadily: a 
total of 5736 FPUs served in UN peace operations in November 2009, whereas ten years 
later in November 2019, the number stood at 6 792.99   
 
Generally, the FPUs represent the harder edge of policing. Their purpose is to manage 
and protect order. They may do so even by force if necessary, but only after due 
exhaustion of less coercive means. When force is used, it must be proportional to the 
threat and escalate gradually along with the gravity of the situation. Use of force must be 
based on UN rules and regulations and it will be investigated when necessary.100 Finally, 
in case of “sustained use of firearms or military weaponry”, the FPUs are to hand over 
authority to the military components.101 On paper, the FPUs are thus the UN’s version of 
modern police forces operating under rule of law: on the one hand they represent the 
Leviathan’s sword that enforces the social contract, while on the other their authority is 
constrained by necessity and they are to be held accountable, as the possibility of 
investigations indicates.102 From the point of view of militarization, however, the FPUs 
introduce yet another blunt instrument to peacekeeping toolkit to be used last before the 
ultima ratio of military force. 
 
The examples of stabilization missions, intervention brigade, and FPUs do not change the 
problematization of adequate force that drives the militarization of peacekeeping: the UN 
faces hostile operating environments, which leads it to problematize the adequate level of 
force it may use in peacekeeping. The solution at which the UN has arrived is to prioritize 
order over the “basic principles” of peacekeeping (which it nonetheless swears to 
uphold).103 Rather, what the stabilization missions, intervention brigade and FPUs do is 
 
98 UN Secretary-General (1999c, para. 60, 1999b, para. 28). 
99 The numbers are drawn from monthly peacekeeping statistics on peacekeeping personnel by mission and 
post, available in United Nations (2009, 2019c). The report from November 2009 was the first to distinguish 
between different types of police, hence the time frame. 
100 DPKO & DFS (2009, paras. 28–39). 
101 DPKO & DFS (2008a, para. 100). 
102 In contrast to the sanitized image given by UN policy documents, critical observers have noted that the 
accountability of militarized UN police has not developed in equal measure with their broadening 
discretionary powers. As a result, FPUs, who by virtue of being peacekeepers enjoy immunity from 
prosecution in host state’s courts, have been allowed to suspend habeas corpus rights and to use deadly 
force. Investigations to excessive use of force have been rare and often inconsequential. (Ryan, 2011, p. 85.) 




that they take the partiality and use of force to new extremes with their heavy-handed 
approach to peacekeeping. When deploying missions with such qualities the UN must 
make decisions as to whose order it wishes to stabilize, which is partial by definition. 
Thus, stabilization missions, intervention brigade and FPUs are similar to the redefinition 
of self-defence in the sense that they open up the possibility of using forceful measures 
in the name of peace. They represent thus intertwined processes that consolidate the 
overall militarization of peacekeeping. 
 
4.3 Policing in UN peacekeeping  
Today, the police are often understood simply as a law enforcement agency that is 
responsible for control and prevention of crime. The narrow understanding obscures, 
however, the history of a regulatory agent that was responsible for establishing and 
maintaining viable order (Foucault, 2007). In his Collège de France lectures of 1978, 
Michel Foucault argued that in the 17th century France, Germany and Italy the police 
governed nothing less than “all the forms of … men’s coexistence with each other” (ibid., 
p. 326), which would include, inter alia, management of the population size, its health and 
access to basic necessities, the circulation of people and goods, and the monitoring of 
citizens’ activities (ibid., pp. 322–326). The purpose of police power was to arrange 
society in such an order that would yield maximum benefits for any potential inter-state 
rivalry. 
 
Mark Neocleous (2000), in contrast, argues that England along with other European states 
used, and indeed use, the police as an instrument for ordering civil society in its pursuit 
of class interests. In Neocleous’ view, management of the poor and especially their 
ending-up at the disposal of the labour market was in the interest of the police. Franz-
Ludwig Knemeyer observes how until early 18th century there was no conceptual 
difference between the police and domestic administration. The police were concerned 
both with law enforcement as well as welfare (Knemeyer, 1980, p. 182). Each of the 
authors shed light on how policing was about viable order, improvement and reform. The 
connection has since virtually disappeared because the functions previously belonging to 
the police forces have been redistributed to other state agencies (Neocleous, 2000, pp. 89–
91). 
 
IR scholars have rediscovered the lost meaning of the police and consequently started to 




reconceptualized interventions both narrowly, in terms of law enforcement, and widely in 
the form of order-making. Perhaps the clearest reason for this interest among IR scholars 
is that international policing is no longer limited to neither cooperation between national 
police forces nor national police agencies operating outside their respective jurisdictions, 
but also includes policing by international police forces (see e.g. Greener, 2009, 2011). 
International police authorities make and guard order both at inter-state and intra-state 
levels. In peacekeeping context, peacekeepers enforce inter-state order by suppressing 
violent clashes. A case in point is the previously described first UN peacekeeping mission, 
UNEF. At the intra-state level, international interventions have become a means to police 
and to reform domestic societies that are seen to jeopardize international peace and 
security. (Doucet, 2017, p. 63; also Ryan, 2011.) The desire for viable order is, according 
to this new reading, at the heart of international interventions.  
 
There are insightful analyses in literatures on development and international relations that 
shed further light on what motivates interventions. First, in so far as interventions are in 
the reform business, they have been noted to be animated by a “will to improve”, the will 
to “to enhance [the recipient’s] capacity for action, and to direct it” (Li, 2007, p. 5). 
Capacity for action, in turn, is thought to emanate from properly functioning state 
institutions and therefore repairing or (re-)building them has come to define peace 
operations’ approach to fostering order, especially after the Cold War (Richmond, 2005, 
pp. 157–158). Finally, the will to improve the functioning of state institutions rests on an 
ethos of “post-liberal state-building”, which construes sovereignty as a quantifiable 
capacity that can be measured in terms of good governance as well as a set of 
responsibilities for which states can be held accountable. And conversely, poor 
performance in matters of, say, security and justice sector and/or failure to live up to or 
violation of sovereign responsibilities, such as protection of civilians, triggers 
intervention to reform these sectors. (Chandler, 2010, pp. 47–55.) International policing 
through interventions thus pursues orderly society and reform not for the sake of making 
the recipient state viable vis-à-vis other states, but for the sake of making it a responsible 
member of the international community. 
 
The final feature that sets international policing interventions apart from for example 
warfighting is reasonable force. Traditionally in combat, force is used to destroy the 
enemy, whereas for the police, force is a means to attain compliance. It is to be used only 




reasonable force, as we shall see, is manifest in peacekeeping at several levels: in 
peacekeepers’ rules of engagement and use of force, in the UN charter and its exhaustion 
principle (arts. 39–42), and in the division of labour between international organizations 
participating in peace operations. It is the organizing principle of peace operations, from 
the grass-roots level to high-politics.   
 
Conceiving of peace operations as policing in the broad sense of the word helps to 
understand that as interventions for peace and security, they draw on a diverse toolkit that 
ranges from consensual methods (development aid) to coercion (military force). In IR 
literature, interventions are sometimes conflated exclusively with the latter (e.g. 
Holzgrefe & Keohane, 2003), whilst development aid and other reformative enterprises 
are left outside this literature precisely because of the absence of coercion (e.g. D. 
Williams, 2013). The broader conception of police and the notion of reasonable force paint 
a different picture of intervention; one in which various means from sticks to carrots are 
used to foster properly functioning institutions – that is, good order. Starting from this 
vantage point, this section shall examine not only the rise of the UN’s constabulary force 
but also the attempts to administer and reform domestic societies with the intention of 
improving the recipient states performance and turning them into responsible members 
of international community.   
 
4.3.1 Policing the former colonies 
The roots of UN policing lie primarily in the colonial world. Indeed, the earliest 
operations were either deployed to the former colonies of European states or to ensure 
seamless decolonization. The first peacekeeping force, UNEF, is a prime example of this: 
the mission was sent to contain the conflict that erupted after Egypt had declared a martial 
law and nationalized the maritime company managing the Suez Canal. The Canal was a 
major strategic interest for the United Kingdom and other European powers, and the 
nationalization limited their access to it. The dispute over access to the Canal quickly 
escalated into armed conflict with Egypt on the one side against Britain, France and Israel 
on the other. (see Orford, 2011, pp. 57–68.) In a way, UNEF was thus deployed to police 
the inter-state order. But it also undertook limited law enforcement tasks in the course of 
its duration and the troops had limited police powers of arrest and detention (Hansen, 
2001, p. 26).104  
 





The second-ever peace operation, ONUC was also deployed to bring order to the formerly 
colonized world. In contrast to UNEF, however, the mission in the Congo was in many 
respects a fully-fledged police operation. Indeed, as sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 above 
describe, ONUC’s mandate quickly expanded to public order enforcement, which 
included, inter alia, protecting civilians, and detaining and deporting foreign mercenaries 
(though critics have pointed out no actual police officers served in its ranks (apart from 
the few month stint by Nigerian and Ghanaian police, according to Broes & Emery, 1998, 
p. 367), and military contingents were not trained for these tasks (e.g. Findlay, 2002, p. 
66)).  
 
An interesting example of the UN policing the colonized world comes from the early 
1960s Oceania. At that time, a conflict had arisen over the ownership of the West New 
Guinea between its former colonizer, the Netherlands, and a prospective owner, 
Indonesia. The parties reached an agreement and, to ensure a smooth transition, the trade 
partners agreed to host a peace operation in the West New Guinea. For this purpose, the 
short-lived UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) and its “police arm”, the UN 
Security Force (UNSF), were established in October 1962 to administer West New Guinea 
under the leadership of a UN Administrator appointed by the Secretary-General. The tasks 
of the Temporary Executive Authority included introducing new legislation, appointing 
officials (including law enforcement), and guaranteeing civil liberties and property rights. 
The Security Force, with its 1,500 infantry personnel, was responsible for aiding the 
Papuan police force in its task of maintaining law and order so that the Temporary 
Executive Authority could perform its duties (Gruss, 2005; MacQueen, 2015).105 The 
example is interesting because it shows how ambitious UN policing was from the 
beginning.  
 
The early peacekeeping experiences thus indicate that many of the policing activities 
(arrest/detention, protection of order, property and citizens, administration of society, 
monitoring and reporting) that prevail in today’s peace operations were very much present 
already in the Cold War operations – however temporary or embryonic their manifestation 
might have been. Moreover, the nature of the missions indicates that from early on, the 
UN was concerned with disorder, be it societal or institutional. This is in line with the 
 




remark made in the previous section; it was noted how ONUC choose establishment of 
order over Hammarskjöld’s basic rules. It was the same with West New Guinea; the basic 
rules held that the UN is to remain a step away from local affairs and from enforcing 
political solutions, whilst the peace operation served ultimately as an interim 
administration for a territory. Thus, the missions indicate how the UN problematized 
disorder – the absence of proper order – and how it imposed the logic of policing upon 
peacekeeping, both in the sense of law enforcement and reform. It also allowed the 
deployment of military components for the purposes of policing (cf. Doucet, 2017, p. 115).  
 
4.3.2 From the emergence of the will to improve… 
A year after the termination of the missions in West New Guinea in March 1964, the term 
Civilian Police entered the UN peacekeeping vocabulary when the Organization deployed 
actual police officers to Cyprus. The civilian police officers serving under UNFICYP 
were to liaise with and shadow Cypriot police officers, monitor checkpoints, help settle 
ethnic disputes, investigate missing persons cases, and help with refugee relief (Schmidl, 
1998, p. 34). As this list of tasks indicates, the civilian police officers were primarily 
involved in monitoring and reporting. Policekeepers acted primarily as the UN’s eyes and 
ears on the ground and as facilitators of peaceful exchange between Greek and Turkish 
communities. Their mandate was considerably reduced from that of UNTEA and UNSF. 
After UNFICYP, moreover, the evolution of policing in UN peace operations halted for 
the next two decades as the missions established between 1964 and 1988 did not include 
police components 
 
The next phase in the evolution of UN Police began in late 1980s and the first half of the 
1990s, when the UN dispatched new missions to Namibia (1989–1990), El Salvador (1991–
1995), Cambodia (1992–1993), Somalia (1992–1995; two performing police tasks and one 
with a police component),106 Mozambique (1992–1994), Haiti (1993–1996), and several 
missions to the former Yugoslavia.107 Each mission had either a civilian police component 
or, as was the case with Mozambique, the UN established an independent civilian police 
mission to watch over the local law enforcement. Unsurprisingly, an increase of civilian 
 
106 The first mission, UNOSOM I, neither performed no public security tasks nor had manpower or 
resources to do so. This proved fateful for the mission. See Lynn and Spataro (1998). 
107 Examination of the role of the police components in each of these missions can be found in the 
contributions to Oakley, Dziedzic and Goldberg (1998). Background and basic information on past missions 




police officers followed: at the end of January 1988, the number stood at 35 individual 
officers, whereas by mid-December 1994, it had climbed up to 2130.108  
 
Organizationally, the growth in numbers led to the institutionalization and strengthening 
of the status of the police within DPKO. First, the UN Civilian Police Unit was established 
in 1993 and some eight years later, as per the proposition presented in the Brahimi 
report,109 the post of the Police Adviser was also created, which elevated the police on par 
with the military component in the DPKO chain of command (Hansen, 2001, p. 22). The 
latest reform is the so-called Peace and Security Reform that came into effect from 1 
January 2019.110 In this new architecture, the Department of Peace Operations jointly 
oversees peacekeeping operations, special political missions and non-mission settings 
with the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, suggesting a comprehensive 
approach to the management of peace and security. The police division is part of the 
Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, which is also home to Justice and 
Corrections Service; Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section; Security 
Sector Reform Unit; and UN Mine Action Service. The institutional linking of the police 
is, again, in line with the will to improve inhering in policing.  
 
Originally, however, the problematization of disorder became more prominent in UN 
peacekeeping when the semi-passive monitoring and reporting role of police officers 
started to change during the first half of the 1990s. During this period, UN officially 
abandoned the role of an apolitical keeper of the social contract, which it had maintained 
previously, and engaged in reform and development programmes for the purposes of 
social engineering. The new position spawned two overlapping approaches for fostering 
peace: capacity-building, which often took the form of “SMART policing” (Support for 
human rights, Monitoring, Advising, Reporting, and Training) and the Reform, 
Restructuring, and Rebuilding (3Rs) of law enforcement and judicial institutions. 
(Hansen, 2001, pp. 20–22; Hughes, Curth-Bibb, & Hunt, 2013, pp. 19–20.) The two 
approaches expanded policing in a way that is visible in UN peace operations even today, 




108 UN Secretary-General (1995a, p. 4).  
109 See UN Secretary-General (2000, para. 222). 




At the time of deployment, state institutions in El Salvador and Haiti were paralyzed by 
politicization, militarization of the civilian domain, and wide-spread state and non-state 
violence. To tame the situations in the two countries, the UN deployed two comprehensive 
operations that were either assigned or eventually assumed the roles of law enforcer, 
reformer and supervisor. Reform in the two countries focused especially on law 
enforcement and judicial institutions with a view to steering them toward depoliticized 
and human rights sensitive performance of duties and to teaching managerial skills and 
specialized tasks – such as forensic and investigative skills – to local authorities. In Haiti, 
development aid was even used to establish university programmes to train legal 
professionals. The supervisory capacity took the form of SMART policing that entailed 
monitoring of and reporting on local authorities both in rural and urban areas as well as 
streets and offices. This way, international police officers could mentor local authorities 
in all locations and at every level of hierarchy. (On Haiti, see Bailey, Maguire, & Pouliot, 
1998; and on El Salvador, see Stanley & Loosle, 1998.)  
 
As for law enforcement, both operations made full use of reasonable force in establishing 
good order, as per the emphasis on public security in both missions’ mandates. In El 
Salvador, the (unarmed) military component was assigned with the “traditional” 
peacekeeping task of monitoring compliance to ceasefire accord but it had no direct role 
in public security tasks per se. However, it took part in securing public order through 
other tasks, such as disarming and demobilizing armed elements. The police component, 
on the other hand, would eventually conduct even executive tasks, such as conducting 
criminal investigations and maintenance of public order and prevention of crime, in 
addition to the aforementioned tasks. (Stanley & Loosle, 1998, pp. 108–111, 115, 118–120.) 
In Haiti, both military and civilian police component were armed, though latter only 
lightly, and thus they both were trusted with maintaining public security. This was done 
by patrolling the streets, responding to crime and violence and by disarming armed 
elements and through search and seizure of weapons. Both provided election security for 
legislative, municipal and presidential elections during the latter half of 1995. (Bailey et 
al., 1998, pp. 219–221, 228–231, 240–242.)  
 
The SMART and the 3Rs approaches to policing as well as the operations in El Salvador 
and Haiti reveal the UN’s growing concern over proper order. This concern, in turn, led 
the Organization to endorse policing as a tool for fostering it. Policing took the form of 




(1998), the intervenors in Haiti were well aware of the need for “synchronization of 
actions by military and civilian police elements” (p. 221). The synchronization thus first 
recalibrated military force for the purposes of law enforcement, that is, protection of 
order, and then brought about civilian policing to supervise, mentor and reform local 
authorities and institutions.  
 
4.3.3 … To full-scale state-building 
Together with for example the mission to Cambodia, where the UN oversaw the 
organization of elections, took over administrative and public security responsibilities 
(though it did not assume executive authority; see Wills, 2009, para. 24, also 
accomppanying note 124), the missions to El Salvador and Haiti paved way for 
expansionist peace operations. There was one development, however, that consolidated 
the status of will to improve and reform in peacekeeping: connecting the performance of 
law enforcement and judicial authorities discursively with democratization. This became 
particularly evident in the UN mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH, 1995–
2002), which at first was limited to monitoring and training local law enforcement and to 
conduct joint patrolling, but turned toward a more comprehensive reform of the local law 
enforcement and judicial system at the turn of the millennium (Dziedzic & Bair, 1998, p. 
281).  
 
In Bosnia, “democratic policing” became the “guiding philosophy” for the mission. The 
UN sought to realign local law enforcement so that their primary concern would be the 
safety of communities and holding everyone equally accountable before the law. The 
police commissioner directed the UNMIBH police force to demonstrate their role in 
public service, measure the performance of officers according to a democratic standard, 
and to re-vet police forces in order to dispose of the unfit material among them. (Dziedzic 
& Bair, 1998, paras. 295–296.) Accordingly, the commissioner’s direction was captured 
in six “core programs”, which consisted of vetting and training police candidates; making 
the police organization more efficient and free from political interference; improve inter-
agency relations within the entire criminal justice, law enforcement and security sector; 
and improve trust in these institutions (den Heyer, 2012, pp. 35–38, see also p. 39, Table 
5.3). Neither the UNMIBH police task force nor the civilian administration would assume 





The importance of reform of and by the police had become a given, nonetheless. If a 
peace operation were to achieve peace, it would have to ensure functional law 
enforcement and judicial system, the discourse on democratization maintained. This 
rationale reached its zenith in 1999, when the peace operations to Kosovo (UNMIK) and 
East Timor (now Timor-Leste; UNTAET)111 were dispatched to provide the target state 
with “transitional” and “interim” administration. At the peak of its authority, the UN was 
managing the East Timorese state and the state-to-be in Kosovo: Both operations were 
established under Chapter VII of the Charter to set up and run civilian administrations to 
provide public services for the two states. These parts of the mandate included for 
example the running of civil and social services as well as preparing the states for self-
government through capacity-building.112 Besides more traditional peacekeeping tasks, 
UN came to be involved in everything from establishing customs and tax services to 
garbage disposal (Orford, 2011, p. 93). 
 
The security related parts of the mandates were no less pervasive. Both mandates state 
that the UN is to establish international security presence in league with other 
organizations and states. In Kosovo, NATO’s Kosovo Force was responsible for the 
harder edge of security services and for enforcing the cessation of hostilities, whereas in 
East Timor UN’s International Force East Timor was responsible for securing the country. 
Both military components also participated in keeping public order for example in the 
form of crowd control. The missions in East Timor and Kosovo consisted of three police 
components: Civilian Police, who were responsible for the quotidian policing tasks as 
well as mentoring local authorities once they were established; FPUs, who, as armed 
police units, participated in public security tasks; and Border Police, who were 
responsible for mediating internal and external security. Finally, Kosovar and East 
Timorese security institutions, too, fell within the remit of capacity-building concerned. 
The internationals organized the recruiting, vetting and training of new officers for the 
police and border security agencies. In East Timor, the UN assisted the government to 
review its entire security sector from the police and military to the Ministry of the Interior 
and Ministry of Defence. (Greener, 2009, pp. 32–35, 42, 45–48.) 
 
 
111 Timor-Leste hosted a string of peace operations and political missions in the course of 1990s and 2000s, 
see list of past peace operations in United Nations (n.d.-b). For brevity’s sake, however, this section focuses 
solely on the only mission with an executive mandate, United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor (UNTAET, 1999–2002). 




The powers which the mandates bestowed on the operations allowed the UN to enforce 
peace through military units, to secure public order by detaining people and by controlling 
crowds by force, and to administer justice by controlling justice departments and their 
staffing (Orford, 2011, pp. 94–95). Ever since the missions in Cambodia, Haiti, El 
Salvador and Bosnia, the problematization of disorder – understood as dysfunctional 
institutions – had thus enabled the UN to penetrate deep into the states’ hardest core. The 
most intrusive missions in Kosovo and East Timor have by now been either scaled down 
or withdrawn completely and currently the UN does not have such protectorates to 
manage. Yet, the operations showed what can be done in the name of peace and security 
if the political will is there.  
 
The ideas of SMART policing and the 3Rs, moreover, have not been abandoned. Indeed, 
of the 12 active operations with a police component, five operations with the biggest 
police presence are mandated in varying combinations to protect civilians, monitor human 
rights situation and implementation of peace accords, maintain public security, facilitate 
for example the distribution of humanitarian aid and the functioning of civilian 
organizations, build the capacity of local law enforcement by training and mentoring and 
support them in policing, support the organization of elections, and to reform security 
sector institutions.113 Numbers-wise, police presence in peace operations has 
strengthened too over time: 12 out of 13 peace operations include police components and 
their number has increased from 30 officers in 1960 to little less than 10,000 officers in 
November 2019.114  
 
4.3.4 Reasonable force in the UN policing 
The final point concerns the role of reasonable force in peace operations. As explained in 
the beginning of this section, reasonable force refers to the use of requisite force to attain 
compliance. In the context of peace operations, the UN and other involved actors must 
attain compliance from the host government as well as the broader civil society. Hence 
 
113 The tasks listed were compiled from the peace operations’ websites, see United Nations (2019a, 2019b, 
2019d, 2019e, 2019f). 
114 In November 2019, the total number of officers is 9,181. The five operations with the biggest police 
components are UNAMID in Darfur, Sudan (2,222 officers), MINUSCA in Central Africa (2,052), UNMISS 
in South Sudan (1,748), MINUSMA in Mali (1,729), and MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (1,201). The remaining operations have less than 100 officers each. The five biggest police 
components thus have more than nine out of ten police officers. The amount of officers in each operation 
was calculated from the data in United Nations (2019c) under the section “Summary of Contribution to UN 




the most comprehensive operations consisted of a cluster of actors, such as the UN and 
its agencies and sub-organizations (such as the Development Programme and High 
Commissioner for Refugees), EU, NATO, OSCE, World Bank and other financial 
institutions as well as countless NGOs. The distribution of labour among the actors in 
these clusters follows the logic of reasonable force, as the examples of Bosnia and Kosovo 
indicate: while some actors provide security on the ground (e.g. NATO and UN or for 
example a collaborative international force), others mentor and reform the police and 
other public institutions (e.g. EU, OSCE, UN Development Programme, World Bank) and 
monitor for example elections (e.g. EU and OSCE) (on Bosnia, see Dziedzic & Bair, 1998, 
p. 271; on Kosovo, see Greener, 2009, p. 33; and Ryan, 2011, pp. 115–116). Thus, actors that 
are not prepared to use force rely on diplomatic ways to compel states to reform, but the 
coercive capacities of the Security Council, NATO and armed UN peacekeepers may be 
deployed whenever necessary. 
 
This section has shown how the UN has problematized disorder, which it generally 
understands in terms of dysfunctional institutions. The absence of order in the UN’s 
thinking is to be solved by various capacity-building projects that call for reform of and 
by the police. Indeed, as Barry Ryan (2011) has put it: “[s]tatebuilding in itself is … a 
form of international community policing” (p. 126, emphasis in original). The 
problematization has opened the definition of international peace and security once again, 
with the consequence that the UN, along with other international organizations and actors, 
has adopted reform programmes that reach into the core institutions of statehood.    
 
4.4 Summary & discussion: civilian protection, militarization, and 
policing 
This chapter began by examining the UN’s problematization of violence against civilians 
from the earliest peace operations onward. Violence against civilians was first 
problematized in the course of ONUC during the first half of the 1960s. Violence against 
civilians stirred moral outrage among the mission leadership, but protection was also seen 
necessary for the general mandate to maintain order. This led the peacekeepers to deploy 
inter-positional tactics and to establish safe zones in order to provide protection against 
immediate threats – tactics that are in use even today.115 In later operations, peacekeepers 
would continue using these means, but they would extend protection to humanitarians as 
 




well. Moreover, they would help evacuating civilians. Mere response to direct attacks 
against civilians, let alone inaction, would not suffice any longer.  
 
Meanwhile, during the 1980s, violence against civilians had reached the agenda of the 
Security Council, too, as it had started to take notice of the poor observance of IHL and 
matters of humanitarian aid. This marks a change in the problematization of violence 
against civilians as it takes a more structural approach to protection than the previous 
approach, which was concerned merely with immediate threats. This development 
culminated in the case of Somalia in 1992 where the Council not only defined the conflict 
within Somalia as a threat to international peace and security but also mandated peace 
operations to carry out civilian protection tasks. The problem of violence against civilians 
thus became internationalized. This is not to say that the response to violence against 
civilians followed automatically. To the contrary, peacekeeping mandates continued to be 
vague and operating environments unforgiving for hesitant peacekeepers, as the cases of 
Rwanda and Bosnia proved. Nonetheless, the Somali case indicates that the Council had 
acknowledged the existence of violence against civilians and the need to address the 
problem.  
 
Violence against civilians continued to pester the UN, however, and the failures to protect 
pushed the Organization to do soul-searching. Consequently, the UN started slowly to 
integrate civilian protection into its peace and security agenda. The first signs of this came 
in the form of Secretary-General’s reports in 1998 and 1999, which were soon followed 
by a string of peace operations with a mandate to protect. The initial reports and 
operations did not immediately translate into policy, however, as it took nearly a decade 
for the UN to start developing its doctrine of Protection of Civilians. The first draft of the 
POC policy for peace operations was published in 2010 and the actual policy with 
accompanying manuals following five and seven years later. Today, the majority of 
peacekeepers and peace operations are deployed to protect civilians at every step of a 
peace operation. After the atrocities of the 1990s, the problematization has remained much 
the same; at its core is the moral indignation, but the concern for maintaining proper order 
that first emerged during ONUC is still present. This is most clearly indicated by the three 
tiers of the POC policy which direct peacekeepers to protect civilian by maintaining order 





The emergence of civilian protection discourse, techniques and technologies is, however, 
but one trajectory that has shaped UN protection of civilians. The chapter examined two 
other such trajectories: militarization and policing. From the very beginning militarization 
was tied to civilian protection, as the example of ONUC showed. The driving factor 
behind militarization of peacekeeping is the problematization of adequate force; the UN 
found itself too often in a situation where it could not respond to aggressions or cope with 
the hostile environment. As the examination of peace operations in the sections of civilian 
protection and militarization showed, the problematization concerned order as much as it 
did self-defence. Force was deemed requisite not only for defending against immediate 
threats but also for order-making.  
 
The increasing use of force proved to be problematic because it went against the 
peacekeeping principles of consent, neutrality and impartiality that had become central 
tenets for the UN peacekeeping imaginary after their initial formulation by the second 
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in the late 1950s. More assertive peace operations 
entailed, firstly, making choices regarding the recognition of legitimate authority in the 
host state. The question became whom to lend political, military, and financial support, 
and whom to leave without support or even undermine. The questions weighed on UN’s 
desire to be (seen as) impartial. Secondly, a more assertive approach opened up the 
concept of self-defence and the thorny issue of using force. As the militarization section 
above showed, self-defence was redefined as defence-of-mandate which, ultimately, 
paved the way for the juridical relocation of peace operations under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, thereby blurring the distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement. 
This, finally, strained on the requirement of consent because even if the deployment of an 
operation was based on consensus between the UN and the recipient state, the consent 
would matter less once the mission had boots on the ground.  
 
The broadened concept of self-defence also allowed the deployment of “bigger guns” in 
the name of peace and security. This is exemplified by the stabilization missions, the 
intervention brigade deployed to Congo and the increasing reliance on armed 
policekeepers, the FPUs. Bigger guns did not change the overall problematization of 
adequate force, however, because these innovations emanated from the same source and 
became permissible by the redefinition of self-defence. What they do is that they further 
entrench the redefinition of self-defence as defence-of-mandate into the UN peacekeeping 




life practices at the Security Council as well as in quotidian peacekeeping. The embedding 
brings the redefinition of self-defence into life.  
 
The rise of police and policing, finally, came about as the result of problematization of 
disorder, or the concern over dysfunctional institutions and the fostering of good order 
through law enforcement and reform. From the very beginning, policing in UN peace 
operations showed these characteristics; indeed, ONUC was engaged in law enforcement 
by deporting mercenaries whereas UNTEA sought to enforce the law but also to establish 
local law enforcement. The primacy of order in peace operations was not as clear then as 
it is now, however, and the more intrusive reform programmes had to wait before 
becoming more prominent. This development began with monitoring and mentoring, then 
progressed to policing through Support, Monitoring, Advising, Reporting, and Training 
(SMART), and to the Reform, Restructuring, and Rebuilding (3Rs) of security and justice 
sectors. The trajectory culminated in the Kosovo and East Timor missions which assumed 
interim authority over the host states and either established or reconstructed security, 
justice and political institutions all the while enforcing order on the streets. The UN has 
not deployed equally comprehensive missions since the turn of the millennium, but the 
police techniques of reform and improvement are part of peace operations even today.  
 
The final point regarding policing in peace operations is that policing rendered reasonable 
force the organizing principle of peace operations. To attain compliance of the target state 
of intervention, a myriad of international organizations contributes to its reform, using 
various measures ranging from Security Council sanctions to financial sticks and carrots 
used by international financial institutions and finally to order-making and -keeping on 
the ground by peacekeepers. The operations in Kosovo and East Timor were the high 
point of this modus operandi, but the principle was present in Haiti and El Salvador and 
even in the workings of UNTEA in West New Guinea. The idea is that the international 
community, acting through peace operations and following the “post-liberal state-
building” ethos (Chandler, 2010), compels states that are found to be unstable and 








The question remains, however, how is civilian protection related to all this? To begin 
with militarization, it was observed how peace operations’ mandates have gradually 
become more permissive of use of force. Another key feature of militarization is the 
expanding definition of self-defence. Finally, militarization manifested in the form of new 
innovations that provided peace operations with “bigger guns”. These include the 
stabilisation missions, MONUSCO’s intervention brigade, and the Formed Police Units. 
Ever since the early operations in the 1960s, the difficult situations to which peacekeepers 
were sent have provided the necessary push for these innovations. Hostile environments 
have forced the UN to question the adequate level of force.  
 
These developments are related to civilian protection, too. This is indicated, first of all, 
by the fact that an overwhelming majority of peacekeepers and peace operations in the 
2000s and 2010s are mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to protect civilians 
by any means necessary. The majority includes the stabilization missions as well as the 
intervention brigade. Besides mandates, secondly, the POC guidelines for both military116 
and police117 components incorporate civilian protection into peacekeepers’ quotidian 
activities. Finally, Protection of Civilians has gradually become a central task for the 
militarized part of the UN police, the FPUs: in the first UN policy on the FPUs from 2009,  
protection of civilians is listed as part their public order management tasks,118 but the 
revised policy from 2016 redefines the protection of civilians as one the FPUs’ “core 
functions”.119 The reformulation is modest but it nonetheless indicates an increased 
emphasis on civilian protection.  
 
These factors indicate how Protection of Civilians is intimately linked with militarization: 
On the one hand, POC necessitates militarization because without requisite force 
protection would be impossible. On the other hand, militarization defines in part what 
POC entails for the UN – that is, how civilians are to be protected. Protection of Civilians 
thus serves as a new language that justifies a permissible approach to the use of force. 
Despite its presence in the doctrine, it was also noted that militarization had not resulted 
in any consistent use of force by peacekeepers in the field because of diverging views as 
to what peacekeepers are obliged to do when mandated to protect civilians.  
 
116 DPKO & DFS (2015a, 2017a). 
117 DPKO & DFS (2017b). 
118 DPKO & DFS (2009, para. 17). 





The connection between UN POC and policing is even more profound. In fact, it is 
policing, broadly conceived, that connects the different trajectories within the dispositif 
of UN POC. As we saw in section 3.1 above, the POC policy divides protection into three 
tiers (protection through dialogue and engagement, provision of physical protection, and 
establishment of a protective environment) and four phases (prevention, pre-emption, 
response and consolidation). (This, in effect, is the reasonable force paradigm examined 
in the previous section.) The first tier includes actions such as 
dialogue with a perpetrator or potential perpetrator, conflict resolution and mediation 
between parties to the conflict, persuading the government and other relevant actors to 
intervene to protect civilians, public information and reporting on POC, and other 
initiatives that seek to protect civilians through public information, dialogue and direct 
engagement.120 
With its emphasis on dialogue, the first tier is about persuasion with soft means.  
 
According to the second tier, if dialogue proves insufficient, peacekeepers may resort to 
forceful measures. This tier consists of all means that involve the threat or use of force 
“to prevent, deter, pre-empt and respond to situations” that endanger civilians.121 While 
the tiers are not to be construed as sequential and they may overlap, escalation is integral 
to the policy. Moreover, both military components and policekeepers are to use minimum 
level of force as required by the situation. The logic is that level of force escalates from 
“authoritative presence” (cooperative control tactics such as verbal commands and 
apprehension tactics) to “non-deadly force” (tactics for control, compelling compliance, 
and for defence) and ultimately to “deadly force” (use of firearms to vital areas).122 In 
accordance with this logic, peacekeepers are allowed to use force to protect civilians even 
against host state forces or elements serving under them whenever there is a reasonable 
belief of hostile intent.123 Protection by both military components and policekeepers is 
thus modelled on the reasonable force paradigm. 
 
 
120 DPKO & DFS (2015b, para. 30). 
121 Ibid. 
122 See the “use of force continuum” visualized in DPKO & DFS (2017a, p. 5, see also paras. 11–12); see 
also the PoC Template for Force in the military guidelines on civilian protection (DPKO & DFS, 2015a, 
Annex B). The continuum presented here applies only to military components, but the logic is essentially 
the same for armed police officers: use of force must be necessary, proportional and escalate gradually. See 
DPKO & DFS (2016, paras. 72–74). 




The third tier, consolidation of peaceful environment, finally, represents the other 
dimension of policing: monitoring and reform. This tier includes activities undertaken to 
support political processes and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
programmes, to reform security and justice sectors, and to facilitate the return of the 
internally displaced and refugees, among other things.124 The reforms are often 
programmatic in nature and they are initiated by Security Council resolutions, which is 
to say their level of coercion depends on the Council’s mandate. In the past, the UN has 
not reformed state agencies through brute force, but coercion is not unprecedented. 
Indeed, the High Representatives of the UN missions to Bosnia and East Timor enjoyed 
first a de facto and then de jure executive authority over the host state, which allowed 
them to impose legislation, overrule decisions by and even dismiss democratically elected 
local officials, as Anne Orford (2011, p. 99) has noted. 
 
The three tiers suggest, to begin, that the problematization of violence against civilians 
implies a conception of international peace and security that goes beyond armed conflict 
and peace between states. These concerns are not forgotten, but as is the case especially 
with the third tier, the problematization also includes the safety of individuals as well as 
the idea of functional society. International peace and security is thus about good order, 
and the role of Protection of Civilians is to provide a platform through which states are 
prepared for mature statehood that includes the will and ability to protect civilians within 
their territory. Conversely, if civilians are not properly protected there can be neither 
peace nor security. And if the Security Council so deems, lack of protection triggers the 
“UN policing machine” (Ryan, 2011, pp. 86–87), which may involve anything from 
“traditional peacekeeping” to enforcement and to development aid and state-building 
programmes. This conception of international peace and security is enshrined in 
numerous UN documents dating back at least to 1999.125 Together the diplomatic 
approach of tier one, peacebuilding approach of tier three and the provision of physical 
protection of tier two make the UN POC a form of policing in both narrow and wide 
 
124 DPKO & DFS (2015b, para. 30). 
125 For instance the first resolution in which the Security Council endorsed the POC concept, Resolution 
1265 (UN Security Council, 1999b), reaffirms “the primary responsibility of States to ensure their 
protection” (p. 2) and “[e]mphasizes the responsibility of States to end impunity and to prosecute those 
responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law” 
(para. 6). This idea is also part and parcel of the R2P concept formulated in the General Assembly’s World 
Summit Outcome Report (2005, para. 138). The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2019) has 
collected all the references to the related principles of R2P in Security Council resolutions and Council 





senses of the word. It thus incorporates both the reasonable force paradigm with the 
desire of good order.  
 
Moreover, the lens of policing helps to understand the role of militarization in 
peacekeeping too: peacekeepers’ coercive measures range from verbal commands to 
deadly force. Deadly force has two sub-categories distinguished by the level of force: 
deadly force of police and that of soldiers. According to the DPKO policy Authority, 
Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, military components 
assume leadership over the police whenever there is “sustained use of firearms or military 
weaponry”. Until then, the police have primacy.126 On the one hand, then, military force 
represents the far-end of the continuum of reasonable force. On the other hand, the 
military may be assigned with tasks that are essentially those of the police, such as 
intelligence gathering for situational awareness, patrolling, investigation and collection 
of evidence, controlling movement, and riot/crowd control.127 
 
This is where the present thesis is in slight disagreement with Doucet’s (2017, pp. 114–115) 
assessment. He first connects UN POC with policing and order-making, a point we both 
share. But then he argues that 
the rationality that is the protection of civilians allows for this transition between police 
and military components of peacekeeping. It is the protection of civilians that enables 
the deployment of military assets as a public order management force. Once on policing 
duties to protect civilians, the deployment of military force can be calibrated in a manner 
that resembles police power. (Doucet, 2017, p. 115, emphasis added) 
There are three minor imprecisions here. First, Doucet does not seem to fully appreciate 
that UN POC expands the concept of international peace and security into the domestic 
sphere, as argued above. This expansion strengthens the UN’s authority vis-à-vis states. 
The second imprecision is semantic. It lies in the remark about how the “transition 
between police and military components” that allows the latter to function in a manner 
that resembles policing. The wording implies that the two are similar yet distinct forms 
of power. It is not a matter of resemblance, however.  The military is, as a matter of fact, 
deployed to perform police functions – to protect civilians and enforce order – as per the 
POC policy. 
 
126 DPKO & DFS (2008a, para. 100). FPUs can resort to lethal force only when it is absolutely necessary 
and less-than-lethal means have been exhausted (DPKO & DFS, 2016, para. 71). 





The last imprecision is historical. As we saw in the two previous sections, even the earliest 
operations (ONUC, UNTEA, and UNEF to a smaller degree) had military performing 
police functions. Thus, it is not protection of civilians that allows the transition from 
military to police, but the problematization of disorder and the redefinition of self-defence 
as defence-of-mandate that allowed the repurposing of military force for policing. 
Protection of civilians is but one factor more that supports the reasonable force paradigm. 
In any case, military contingents and FPUs have become an integral part of the policing 
logic of UN POC that operates on the basis of reasonable force. Next chapter continues 
the examination of problematization of violence against civilians by turning to Secretary-




5 UN and the problematization of violence against civilians II: 
The Protection of Civilians discourse 
This chapter continues the examination of the problematization of armed conflict, 
violence against civilians and civilian protection in the Secretary-General’s report series 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. The series comprises 15 reports published 
between 1999 and 2019. The chapter is a continuation of the preceding chapter in the sense 
that it examines the rationalization and justification of the practices of protection that had 
emerged ever since the 1960s. In other words, whereas the previous chapter used scholarly 
literature to reconstruct key historical trajectories that have shaped United Nations peace 
operations, the present chapter examines the POC discourse and how it has developed 
during the past 20 years. How does the discourse absorb the insecurities that civilians face 
within the remit of the UN? Why the UN’s solutions to the problematizations of violence 
against civilians, adequate force and disorder might appear reasonable? What kind of 
social sorting does the discourse entail? Answering these questions is the task of this 
chapter.  
 
The answers are sought with the alternative conceptualization laid out in Chapter 3. 
Protection is here taken as a word that has a degree of stability in so far as it implies a 
fixed social setting: one between the referent object(s), protector(s) and insecurity. 
However, who protects whom from what is a question that may be answered again and 
again ad infinitum by different actors. UN POC is one answer among many to this 
question. This much became evident from the mainstream analyses trying to make sense 
of the conceptual mesh that the Protection of Civilians represents. This also implies that 
the UN POC discourse is a specific way of thinking a problem and how it could be 
managed. It is a problematization. It emerged to justify and rationalize the nascent 
protection programme examined in the previous chapter.  
 
The entire chapter is dedicated to the analysis of this problematization. It first examines 
the nature of armed conflict and the distribution of protective responsibilities that the POC 
reports envision. Next, section 5.2 unfolds into nine sub-sections, each of which examines 
an insecurity that threatens or puts civilians at risk. Due to its length, the section concludes 
with a summary of the insecurities, and then moves to the concluding section to bring all 
the threads of the entire chapter together. The concluding section also presents a lengthy 




other peace and security discourses that originate in the 1990s and, finally, the politics of 
protection more generally.. 
 
5.1 Armed conflict and the international community in the UN POC 
discourse 
The United Nations Protection of Civilians discourse postulates the nature of armed 
conflict has changed. This new type of conflict is, in the Secretary-General’s analysis, one 
in which civilians are increasingly victimized: “As is now well known, civilians, rather 
than combatants, are the main casualties of conflicts today.”128 Important here is not only 
the fact that civilians suffer, but that civilian casualties are characteristic of “the new 
warfare that has emerged” – a feature which is taken to be largely absent in yesterday’s 
conflicts.129 These arguments often feature in the opening section of the reports, which 
underlines how they serve as the premise of the report, rather than an argument to be 
developed.130 Other characteristics are the non-international nature of conflict, 
asymmetry between parties to the conflict, displacement, counter-terrorism operations 
and private military and security actors.131 The reality of armed conflict today is that 
“large numbers of civilians remain at risk of, or suffer, brutality and degradation. Some 
are simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. Others are deliberately targeted and 
subjected to atrocities in an environment of almost total impunity.”132 The multifaceted 
understanding of armed conflict today sets the scene for a broad understanding of 
protection. 
 
Similarly, the vision of protection, its organization and participants, is multifaceted. The 
bottom line for the Secretary-General is that states and other parties to a conflict are the 
primary responsible parties for the provision of protection within their territories.133 That 
is, they should first and foremost observe international humanitarian law. Furthermore, 
they ought to avoid civilian casualties, allow and support the distribution of humanitarian 
aid, and provide protection for the displaced. However, this fundament comes often with 
a qualification: if a state or parties to the conflict are “unable or unwilling” to fulfil their 
 
128 UN Secretary-General (2002, para. 12).  
129 UN Secretary-General (2005b, para. 3).  
130 See UN Secretary-General (1999e, para. 8, 2001, para. 3, 2004, para. 3, 2012, para. 4, 2013, para. 8, 2015b, 
para. 4, 2016, para. 3, 2018, para. 5, 2019, paras. 4–5). 
131 UN Secretary-General (2007, paras. 5, 7–9, also 2009b, para. 24, 2019, paras. 25–27).  
132 UN Secretary-General (2007, para. 4).   
133 See UN Secretary-General (2001, para. 7, 2002, para. 37, 2004, para. 24, 2005b, para. 21, 2007, para. 3, 




responsibilities, as the truism goes, the so called international community (the UN, other 
international organizations and non-governmental organizations) may step in. This 
interventionist logic became entrenched in the UN parlance especially after the 
endorsement of the R2P concept in 2005,134 although it had appeared in the POC reports 
in one form or another even before.135  
 
The protective responsibilities trickle down in other forms, too. Third parties, such as 
regional organizations, are expected to share information and best practices in order to 
improve protection. Domestic civil societies and NGOs, on the other hand, must be 
harnessed not only to provide relief and assistance but also to serve as the wider 
international community’s eyes and ears in the field. Private sector serves as a service and 
commodity provider in the Secretary-General’s vision, a supporting actor in the broader 
peacebuilding efforts. At the level of individuals, women and particularly children, 
though mostly victims, are to be utilized as mediators, economic actors and liaisons 
through which for example disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation programmes 
can be facilitated.136  
 
Secretary-General’s thoughts on peace operations’ role in civilian protection are based on 
the idea of a “broad prevention agenda”137: civilian protection is “a whole-of-mission 
endeavour encompassing civilian, military and police functions such as engaging with 
local communities, mediating disputes, monitoring human rights violations and gathering 
information to prevent future violence.”138 Besides physically protecting endangered 
civilians, especially vulnerable groups, military and police components are to provide the 
necessary security guarantees for non-UN actors involved in protection, whilst civilian 
personnel are to engage in such activities as diplomacy, improvement of security and law 
 
134 See UN General Assembly (2005, paras. 138–140) and UN Security Council resolution 1674 (2006). 
135 UN Secretary-General (2001, paras. 24, 51, 2004, paras. 24, 39, 2005b, paras. 6, 28, 2007, paras. 3, 19, 
2009b, para. 58, 2010, para. 50, 2015b, paras. 7, 39, 44, 2016, para. 55). In the 1999 report, Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan (1999e, para. 67, also p. 20, recommendation 35; see also UN Secretary-General, 1998a, para. 
35) called for humanitarian intervention in dire situations after which the interventionist logic and rhetoric 
become less vocal. Generally, it is the state responsibilities that get more and more emphasis in later reports. 
This is in line with for example Security Council’s resolutions invoking R2P, which often simply state that 
protection of civilians is the responsibility of states and national governments (for relevant excerpts, see 
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2019).    
136 This brief summary of protective actors and their roles is based on an early report (UN Secretary-
General, 2001, paras. 46–63), but the vision remains fundamentally the same in later reports.  
137 UN Secretary-General (2018, para. 5). 




institutions, as well as community outreach and other peacebuilding tasks.139 Peace 
operations are also one way for the UN to liaise with other protection actors such as 
humanitarian NGOs and civil society groups.140 In spite of labelling civilian protection a 
peacekeeping priority, however, underlying the broad prevention agenda is the same 
protection logic that defines R2P: civilian protection is first and foremost the 
responsibility of states themselves, which the UN and international community ought to 
support through, for example, development programmes or peace operations.141  
 
In sum, this section has demonstrated how the UN POC discourse is premised on the 
notion of a new type of armed conflict that increasingly victimizes civilians. The problem 
is taken to be so severe that it warrants the attention of the international community, which 
has to address the problem comprehensively if it is to deal with it, while still remembering 
that it is the states who are primarily responsible for protecting civilians. As shall be 
discussed in the closing section of this chapter, this is significant for understanding the 
overall security logic of the UN POC. 
 
5.2 Insecurities and referent objects in the UN POC discourse 
This section turns to the construction of insecurities in the UN POC discourse. Table 5.1 
below lists the nine main sources of insecurity identified in the UN POC discourse 
between 1999 and 2019. The table illustrates when an insecurity appears in the reports and 
when it disappears (if this is the case). The table thus illustrates constancy and fluctuation 
of insecurities in the POC reports. It does not indicate the importance of a given insecurity, 
however, because gravity is determined more by qualitative than quantitative factors. The 
ensuing sections therefore analyse in detail the qualitative features of these insecurities. 
They ask what the insecurities risk or threaten and how they do so. Of interest is also 
change in the sub-discourses: have the sub-discourses changed and if yes, how? While 
the temporal aspects of the sub-discourses have little importance for the main conclusions 
of this thesis, they are nonetheless important because the temporal element helps to avoid 
too far-reaching generalizations. Moreover, the temporal shifts in the discourse are of 
general interest.  
 
 
139 UN Secretary-General (2005b, para. 23, 2009b, paras. 49, 53, 2010, paras. 36–42, 2012, paras. 54–55, 2013, 
paras. 43, 45–46, 48–49).   
140 UN Secretary-General (2012, paras. 52, 54).  




I deduced the categories by identifying all the factors that the Secretary-General 
considered threatening, risky or harmful for civilians and civilian protection. This is not 
to say I first counted each and every reference to different insecurities, and then 
categorized the observations into the table. Instead, my focus lay in the meaningful 
references that specify how a menace is or might become a matter of insecurity. Thus, in 
the final analysis, I included for example references to “terrorism” that illustrate how the 
phenomenon endangers the distinction between civilians and combatants. Conversely, I 
discarded passing references to terrorist acts that might have been negative in tone, but 
not substantive.   
 
A general remark about the insecurities is in order before examining the individual 
insecurities. The insecurities listed in the reports do not constitute a mortal enemy à la 
Schmitt. Rather, as will be detailed below, they form a discursive web of insecurities, 
which together make life uncertain and precarious, and sometimes even dangerous. This 
is curious from a theoretical point of view because, as we saw in chapter two, 
securitization theory asserts that securitization often revolves around enmity and the 
naming of an existential enemy – in other words, the social construction of the menacing 
Other. A word query of “enemy” throughout the POC reports shows that the word 
“enemy” is almost completely absent from the reports. The query returns six hits: the 
reports from 2004, 2007 and 2010 each mention the word once, whereas the 2009 report 
mentions it thrice.142 Each report discusses how attacks against enemies by the parties to 
a conflict affect civilians, but the UN does not seem to have enemies of its own, only 
parties to conflicts.  
 
A query of the more general word “threat” and stemmed words, in turn, shows that threats 
are discussed in every report, but when examined in context, the nature of threats remains 
vague. When threats are named, they are acts, lifeless objects or phenomena and 
processes, such as commercial exploitation of conflicts, crimes against humanity, 
explosives, genocide, mixing of combatants into civilian population, obstruction of 
humanitarian assistance, piracy, sexual exploitation of civilians, terrorism and war crimes, 
but never individual actors.143 The amorphous nature of threats that cannot be located in 
any distinct problem underscores the emphasis on complexity that underlies the “new 
 
142 UN Secretary-General (2004, para. 4, 2007, para. 7, 2009b, paras. 24, 46, 2010, para. 8).  
143 UN Secretary-General (1999e, para. 67, 2002, paras. 12, 34, 61, 2004, para. 10, 2009b, para. 41, 2010, para. 




wars” premise of the UN POC discourse. Consequently, there is no one enemy whose 
elimination would solve the problem of violence against civilians. The ensuing sub-
section illustrate how the insecurities are many, and to protect civilians they must be 
managed. 
 
Table 5.1 Insecurity sub-discourse as they feature in the Secretary-General’s POC reports 1999–2019.144 
Insecurity sub-
discourse 




































































x x x x x x       x   
Denial and 
obstruction of aid 
and protection 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Displacement x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Hate media x x              
Ill-designed 
sanctions 
x               
Lawlessness and 
dysfunctional justice 
and security sectors 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Socio-economic 
disruption  
x  x x x x  x      x x 




x   x  x x x x x x x x x x 
 
The recurrence of the myriad of insecurities has varied remarkably over the years in the 
reports, as the table illustrates: the only constant insecurities are the denial and 
obstruction of protection, displacement, and lawlessness and dysfunctional justice and 
security sectors. They feature in each report. The rest of the sub-discourses feature in the 
reports unevenly. The sub-discourse weapons technologies and proliferation of weapons 
is almost constant as it is discussed in twelve reports. Commercial exploitation (occurs in 
7 reports), socio-economic disruption (8) and (counter-)terrorism (8) on the other hand, 
are little less but still relatively prominent as they occur in around half of the reports. 
 
144 I used the query function of NVivo produce this table. To do so, I ensured that the absences of insecurities 
are correct and therefore did not query the insecurities that featured in every report. Based on key words 
selected during the initial perusal, I searched for stemmed words in order to cast as wide a net as possible. 
The root words were: “commercial” and “exploit” for commercial exploitation; “displace” for 
displacement; “media” and “journalist” for hate media; “sanction” for ill-designed sanctions; “social” and 
“economic” for socio-economic disruption; “terror” for (counter-)terrorism; and “weapon,” “munition,” 
“mine,” and “drone” for weapons technologies & proliferation. After the queries, it was possible to judge 




Finally, there are the less-frequent hate-media (2) and ill-designed sanctions (1) sub-
discourses that disappeared from the reports shortly after their introduction.  
 
5.2.1 Commercial exploitation 
In Secretary-General’s discourse, commercial exploitation refers to the kind of 
exploitation that undermines civilians’ capacity to survive from the conflict environment 
as well as to exploitation that prolongs combat and sustains the threat to civilians. The 
most obvious harmful conflict dynamic is the confiscation and looting of civilian property 
and belongings by the parties to the conflict for the purpose of supporting and funding 
combat.145 Another harmful dynamic is that of the “resource curse”, which refers to the 
competition over natural resources by states, non-state actors and private corporations 
that in weakly governed parts of the world not only drains the region of its wealth but also 
may result in or sustain armed conflict and therefore also violence against civilians.146 A 
third dynamic of commercial exploitation relates to gender based violence and especially 
to sexual abuse and exploitation: while women and children face sexual violence as such 
during times of conflict they may also become prey for human traffickers, or they may be 
enslaved or forced to prostitution. The insecurity here arises, according to the reports, 
from the uneven power-relations that leave women and children vulnerable vis-à-vis the 
parties to the conflict as well as humanitarians and peacekeepers.147  
 
As the insecurity dynamics presented above indicate, the apparent referent objects of this 
insecurity are the civilians – exploited men, women and children – and the precarious 
condition arising from their subordinate position. Yet, Secretary-General sees here other 
dynamics too that give the insecurity transnational dimensions:  
While armed conflicts may frequently occur within rather than across borders, they 
nonetheless have implications for the regions where they are fought. These include the 
flow of refugees seeking safety in neighbouring countries, human trafficking, the illicit 
flow of small arms and the illegal exploitation of natural resources. In many cases, such 
as that of West Africa, conflict in one country contributes to overall instability in the 
region, requiring regional approaches to the protection of civilians.148 
 
145 UN Secretary-General (2004, para. 22, 2005b, para. 3, 2007, paras. 52–54). 
146 UN Secretary-General (1999e, para. 13, 2001, para. 61, 2002, para. 58, 2004, para. 49, 2005b, para. 39, 
2007, para. 53).  
147 UN Secretary-General (1999e, para. 18, 2001, para. 59, 2002, paras. 31, 54, 56, 2005b, para. 39, 2017, 
paras. 12, 65). Sexual abuse and exploitation by peacekeepers and humanitarian workers are well-known 
problems and therefore they are sometimes considered as sources of insecurity too.  




Emphasized in the quote are the forms of commercial exploitation that may have 
transnational implications – viz. human trafficking and exploitation of natural resources. 
Thus, while prima facie a threat to civilians, commercial exploitation can become an 
international security matter because it may jeopardize regional stability.  
 
5.2.2 Denial and obstruction of protection 
The second source of insecurity, denial and obstruction of protection, has been constant 
topic in the POC reports. Its status was institutionalized in 2009 when the Secretary-
General named ‘humanitarian access’ as one of the ‘core challenges’ of civilian 
protection. In 2017, humanitarian access featured among the three POC “protection 
priorities”, which the two subsequent reports share too.149 The appointment of core 
challenges and protection priorities indicate the institutionalization of this idea because 
they serve as templates for future POC reports and thereby lay path for observing 
insecurities. According to the reports, denial comes in many shapes and forms, and while 
it occasionally results from intense conflicts, it is often deliberate obstruction. Forms of 
deliberate sabotage are often used under the guise of sovereign prerogative. When aid and 
protection are not outright denied, they may for example be sabotaged through 
bureaucratic means, such as denials of visas for foreign personnel, as well as constraints 
on operations (e.g. curfews) and restrictions on free movement (e.g. roadblocks). 
Sometimes international personnel are intimidated with violence, attacked, abducted or 
even murdered. Aid convoys are also targeted and robbed.150  
 
In the reports, the insecurity of obstruction arises primarily from the indirect harm it 
causes to civilians: “the denial of access prolongs suffering and kills people.”151 This logic 
underlies all discussions of denial and obstruction either explicitly or implicitly and is 
therefore fundamental for this category. Generally, Secretary-General’s discourse on 
 
149 See UN Secretary-General (2009b, 2017, 2018, paras. 20–30, 2019, paras. 38–44). The five core challenges 
are enhancing compliance by parties to conflict with international law, enhancing compliance with the law 
by non-State armed groups, enhancing protection through more effective and better resourced peacekeeping 
and other relevant missions, enhancing humanitarian access, and enhancing accountability for violations of 
the law. The three protection priorities are: enhance respect for IHL and IHRL and promote good practice 
by parties to conflict, protect the humanitarian and medical mission and accord priority to the protection of 
civilians in UN peace operations, prevent forced displacement and pursue durable solutions for refugees 
and internally displaced persons. 
150 A detailed analysis of obstruction is presented in the annex of 2009 POC report (UN Secretary-General, 
2009b, pp. 18–29). 




denial and obstruction has varied only little. However, for example in 2002, he noted that 
killings and abductions of the personnel of international organizations  
do not simply destroy individual lives. They are an attack on the emblem of the United 
Nations and ICRC and other humanitarian organizations, an attempt to drive them out 
and to deny their role as protectors of civilians in conflict.152 
Obstruction and denial are thus drawn within the remit of the Security Council and UN’s 
POC agenda because they pose a threat for the entire international peace and security 
enterprise and not just the physical wellbeing of peacekeepers and humanitarians.  
 
Another variation to the general logic of this sub-discourse can be observed in the 2007 
report where the referent object at jeopardy is neither a civilian population nor their 
protector, but the profitability of the POC enterprise. In that report Secretary-General 
argued that obstruction can “undermine the impact of assistance that can be provided, 
reduce the protective value of a humanitarian presence among vulnerable populations and 
lead to higher operational costs.”153 In other words, the security logic here concerns not 
survival or even well-being but the returns expected from humanitarian aid. In sum, while 
the indirect harm to civilians is the primary source of insecurity in this category, other 
referent objects (value of protection efforts, organizational integrity) insert a more 
systemic character to the sub-discourse. 
 
5.2.3 Displacement 
The third source of insecurity, displacement, is often the consequence of violence against 
civilians, but it is also a source of insecurity in and of itself. Besides being discussed in 
every POC report, this insecurity was institutionalized in the protection agenda as it was 
appointed a protection priority in 2017, ostensibly because the number of displaced 
persons reached a record high of 65 million persons during the reporting period.154 The 
two subsequent reports continue along these lines.155  
 
Displacement, be it cross-border or domestic, is either an indirect consequence of conflict 
or a deliberate combat strategy that endangers first and foremost the displaced: they lose 
the shelter of their home, they may end up in camps where they suffer from poor or 
 
152 UN Secretary-General (2002, para. 22, emphasis added).  
153 UN Secretary-General (2007, para. 34). 
154 UN Secretary-General (2017, paras. 60–67). 




sometimes inhumane conditions, they are threatened by state and non-state actors alike 
who attack the camps or infiltrate and militarize them.156 Women and children in 
particular are more exposed to sexual exploitation and abuse, forced recruitment either to 
the parties to the conflict or general enslavement. Displacement also undermines legal 
protections non-displaced persons may have, such as access to justice, employment, and 
property rights.157 Displacement is thus a root cause for a host of insecurities for civilians, 
which is the primary concern for the Secretary-General throughout the POC reports.  
 
There is one notable shift between pre- and post-2004 reports, however. Before 2004, in 
addition to the personal safety of the displaced, Secretary-General was also concerned 
about the systemic effects caused by displacement and what it might to do to regional 
stability. A specific concern is the possibility of armed elements infiltrating displaced 
civilian populations in refugee camps or outside them, which might result in the 
militarization of refugee camps and border zones, the spread of conflict into other states, 
and ultimately the destabilization of recipient states and regions.158 Now, because of the 
fear of the “enemy within”, it is no longer the civilian whose security and well-being is 
at stake. Instead, at stake are the security of refugee camps and border zones, and the 
stability of states and regions. Thus, even if it is acknowledged that not all individual 
members of the displaced population are dangerous, the mere possibility of an “enemy 
within” places displaced populations under suspicion and designates them as a target for 
weeding out armed elements.159 After 2004, this concern disappears from the reports. 
 
There are further nuances still to Secretary-General’s displacement discourse. For 
example in 2004 he noted that protracted displacement can prolong conflicts and hinder 
peace processes,160 and earlier in 2002 he argued how “massive movements of displaced 
populations across international borders, most frequently prompted by civil wars in 
 
156 UN Secretary-General (1999e, paras. 8, 13, 2004, para. 4, 2005b, para. 20).  
157 UN Secretary-General (1999e, para. 11, 2001, para. 22, 2017, paras. 60–66, 2004, para. 22, 2005b, paras. 
17–20, 2007, paras. 54–55, 2010, paras. 13–15, 2012, para. 5, 2013, paras. 9, 22, 2015b, paras. 41–42, 2016, 
paras. 41–46).  
158 The most detailed examination of this hazard can be found in the 2002 report but the same security logic 
is present in other reports as well, see UN Secretary-General (1999e, paras. 14–15, 2001, paras. 28–30, 2002, 
paras. 31–36, 2004, para. 22).  
159 The specific security measures may vary from one protector to another, but for example an aide-memoire 
authored by UN High Commissioner for Refugees and ICRC (2018) propose screening for the identification 
of threatening individuals; separation of those who continue to engage in combat or otherwise compromise 
security from those who do not by expulsion from the protected site, transfer to another place, reporting to 
authorities and, in extremis, deprivation of liberty; as well as disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration and other programs in order to rehabilitate former combatants back into civilian life. 




[Africa], have altered delicate ethnic balances in neighbouring States and thereby 
destabilized the recipient societies.”161 Like the enemy within, displacement jeopardizes 
international peace and security by undermining peace and by altering demographic 
makeup and is therefore a source of international concern. Under the “enemy within” and 
“ethnic balance” logics, the displaced are not victims, but risks. 
 
5.2.4 Hate media 
The sub-discourse hate media was a short-lived one. In fact, a text search query shows 
that, so far, Secretary-General has discussed media and/or journalists in ten POC 
reports,162 but the “hate media” frame was present only in the first two reports of 1999 
and 2001. In this frame, the media is seen as a source of insecurity for civilians because 
“[h]ate speech, misinformation and hostile propaganda continue to be used as blunt 
instruments against civilians, triggering ethnic violence and forcing displacement.”163 In 
this sub-discourse, there are no other endangered referent objects except civilians and 
peace, but only by implication.  
 
As noted above, however, the media did not disappear from the POC reports altogether. 
Instead, the utility of media in conflict management that the Secretary-General had noted 
already in 1999 became the dominant frame after 2001,164 while journalists, whose 
“[i]ndependent and accurate reporting is essential to expose human suffering, restrain 
military actors and put pressure on political actors to find solutions to conflicts and 
promote accountability,” have become allies.165 They are also victims to be protected.166 
The shift is notable because incitement of hatred and violence has hardly disappeared 




161 UN Secretary-General (2001, para. 28).  
162 The query was based on a search for the words ‘media’ and ‘journalist’ and stemmed words. At first, the 
query found the search words in 12 reports, but the findings from the 2002 report comprise of quotations 
from the 1999 and 2001 reports included in an annex, and the sole the finding from the 2004 report does not 
refer to a discussion of media and violence against civilians. Therefore, these reports were not included in 
the total number above. The 2005 report does not mention either of the words, which leaves the total number 
to ten. 
163 UN Secretary-General (2001, para. 38, also 1999e, para. 48).  
164 UN Secretary-General (1999e, para. 48, 2001, paras. 39–40).  
165 UN Secretary-General (2017, para. 32, also 2016, para. 20). 




5.2.5 Ill-designed sanctions 
Even rarer than the hate media sub-discourse is that regarding the collateral damage 
caused by ill-designed sanctions. The once-discussed phenomenon is perceived to cause 
shortage and poverty. The primary victims of ill-designed sanctions regimes are the 
civilians as the Secretary-General emphasizes. There is also an emphasis on gender, as 
women and children are believed to suffer the most when they are deprived of 
humanitarian aid.167 Also the UN humanitarian operations whom the sanctions prevent 
from distributing aid bear a part of the brunt of sanctions.168 In the 1999 POC report and 
four subsequent reports,169 the discourse on sanctions shifts to the potential of “less blunt” 
targeted sanctions in the protection of civilians while the problems of sanctions regimes 
are not revisited.170 As with the hate media, the shift and omission in this sub-discourse 
is more likely to reflect selectivity, rather than the disappearance of this particular 
insecurity.  
 
5.2.6 Lawlessness and dysfunctional justice and security sectors 
All insecurities that arise from non-compliance with law, impunity, inability to hold 
perpetrators of violence accountable, and the problems in security and justice sectors are 
collected under the heading lawlessness and dysfunctional justice and security sectors. 
Thus, it is not the violations of law, such as combatants attacking civilians, that are the 
subject here, but the rule of law deficiencies and dysfunctional justice and security 
systems. This insecurity is a constant theme in the reports and indeed the Secretary-
General named “enhancing compliance by parties to conflict with international law, in 
particular in the conduct of hostilities”, “enhancing compliance with the law by non-State 
armed groups” and “enhancing accountability for violations of the law” as core challenges 
 
167 UN Secretary-General (1999e, para. 25). 
168 Ibid., paras. 25–26. 
169 A word search query of the Word ‘sanction’ and stemmed words showed references in eight reports, but 
three of them (2001, 2002, 2010) were not relevant as the references either did not discuss sanctions regimes 
or merely quoted earlier reports. The reports of 1999, 2004, 2005, 2007 and 2012 all viewed targeted 
sanctions in benevolent rather than critical light and, after the 1999 report, mentioned the subject only in 
passing, see UN Secretary-General (1999e, para. 54, 2004, para. 42, 2005b, para. 32, 2007, p. 18, 2012, para. 
22).  
170 The targeted sanctions include for example “the freezing of financial assets of regime members or elites 
who support them; suspension of credits and grant aid; denial and limitation of access to overseas financial 
markets; trade embargoes on arms and luxury goods; flight bans; political sanctions such as diplomatic 
isolation and withdrawal of accreditation; denial of overseas travel, visas and educational opportunities to 
regime members and their families” and the benefits they are supposed to yield include “minimizing 
humanitarian costs, the disruption of non-military trade, the likelihood of a black market emerging, 
additional humanitarian aid requirements and a negative impact on social infrastructures” (UN Secretary-




of civilian protection in his in the 2009 report.171 In 2017, 2018 and 2019, the same issues 
continued to concern the Secretary-General and as a result “respect for international 
humanitarian law and international human rights law” as well as the promotion of good 
practices among parties to conflict were named as “protection priorities.”172 Like 
displacement, lawlessness and dysfunctional justice and security sectors have become 
institutionalized in the UN POC discourse. 
 
In the POC reports, matters of law and its implementation, or lack thereof, comprise a 
variegated source of insecurities to civilians, peacekeepers and humanitarians alike and 
thus for international peace and security more broadly. Those not participating in a 
conflict – civilians, peacekeepers and humanitarians – are all put in harm’s way first of 
all by the erosion of the distinction between civilians and combatants, which results from 
the asymmetric nature of contemporary armed conflict, indiscriminate weapons, and 
infiltration of civilian populations by armed elements and terrorists.173 Secretary-
General’s logic here is that failure to observe the principle of distinction constitutes a 
violation of IHL and that  widespread violations of these principles undermine the 
credibility of IHL. It would thus appear that the damage to the credibility of law is the 
collateral damage of violence against civilians.  
 
However, as the Secretary-General underlines, if frequent and left unaddressed, impunity 
and inability (or unwillingness) to hold perpetrators of violence accountable may also 
ease the return of violence.174 This is because “institutions for security, law and order are 
frequently the first to weaken or collapse in contemporary civil conflicts, thus creating a 
vacuum for human rights protection.”175 Indeed, “[a]nything less [than addressing 
impunity and accountability] promotes a culture of impunity within which violations 
flourish.”176 Impunity and inability to hold perpetrators of violence accountable are thus 
not a mere by-product of violence against civilians. Rather, they comprise a vicious cycle 
 
171 UN Secretary-General (2009b, para. 5). 
172 UN Secretary-General (2017, para. 5, 2018, paras. 32–33, 2019, paras. 51–62).  
173 The consequences of asymmetric conflicts are noted repeatedly in the POC reports, see UN Secretary-
General (2007, para. 7, 2009b, para. 24, 2010, para. 8). Violence against peacekeepers and humanitarians 
was discussed above in relation to obstruction and denial of protection, while infiltration by armed elements 
and terrorists was discussed above in relation to displacement. Indiscriminate weapons and terrorism will 
be discussed below. 
174 UN Secretary-General (2001, paras. 10–11, 2004, para. 55, 2007, para. 47, 2009b, paras. 61–62, 2010, para. 
82, 2013, para. 60, 2016, para. 18).  
175 UN Secretary-General (2002, para. 21). 




in which violence breeds disregard toward the law and the latter facilitates the former. 
And it is this cycle that elevates matters of impunity, inability to hold perpetrators of 
violence accountable and dysfunctional justice systems onto the POC agenda. 
 
5.2.7 Socio-economic disruption 
The seventh source of insecurity, socio-economic disruption, refers not to the direct losses 
caused by conflict, such as loss of life and destruction of property, but to the more abstract 
and indirect consequences of violence that add to the precarious situation of civilians 
affected by conflict. In addition to direct violence against civilians, especially the above-
explored commercial exploitation and displacement are closely related to socio-economic 
disruption in the UN POC discourse.  
 
In Secretary-General’s reports, displacement, for example, often results from the 
destruction of housing and disputes over land and real property. Therefore, considering 
these issues is “vital to political stability, economic security, the protection of human 
rights and the establishment and strengthening of the rule of law” and therefore also 
“inextricably linked to the achievement and consolidation of lasting peace and the 
prevention of future violence.”177 More specifically, the disputes here refer to a myriad of 
problems, such as “forced evictions; property transactions made under duress; illegal 
destruction or appropriation and occupation of abandoned property; the illegal 
confiscation of land; discriminatory application of abandonment laws; and the loss or 
deliberate destruction of documentary evidence of ownership” as well as gender-biased 
inheritance and property laws that discriminate against women.178 Insecurities arise here 
thus not just from, say, the lack of housing but from dysfunctional public institutions that 
prolong displacement and other related social problems.  
 
More abstract insecurity, the POC reports notice, is the “breakdown of the social fabric” 
and “social support structures” caused by armed conflict. Social disruption has numerous 
consequences according to Secretary-General: conflicts induce an overall transformation 
of roles of family members; they increase the workload of mothers at home and hinder 
their ability to sustain their families; and they increase the risk of gender-based violence 
 
177 Quotes come from two POC reports (UN Secretary-General, 2002, para. 49, and 2007, para. 52), 
respectively, but similar train of thought is present elsewhere too (UN Secretary-General, 2004, para. 54, 
2010, para. 14).  




thus victimizing girls and women even further and increasing the spread of sexually 
transmitted diseases that come not only with physical and mental damage but also with 
social stigmas.179 Instead of material losses, the unwinding of social fabric burdens and 
threatens civilians’ capacity to cope in dire situations.   
 
Finally, the two latest reports introduce new insecurities: environmental devastation and 
food insecurity. The former insecurity dynamic appears only in the 2019 report where the 
Secretary-General takes concern with the destruction of urban buildings and 
infrastructure, the consequent contamination of air, soil and groundwater, their possible 
impact on individuals’ health and lives more generally long after the conflict itself has 
ended.180 Conflict driven food insecurity, on the other hand, results primarily from the use 
of starvation as a tactic of armed conflict. The previously examined insecurity of 
obstruction of humanitarian assistance is one concrete example of how this insecurity 
works. The above-mentioned contamination of soil and groundwater is another. The 
subject had appeared in several previous reports, but was mentioned only briefly, whereas 
the 2019 report names it a “global problem” and dedicates a section for the issue, thus 
indicating increasing concern for the problem.181  
 
These four dynamics – disputes over housing, land and property; breakdown of social 
fabric; environmental devastation; and food insecurity – add up to an insecurity whose 
primary referent object is the civilian, but it implicates a wider net of social networks and 
public institutions that have to be reformed in order to mitigate the problem. It is also 
strongly linked to the enhancement of respect for the laws of armed conflict. Secretary-




(Counter-)Terrorism, the eighth source of insecurity, appears for the first time in the 
Secretary-General’s 2002 report, the first to be published after the 11 September 2001 
terrorist attacks against the United States. The “new threat” of terrorism, says Secretary-
General, threatens civilians first and foremost because terrorists, like non-state underdogs 
 
179 UN Secretary-General (1999e, para. 18, 2004, paras. 4, 26, 2005b, para. 25, 2007, para. 44). 
180 UN Secretary-General (2019, para. 50). 
181 UN Secretary-General (2018, para. 5, 2019, paras. 47–48). The use of starvation as a combat tactic is 




in asymmetric armed conflicts, target soft targets such as civilians and hide among them, 
thus placing civilian populations and for example humanitarian workers in the line of fire 
of counter-terrorism measures.182 In short, civilians suffer on the one hand from being 
targeted by terrorists and, on the other, from the erosion of the distinction between 
combatants and civilians, as discussed previously.  
 
Interestingly however, terrorists themselves are seen as a threat only in the 2002 report, 
whereas later reports – with only one brief exception183 – frame counterterrorism as a 
threat to protection of civilians. Indeed, violent and indiscriminate counter-terrorism 
measures are seen to put civilians in harm’s way, disregard their human rights, and to 
encourage violent extremism.184 Moreover, counter-terrorism policies and legislation, 
when pursued too rigorously, may hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid by effectively 
criminalizing it and thereby “erode the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality 
and impartiality.”185 Like the lawlessness sub-discourse, the post-2002 security framing 
of counterterrorism redefines observance of law as a matter of civilian protection thereby 
drawing it within the remits of the UN POC agenda.    
 
5.2.9 Weapons technologies and proliferation 
Finally, the sub-discourse on the insecurity of weapons technologies and proliferation is 
a recurring theme that concerns the Secretary-General in every report, save for three 
exceptions. The greatest insecurity in this sub-discourse stems from the direct harm that 
small arms and light weapons, landmines, cluster munitions and their proliferation cause 
for civilians by accident or intention.186 More recently, the direct damage caused by armed 
unmanned aerial vehicles (hereafter drones) has come to the Secretary-General’s 
attention.187 The danger is, in short, that weapons, mines and the drones carrying them 
maim civilians and therefore the civilian is the primary referent object in every report 
where the Secretary-General discusses this insecurity. The sub-discourse remains 
unchanged throughout the reports in this regard.   
 
 
182 UN Secretary-General (2002, paras. 12, 61, 63). 
183 UN Secretary-General (2005b, para. 10).  
184 UN Secretary-General. (2004, para. 57, 2007, para. 8, 2018, paras. 22, 47, 2019, para. 41). 
185 UN Secretary-General (2013b, para. 40, also 2005b, para. 10, and 2012, para. 46). 
186 E.g. UN Secretary-General (1999e, paras. 23-24,55, 2004, para. 36, 2007, para. 60, 2009b, para. 36, 2015b, 
para. 31, 2016, para. 24, 2017, para. 24).  
187 UN Secretary-General (2010, para. 17, 2012, para. 17, 2013, para. 26). Curiously, the subject of drones is 




Yet, as with most of the insecurities so far, the weapons technologies sub-discourse is 
more nuanced than first meets the eye. Weapons technologies and their (cross-border) 
proliferation may, first of all, prolong and regionalize conflicts;188 secondly, they 
contribute to the breakdown of society by for example destroying housing and basic 
infrastructure;189 thirdly, they have vast socio-economic impacts for they hamper access 
to healthcare, prevent the use of land, destroy harvests and other sources of income and 
thereby undermine peoples’ livelihood, halt the education of children and disturb the 
practice of religion;190 fourthly, arms, munitions and drones can also be indiscriminate 
and therefore contribute to the erosion of the principle of distinction and general 
lawlessness;191 and finally, Secretary-General opines that drones in particular increase the 
asymmetry of conflicts, which, consequently, increases the risk of violence against 
civilians.192 Overall the sub-discourse maintains that weapons and their proliferation do 
not merely pose an immediate threat to the safety and well-being of civilians, but also to 
wider human societies, their internal stability as well as the stability between domestic 
societies. The issue is therefore permanently drawn on the international peace and security 
agenda.  
 
5.2.10 Summary of insecurity discourses 
This section has examined the UN’s understanding of the phenomenon of violence against 
civilians in the UN POC discourse as articulated in Secretary-General’s reports. The 
reports were read primarily with the view to identifying referent object(s) and insecurities 
of the UN POC discourse as well as the possible qualitative shifts in these categories. To 
begin, UN POC discourse is unsurprisingly premised on the notion that civilians in 
particular are victimized in contemporary armed conflicts. Save for the occasional 
mention of using individuals as facilitators for peace programmes, the role of the 
individual is that of a victim.  
 
While the discourse generally rests on this basic assumption, all the sub-discourses 
included other referent objects too. This is illustrated in Table 5.2 below. In addition to 
civilians, the referent objects include for example humanitarians and peacekeepers. Other 
 
188 UN Secretary-General (1999e, para. 55, 2004, para. 36, 2010, para. 18, 2017, para. 23). 
189 UN Secretary-General (1999e, para. 55, 2009b, para. 36, 2010, para. 49, 2015b, para. 33, 2017, para. 18, 
2018, para. 42, 2019, para. 31). 
190 UN Secretary-General (1999e, para. 24, 2007, paras. 60–63, 2012, para. 38, 2013, para. 27, 2015b, paras. 
33–34, 2016, para. 24). 
191 UN Secretary-General (2010, paras. 17, 48, 2012, para. 17, 2013, para. 26, 2015b, paras. 31–32, 35). 




referent objects include peace and stability (national, regional or international), justice 
and security systems (again, national or international), housing and general infrastructure, 
social fabric and social support structures and so on. The conclusion to be drawn from 
this section is that there is no one referent object whose survival is threatened, but 
numerous referent objects who face insecurities of different gravity and type.  
 
Table 5.2 Insecurities and referent objects in the UN POC discourse 
Insecurity sub-
discourse 
Source of insecurity Referent objects 
Commercial 
exploitation 
Prolonged conflict, loss of property, resource 
curse, enslavement/human trafficking 
Regional stability, 
civilians 
Denial and obstruction 
of aid and protection 
Bureaucratic obstruction, forced limitation, 
harassment, violence 
Civilians, peacekeepers 
and aid workers, UN’s 
organizational integrity, 
“profitability” of aid 
Displacement 
Loss of shelter, exposure to inhumane 
conditions, undermined legal protection, armed 
elements, militarization of refugee camps/border 






Hate media Incitement of violence Civilians, peace/stability 
Ill-designed sanctions 
Shortage, poverty, limitations to humanitarian 
aid 
 
Civilians, aid workers 
Lawlessness and 
dysfunctional justice 
and security sectors 
 
Disregard for law, erosion of distinction 
principle, prolonged conflict, impunity,  
Civilians, peacekeepers, 
aid workers, rule of law 
Socio-economic 
disruption  
Destruction of housing, housing/land/property 
rights issues, unravelling social fabric, 




stability and cohesion 
(Counter-)Terrorism 
 
Terrorist attacks, indiscriminate counter-terrorist 
measures, counter-terrorism legislation 
Civilians; principles of 





Accidents, wilful attacks, proliferation prolongs 
conflicts, destruction of housing/infrastructure, 








The insecurities are not only variegated in terms of threats and referent objects, however. 
Some of the security framings have changed over time, too. Displacement, firstly, was 
seen as a source of instability in itself in the reports before, but not after 2004. The framing 
effectively turned displacement and the displaced into security problems. Secondly, 
hatred incited by media was conceived as an issue to be addressed, but after 2001, the 
media became the victim to be defended. The insecurity frame disappears. Thirdly comes 
terrorism, which in 2002 only was defined as a threat, but in subsequent reports it is 
counterterrorism that hinders civilian protection as it may itself be violent and 




above form 2018 and 2019 saw the emergence of environmental devastation and food 
insecurity on the agenda. It is too early to say how constant the themes are, but both imply 
problems of broad, systemic nature.  
 
Considering these shifts, it might seem that the UN POC discourse has become narrower 
over time with only few constant themes. Yet, the disappearance and change of certain 
sub-discourses from the POC reports does not necessarily mean that they have been 
completely discarded from UN’s civilian protection agenda. Indeed, some of the sub-
discourses and their security frames that have disappeared from Secretary-General’s 
reports are to varying degrees present in the seven POC aide-mémoires193 that have been 
prepared for the Security Council to consult when taking action to protect civilians. Of 
the sub-discourses that have changed in the Secretary-General’s reports, the security 
framing of the media in the aide-mémoires contained both perspectives and underlined 
the need to protect journalists as well as to root out incitement of hatred.194  
 
Terrorism, on the other hand, is barely discussed except when it is condemned.195 
Counterterrorism is not discussed at all, and it is only mentioned in selections of agreed 
language that are drawn from the POC-related Security Council resolutions.196 The 
framing of displacement in the aide-mémoires, finally, is more complex than that of media 
and terrorism. The somewhat crude concern over “delicate ethnic balances” being 
disturbed is completely absent from the aide-mémoires. In the aide-mémoires of 2002 and 
2003, there is a recommendation for developing a regional approach for managing mass 
displacement, echoing the previously noted concerns over regional stability, but the 
specific notion of “ethnic balances” is absent.197  
 
The rest of the aide-mémoires rely on similar security framings as the 2018 document, 
which expresses concern over for example armed elements hiding among the displaced 
 
193 UN Security Council (2018). The first aide-mémoire was published in 2002 and the rest followed in 2003, 
2009, 2010, 2014, 2015 and 2018, during which time the document has bloated from seven pages to almost 
250 pages. The aide-mémoires are prepared by the Security Council in collaboration with the Secretariat 
and other UN agencies.   
194 UN Security Council (2002, p. 6, 2003, p. 11, 2009, pp. 12–13, 2010, p. 12, 2014, p. 15, 2015, pp. 18–19, 
2018, pp. 23–24).  
195 Ibid., pp. 4, 16. 
196 On a side note, the notion of “agreed language” is interesting because it suggests the institutionalization 
of civilian protection discourse at the Security Council, which might, consequently, limit how the issue is 
conceived and therefore also handled.   




and flow of arms, and then proposes “the reestablishment of security conditions 
conducive to voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable returns, or the realization of other 
durable solutions, including through police patrols in areas of return, local integration or 
resettlement”. The aide-mémoire emphasizes that the establishment of secure conditions 
is the responsibility of states, but that peace operations may be mandated to assist to do 
so.198 Thus, for example displacement is still seen as a source of insecurity, but the 
articulation is subtler than before: on the one hand, the references to “dignified and 
sustainable returns” designate the displaced as victims and recipients of protection while 
on the other hand, the proposal for police patrols makes them targets of security measures.  
 
5.3 Summary & discussion: the politics of the UN POC discourse 
This chapter began with the examination of the nature of armed conflict, as characterized 
by Secretary-General in his Protection of Civilians reports. The problematization of 
violence against civilians rests on the premise that armed conflict has changed, which 
consequently results in the increasing victimization of civilians. Another key change is 
that armed conflicts no longer occur between states but are instead asymmetrical. The 
underdogs of asymmetric conflicts, the reports generally posit, tend to rely on terror 
tactics that for example displace civilians. Such tactics often put civilians in sights of 
counter-terrorism measures, which themselves can be violent and indiscriminate. 
Civilians are thus victims and collateral damage of the “new wars”, where war, organized 
crime and large-scale violence against civilians increasingly blend into one another 
(Kaldor, 1999, p. 2). 
 
The reports connect these new wars with a myriad of insecurities that civilians face. The 
previous section divided the insecurities into nine categories, each of which had more 
than one referent object. Moreover, the insecurities threaten referent objects at different 
levels: the civilian, as noted, is the primary referent object, but so are individual 
peacekeepers and aid workers. Social cohesion as well as national and regional stability 
are also threatened by the new wars. Of symbolic value are referent objects such as the 
integrity of UN and the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality. Finally, the 
insecurities examined above were found to be inter-related; for instance, the reports 
 





connect displacement with commercial exploitation, and proliferation of weapons is seen 
to contribute to socio-economic disruption. 
 
Herein lies one central finding of section 5.2, which also serves as a premise for the 
comprehensive response laid out in the POC policy. The problematization of violence 
against civilians in the UN POC discourse is premised on the notion of interdependent 
and mutually reinforcing insecurities that are difficult to distinguish from one another. 
There is no distinct enemy against which to wage war, but a discursive web of insecurities 
whose individual components are of varying gravity. Among critical security scholars, 
this phenomenon is known as the “security continuum” (Bigo, 1994, p. 164), which 
securitizes by associating insecurities to non-securities. For instance, the non-menacing 
migration, much like displacement in this chapter, has in Bigo’s view become a security 
issue by virtue of its association with such menaces as organized crime and terrorism. 
Security continuums work by making the established boundaries between security and 
non-security increasingly porous thereby allowing security logics and practices to travel 
into domains where they were previously absent (Huysmans, 2014, p. 83). This way 
seemingly non-security related matters such as housing and dysfunctional bureaucracy 
become matters of international peace and security. 
 
Security continuums are facilitated by a shift in security discourse toward risk and 
“reflexive security” (Rasmussen, 2001; see also section 2.2.5 above). The reflexive 
approach to security emphasizes management, the primacy of future scenarios, and it is 
premised on the certainty of boomerang effects of backfiring policies. The UN POC 
discourse exhibits these characteristics: To exemplify the last, the UN has come to see the 
policy of impartiality as doomed to backfire, because if the UN remains agnostic about 
violence against civilians for the sake of impartiality, violence against civilians will fester 
and disintegrate societies. Consequently, the UN has adopted an approach to violence 
against civilians that recognizes both structural violence in the Galtungian sense (1969) 
as well as direct physical violence. This, finally, elevates all the seemingly non-security 
related matters on the international peace and security agenda. The risk-driven logic of 
UN POC discourse securitizes by drawing international peace and security managers’ 
attention to a whole host of issues that together might jeopardize peace and security.  
 
Another important feature of the UN POC discourse is the division of labour it envisions. 




national and international NGO, states and finally to international organizations. The 
distribution of protective responsibilities follows the well-established argument according 
to which states are the primary protectors of civilians within their territory. If the state 
proves to be unable or unwilling to protect civilians, international intervention may 
become an option. Intervention may take the form of assistance or more coercive peace 
operation or even a military operation. This, as noted, is largely in line with the logic that 
has become entrenched in the UN along with the R2P concept.  
 
Like R2P, Protection of Civilians, as defined by the UN is also a rationale for the UN’s 
assumption of executive authority. And while attention is often paid to the forceful 
measures contained in these instruments, less coercive measures entail the possibility of 
intervention by other means to rectify the behaviour of the irresponsible state. These 
means, such as development assistance often comes with monitoring and regulation by 
third parties, such as the UN Development Programme, peace operations or international 
financial institutions (ibid., pp. 90–103; Chandler, 2010, pp. 55–59). The UN POC 
discourse echoes this same logic, as does the third tier of the POC policy, which is 




It has been established that R2P and UN POC share similar language as well as the logic 
concerning the division of responsibility. Moreover, they both entered the peace and 
security discourse almost simultaneously. Differences between the two concepts 
obviously remain (see Breakey, 2012b; P. D. Williams, 2016), and it is impossible to say 
to what extent their convergence was a coincidence, but nevertheless, the two concepts 
overlap. One might thus say the that the UN POC discourse is intertextual as it shares 
“presuppositions, logical implications or entailments, and implicatures” with other peace 
and security discourses (see Fairclough, 2003, p. 40). The rest of the present discussion 
examines the intertextuality of UN POC with a particular focus on the shared security 
logics between the discourses as well as the politics they entail. In addition to R2P, the 
relevant discourses include the Agenda discourse, which expanded notably after the Cold 
War, and the human security discourse, a product of the post-Cold War development 





It is commonplace to distinguish between Cold War and post-Cold War approaches to 
international peace and security. The first indications of a shift from one era to the next 
emerged in the security discourse already in mid-1980s, when Secretary-General and a 
group of governmental experts undertook a study on the concepts of security at the request 
of the General Assembly. The study’s conclusions begin by linking security with national 
security but ended by noting how national and international security are becoming 
increasingly interrelated. The conclusions note how states’ internal security is hindered 
by various insecurities ranging from “structural economic crises” to “international 
tensions and armed conflicts in different regions of the world” and even to “continuation 
of colonialism and racism”.199 The study thus takes note of how interdependence driven 
by globalisation erodes the distinction between domestic and international security. 
Consequently, national security is no longer a discrete domain, but inseparably attached 
to international security and all the insecurities that threaten it. 
 
The conclusion was further confirmed seven years later on 31 January 1992, when the then 
President of Security Council declared that absence of war no longer means peace, for 
there are also other sources of instability that threaten it.200 In the months to come and in 
response to Council President, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali wrote An Agenda for 
Peace, the seminal peacekeeping document that would change how the UN thinks about 
peacekeeping. The Agenda echoed Council President’s reasoning by arguing that “the 
efforts of the Organisation to build peace, stability and security must encompass matters 
beyond military threats.”201 To this end, the Agenda lays out plans for preventing conflicts 
before breaking out by identifying situations that could lead into conflict as well as the 
necessary interventions for rebuilding institutions after conflicts.202 It also noted that 
while states remain at the centre of international fora, “[t]he time of absolute and 
exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed.”203 
 
In 1994 and 1996, Secretary-General published two further agendas – An Agenda for 
Development and An Agenda for Democratization – along with supporting reports on 
democratization, which elaborated on this new understanding of peace and security. The 
documents confirm the previous remark according to which absence of war indeed does 
 
199 UN Secretary-General (1985, paras. 206–213).  
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201 UN Secretary-General (1992a, paras. 12–14).  
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not mean peace. To the contrary, the documents link peace and security with development, 
democratization, human rights, good governance and the rule of law.204 Peace is thus in 
this discourse the prerequisite of development and development in turn is key for 
sustaining peace. Democratization in turn fosters peace and human rights, while market 
economy, besides being the “engine of progress”, asserts pressure for democratization 
and human rights.205 Matters previously considered domestic had now turned 
international. They were also drawn into the realm of peace and security.  
 
The second discourse, human security, is another step away from a state-centric security 
conception. Human security is about development of living conditions and in its most 
condensed form, the concept refers to “freedom from fear and freedom from want.”206 If 
security by definition means the absence of threats, then the human security concept 
entails a broad range of threats to be absented,207 which in turn allows the security 
discourse to absorb yet more issues that previously did not belong to the realm of security. 
Human security has thus been instrumental in the merging of security and development, 
as a result of which “the promotion of development has become synonymous with the 
pursuit of security” while “security has become a prerequisite for sustainable 
development” (Duffield, 2014, p. 37).  
 
Exactly the same idea can be found in UN documents on peace and security and security 
sector reform.208 The point is also underlined by the fact that UN Development 
Programme views development through a conflict prevention lens, which is to say that 
development, even if not necessarily a matter of Chapter VII of the Charter, is a matter of 
security for the UN.209 By way of connecting development with security, human security 
discourse further entrenched the security logic of R2P, UN POC and the Agenda 
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207 In its original formulation, human security comprises of seven components: economic security (basic 
income), food security (readily available and accessible), health security (access to health care), 
environmental security (a healthy physical environment), personal security (freedom from physical 
violence, self-inflicted or otherwise), community security (freedom from intra-/inter-communal 
oppression) and political security (basic human rights) (ibid., pp. 24–33). If to name security is to name 
insecurity, then human security names numerous insecurities, as anything that might hinder these 
components is a potential insecurity. If compared to the insecurities listed in Secretary-General’s POC 
reports, similarities are evident.  
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discourse. It bridges the domestic realm with that of the international, thereby also 
bringing matters of domestic security to the international peace and security agenda.  
 
Thus, we have here four discourses of international peace and security – UN POC, R2P, 
human security and Agenda discourse – that are not identical, but nonetheless operate 
under similar security logics. The most prominent intertextual feature between the 
discourses is the broad conception of security that departs from the state-centric notion of 
security of previous decades. Each of the discourses builds upon the idea that matters 
ranging from underdevelopment and poor governance to fear, want and violence against 
civilians are matters of security. Politically, the discourses consolidate the discursive 
merging of domestic and international security, which is to say that while the insecurities 
themselves may remain the same, the perspective from which they are examined, and 
therefore the responses to them, do change. The merging of internal and external security 
after the Cold War was by no means a phenomenon confined to the offices of the UN; it 
was common among other security actors as well (see e.g. Bigo, 2000, 2001, 2006a).  
 
Each of the discourses encourage, either explicitly or implicitly, more interventionist 
approaches to foster peace and security: UN POC encourages intervention in numerous 
ways to protect civilians. R2P is not a policy programme, but in the current formulation 
its second and third pillars provide that in case of the atrocity crimes, international 
assistance or forceful intervention may be considered, after due exhaustion of peaceful 
means and blessing of the Security Council.210 In the other two discourses, the invitation 
to intervene is more implicit: The Agenda discourse on peace and security underlies the 
other three discourses, as its renegotiation immediately after the Cold War paved way for 
the later security discourses. The idea was then continued by Secretary-General in his 
three Agendas, which all advocate interventionist programmes to reform underachieving 
states in rule of law matters for example. Human security, finally, is not a policy 
programme per se, but a comprehensive framework to be used in planning development 
programmes envisioned by the Agendas. Each discourse builds on the comprehensive 
approach to security.  
 
To bring the chapter to a close, the problematization of violence against civilians in the 
UN POC discourse is premised on the new wars thesis, the conception of violence against 
 




civilians from the perspective of risks and security continuums, and the necessity of 
comprehensive and “all-inclusive” management of the phenomenon. Consequently, 
violence against civilians is problematized as a problem of peace and security that merits 
international response. The problematization did not emerge out of thin air, however, but 
is interrelated to several other security discourses that emerged in the 1990s. The 
discourses share the same broad conception of security and the invitation to intervention.  
 
As noted previously, Anne Orford (2011, pp. 103–108) argues that the R2P discourse is a 
move from deeds to words in the sense that it has rationalized the international executive 
authority the UN had assumed during the decades past. Given the similar security logics 
in the four discourses that the intertextual analysis revealed, this thesis posits, contra 
Orford, that it is not R2P alone that rationalizes the UN’s assumption of executive 
authority. Rather, this premise is integral to several peace and security discourses. Indeed, 
the discourses examined here emerged roughly the same time inside and outside the UN 
and they all posit that to guarantee international peace and security, it might sometimes 
be necessary to intervene in states’ domestic affairs. And they all envision more or less 
explicitly a preparedness for international response to the insecurities. Though this is not 
to say that the discourses caused the expansion of peace and security agenda and 
practices. To the contrary, the discourses emerged (sometimes long) after the fact. Thus, 
if anything, the causal relationship flows to the opposite direction, from practices to 
deeds, as Orford put it. 
 
The political significance of intertwining domestic and international security, the 
expansion of the concept of security, and the endorsement of an interventionist approach 
to the management of peace and security is that they undermine article 2.7 of the UN 
Charter, which prohibits the UN from interfering in matters falling “essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state”. In other words, while the rules of world order have 
not been re-negotiated de jure, UN POC and other peace and security discourses have de 
facto created an opening for the relaxation and creative interpretation of the phrase 
“domestic jurisdiction”. This, consequently, bolsters the UN’s and especially Security 





6 Conclusion: the politics of protecting civilians 
So, how has violence against civilians has become a matter of international peace and 
security for the United Nations and with what political effects? The conundrum is 
interesting because, on the one hand, violence against civilians and their protection are 
among the most controversial and difficult issues on the peacekeeping agenda. On the 
other hand, civilian protection has become a key component of that very same agenda 
since 1999. In 2015, the UN approach to civilian protection in peacekeeping was 
crystalized in the Protection of Civilians policy statement and subsequent guidelines. The 
POC policy envisions a three-tiered and four-phased protection programme with a view 
to upholding international law. The tiers progress from dialogue to the creation of a 
protective environment. The policy promises comprehensive protection to all the civilians 
within the protector’s capabilities.  
 
The present author noted, however, that there are discrepancies between the Protection of 
Civilians of international humanitarian law and the UN’s version of the Protection of 
Civilians. Their vision and scope of protection as well as the temporal limits of protection 
differ greatly. It turned out, moreover, that the UN POC broadens the discretionary powers 
of the United Nations Security Council. Yet, scholars researching the concept of the 
Protection of Civilians, while fully aware of its differing conceptions, continue to take the 
rationale of POC as a given. It is a concept designed to intervene in situations where 
civilians find themselves in danger, they say. This thesis posited that taking the rationale 
as a given obscures the political nature of Protection of Civilians. Therefore, in order not 
to take the protection rationale of UN POC as a given, the present thesis introduced the 
concept of dispositif – an ensemble of protection discourses and practices, knowledge and 
techniques – with a view to examining the workings of the UN POC. More specifically, 
the purpose of this move was to facilitate an analysis of how the UN POC construes the 
problem of violence against civilians, and how it approaches it. What are its techniques 
and rationales? 
 
To further facilitate the probing of this dispositif, the thesis made another move and 
adopted a securitization framework. The framework was modelled on Jef Huysmans’ 
reading of the theory. The novelty of this specific approach is that it widens analytic gaze 
of the theory beyond speech acts into the discourses and practices of government and their 




just from securitization spectacles but also from the security framings of policy 
programmes, for example. The purpose of these conceptual moves was to create a 
framework for producing an analytical narrative that makes sense of how violence against 
civilians has become a matter of international peace and security.  
 
Next, I shall present this analytical narrative by using the key concepts of the thesis in 
order of importance: problematizations, securitization, and protection. 
 
As their headings suggest, Chapters 4 and 5 offer two takes on the problematization of 
violence against civilians – one quasi-historical, the other discursive. The purpose of this 
design was to underscore how the UN POC discourse and the POC policy statement 
emerged to rationalize the nascent practices of protection that the UN had developed in 
the course of its past peace operations. Chapter 4 identified three major problematizations 
that have shaped the UN approach to the protection of civilians. The problematizations of 
violence against civilians, adequate force, and disorder started to emerge from the UN’s 
field experiences already in the 1960s.  
 
Violence against civilians turned into a problem for the UN and its peacekeepers as early 
as 1960. The problem was first conceived in terms of moral indignation and the solutions 
reflected this: peacekeepers took measures to halt imminent and ongoing violence. 
Another feature of this problematization was the nascent concern for proper order; 
violence against civilians and for example the destruction of civilian property and 
infrastructure did not belong to orderly society. Ultimately, however, civilian protection 
in this embryonic form did not go further than the inter-positional tactics and safe zones 
that were designed to provide immediate relief. This began to change during the 1980s, 
however, as the Security Council became increasingly concerned about the violations of 
international humanitarian law. At this point, the problematization of violence against 
civilians became more structural in orientation: the protection of civilians required that 
respect for law is ensured. In the early 1990s, this development resulted in the decision to 
declare humanitarian crises as threats to international peace and security. Since 1999, this 
approach has been visible in numerous peacekeeping mandates that authorize the 
protection of civilians under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The problematization 





The problematization of adequate force began simultaneously with the problematization 
of violence against civilians. In fact, the two are inseparable as the early peacekeepers 
had to work their way around the strict limitations concerning the use of force. These 
limitations led the UN to reconsider its approach to force through the concept of self-
defence. More specifically, peace operations throughout the 1960s and 1970s redefined 
self-defence so that it became to include the use of force for the purpose of defending the 
mission mandate. The redefinition is more permissible than the strict limitation of self-
defence to the defence of one’s person. It considerably broadens the discretion that 
peacekeepers have in executing their tasks. The redefinition of self-defence also paved 
the way for militarized innovations in peace operations. The permissible approach to force 
allowed the UN to establish more forceful operations under the heading “stabilization 
mission”, deploy contingents with offensive capacities, and to introduce armed police 
units to the UN police forces. The innovations stretch the permissible approach to force 
even further and consolidate its underlying logic that implies the necessity of force. 
 
Like the previous two, the problematization of disorder was present in the UN’s work 
from the 1960s onward. The peace operations in the recently decolonized world were 
established to bring order where there conceivably was none. This led the early operations 
in the Congo and New West Guinea to undertake law enforcement as well as executive 
tasks. The UN had entered the domain of policing. But the policing logic of peace 
operations retreated after the 1960s and consequently, policing was reduced to monitoring 
and mentoring the recipient state’s authorities. This changed once again at the turn of the 
1980s and 1990s when the UN deployed a string of peace operations with police 
components. The number of police officers increased, and the status of policing was 
institutionalized within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy.  
 
Consequently, the UN’s interest in order re-emerged, and the police forces would once 
again be involved in the enforcement as well as the (re-)making of order. The desire for 
good order was visible in the concepts such as “democratic policing”, “SMART policing” 
(Support for human rights, Monitoring, Advising, Reporting, and Training)) and “3Rs” 
(Reform, Restructuring, and Rebuilding), which all imply the need for good institutions 
if one is to have orderly society. The problematization of disorder thus resulted in the 
prominence of the police and policing in peace order and led the Organization to 




development reached its zenith with the peace operations deployed to Kosovo and East 
Timor, which effectively became UN protectorates.  
 
The thesis also found that the three problematizations are interdependent. At the root of 
this interdependency is the UN’s concept of the Protection of Civilians; it has incorporated 
the militarization and policing into civilian protection. This is evidenced by the mission 
mandates that in the 2000s have predominantly relied on the permissible approach to the 
use of force. The same approach is present in the POC policy statements and guidelines. 
Moreover, the militarized innovations are also mandated to protect civilians. Policing, on 
the other hand, is manifest in the UN’s approach to the protection of civilians in that it 
builds on the law enforcement as well as order-making aspects of policing. By 
incorporating the militarization and policing aspects of peacekeeping into civilian 
protection, the POC policy is thus a key component in the UN’s rationalization of the 
practices of protection.  
 
The UN POC discourse, too, has a specific way of problematizing violence against 
civilians. As noted, Chapter 4 focused on the historical trajectories that have shaped the 
UN’s approach to the protection of civilians, whereas Chapter 5 turned to the UN POC 
discourse that rationalized the practices of protection that emerged from the years of 
peacekeeping practice. The problematization of violence against civilians inhering in the 
POC discourse relies on two points, one concerning the nature of contemporary armed 
conflicts and the other the nature of insecurities that the civilians face. The nature of 
contemporary armed conflict is crystalized in the “new wars” premise which holds that 
organized crime and large-scale violence against civilians increasingly blend into one 
another. Consequently, armed conflicts become increasingly complex. The insecurities of 
the POC discourse are equally complex. Besides direct, physical violence, the UN POC 
discourse posits, civilians are endangered by a myriad of interdependent insecurities. 
Furthermore, the civilian is not the only endangered referent object in the discourse. 
Instead, the discourse connects violence against civilians with numerous objects from 
states and regional stability to the principle of distinction codified in international 
humanitarian law. Violence against civilians, thus, is a phenomenon that sprawls into 
other walks of life thereby spreading insecurity. 
 
This leads us to the second key concept of the thesis: securitization. How do the UN’s 




is the security rationale in terms of which the discourse and practices frame the 
phenomenon of violence against civilians? The answer lies in the presumed complexity 
of violence against civilians, which introduces the logic of risk into the UN’s security 
rationale. Indeed, the insecurities in the POC discourse are not conceived in terms of 
enmity but in terms of risk. Large-scale violence against civilians is not a matter of 
security simply because it threatens the lives of civilians, but because it has a tendency to 
sprawl into other domains of life and thereby place various other referent objects at risk.   
 
This necessitates countermeasures. These countermeasures, which emerged largely 
during the decades preceding the adoption of the POC concept, function on the basis of 
risk logic. For example, as noted above, the policing logic of peace operations has led the 
UN to engage in state-building. In the context of civilian protection, therefore, the goal 
of state-building is to pre-empt violence against civilians by creating the kind of 
institutions that will not allow, let alone perpetrate, violence against civilians. The security 
rationale of the UN’s Protection of Civilians discourse and practices is thus one of 
complexity and risk. This leads the Organization to adopt a comprehensive conception of 
Protection of Civilians that seeks to nullify the structural reasons for insecurity as well as 
prevent immediate threats to civilians. Consequently, the security rationale of the UN 
Protection of Civilians discourse and practices internationalize matters that previously 
belonged to the domestic realm where the UN was not allowed to intervene. 
 
This is the utility of the securitization theory: it allows the analyst to take into account 
other modalities of securitization than the one that limits security to survival. By 
conceiving the securitization theory in terms of threat–urgency modality, rather than, say, 
survival, it is possible discern how insecurity operates in subtler ways than mere 
declarations of existential danger. This is not to say, of course, that the existential mode 
of securitization has lost its pertinence. Rather, the point is to emphasize that securityness 
may accumulate to the extent that it triggers security measures without ever reaching the 
level of existential danger.   
 
Finally, to protection, the third key concept of which this thesis has tried to make sense. 
As the preceding paragraphs and indeed the preceding analyses in the previous chapters 
make clear, the protection programme envisioned by the United Nations relies on a range 
of measures to protect civilians. Peace operations have diplomatic, coercive and state-




several international organizations and states working in tandem to create, maintain and 
restore protective environments. The organizing principle at the core of the UN Protection 
of Civilians is thus that of reasonable force. It enables the UN to attain compliance at the 
grass roots level as well as at the level of the state. 
 
As is clear by now, the United Nations Protection of Civilians discourse and policy 
programme, on their part, expand the concept of international peace and security into the 
domestic realm. International and domestic security become indistinguishable. 
Consequently, the jurisdiction of the UN is also expanded without ever formally 
renegotiating the rules of the world order. Together the problematizations, practices of 
protection, the security rationale and the principle of reasonable force enable the UN to 
penetrate deep into the vital institutions of statehood and pursue the Organization’s vision 




I would now like to bring the thesis to a closure with an ethical note. In the broadest terms, 
this thesis is based on social constructivist ideas on how the world hangs together. From 
time to time, approaches like this are (mis)interpreted as undermining the value of truth 
with the assertion that our knowledge of the world is artificial. To assert for example that 
the depictions of violence contained in the Secretary-General’s reports are mere figments 
of imagination would be truly distasteful. But this is not the point. The point of studying 
the securitization of violence against civilians is not to deny the reality of violence. 
Neither is it to assert that protection afforded by the United Nations is simply a cynical 
ploy to amass power. Instead, the point is to examine what words and wordings allow. 
This is a question with political implications. To bring this into light is, to paraphrase that 
French historian of systems of thought (1988, p. 155) one last time, to make facile gestures 
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